We investigate whether lenders employ sustainability pricing provisions to manage borrowers’ environmental risk. Using unexpected negative environmental incidents of borrowers as exogenous shocks that reveal information on environmental risk, we find that lenders manage borrowers’ environmental risk by conventional tools such as imposing higher interest rates, utilizing financial and net worth covenants, showing reluctance to refinance, and demanding increased collateral. In contrast, the inclusion of sustainability pricing provisions in loan agreements for high environmental risk borrowers is reduced by 11 percentage points. Our study suggests that sustainability pricing provisions may not primarily serve as risk management tools but rather as instruments to attract demand from institutional investors and facilitate secondary market transactions.

We examine the effect of sovereign credit impairments on the pricing of syndicated loans following rating downgrades in the borrowing firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionately adverse impact on the bounded firms' borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms following their sovereign's rating downgrade. Rating-based regulatory frictions partially explain our results. On the supply-side, loans carry a higher spread when granted from low-capital banks, non-bank lenders, and banks with high market power. We further document an operating demand-side channel, contingent on borrowers' size, financial constraints, and global diversification. Our results can be attributed to the relative bargaining power between lenders and borrowers: relationship borrowers and non-bank dependent borrowers with alternative financing sources are much less affected.

We hypothesize and empirically establish that economic preferences for risk-taking in different subnational regions affect firm financing costs. We study this hypothesis by hand-matching firms' regions worldwide with the corresponding regional economic risk-taking preferences. We first show that higher regional risk-taking is positively associated with several measures of firm risk and investments. Subsequently, our baseline results show that credit and bond pricing increase when risk-taking preferences increase. For the loan of average size and maturity a one-standard-deviation increase in regional risk-taking increases interest expense by $0.54 million USD. We also find that these results are demand (firm)-driven and stronger for firms with more local shareholders.

This study investigates the association between CEO perquisites and bank loan spreads. We collect detailed data on CEO perquisites from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2015 to study this issue. The empirical evidence supports the agency cost view that the lending banks demand significantly higher returns (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with higher CEO perquisites. We further confirm that the effect of these perquisites remains after we control for various corporate governance and agency cost factors. We conclude that banks consider CEO perquisites as a type of agency cost when they make lending decisions.

Career-concerned analysts are averse to firm risk. Not only does higher firm risk require more effort to analyze the firm, thus constraining analysts' ability to earn more remuneration through covering more firms, but it also jeopardizes their research quality and career advancement. As such, career concerns incentivize analysts to pressure firms to undertake risk-management activities, thus leading to a lower cost of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a negative association between analyst career concerns and bank loan spreads. In addition, our mediation analysis suggests that this association is achieved through the channel of reducing firm risk. Additional tests suggest that the effect of analyst career concerns on loan spreads is more pronounced for firms with higher analyst coverage. Our study is the first to identify the demand for risk management as a key channel through which analysts help reduce the cost of debt.

Die Transformation der Planwirtschaften Osteuropas in markwirtschaftliche Systeme, die Integration Ost- und Westeuropas und die deutsche Wiedervereinigung waren recht einmalige politische und gesellschaftliche Prozesse. Es gab keine „Evidenz“ aus früheren Zeiten, an denen sich die handelnden Akteure orientieren konnten. Zeigt dies die Grenzen evidenzbasierter Politik auf? Einer Politik, die Maßnahmen vorab evaluiert, deren Wirkungen beobachtet und aus diesen empirischen Beobachtungen systematisch Schlüsse für zukünftiges politisches Handeln zieht? In einem eng definierten Sinn evidenzbasierter Politik muss die Antwort auf diese Frage sicherlich „Ja“ lauten. Es gibt Grenzen evidenzbasierter Politik in Zeiten großer gesellschaftlicher Umwälzungen und wenn (wirtschafts-)politische Maßnahmen so weit aus dem Rahmen des bisher Bekannten heraustreten, dass Verhaltensmuster der Vergangenheit kaum Rückschlüsse auf zukünftiges Verhalten zulassen. In solchen Phasen sind alle sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen gefordert, politische Prozesse aus einem breiten Fundus an Wissen und Erfahrungen heraus zu begleiten. Empirisch messbare Effekte einzelner Maßnahmen sind in solchen Umbruchzeiten nicht verfügbar. So verstanden könnten Überlegungen zur Rolle evidenzbasierter Politik generell und speziell zur Frage, wie Finanzmärkte zur Transformation von wirtschaftlichen Systemen beitragen, schnell enden.

One explanation for the emergence of the housing market bubble and the subprime crisis is that increases in individuals’ income led to higher increases in the amount of mortgage loans demanded, especially for the middle class. This hypothesis translates to an increase in the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand before 2007. Using applicant‐level data, we test this hypothesis and find that the income elasticity of mortgage loan demand in fact declines in the years before 2007, especially for the mid‐ and lower‐middle income groups. Our finding implies that increases in house prices were not matched by increases in loan applicants’ income.