Regional economic conditions are well-established determinants of the geography of political resentment. However, regions are not homogeneous, and the mechanisms through which local economies affect individual political attitudes are unclear. We argue that feelings of relative deprivation are shaped by how personal prospects are tied to regional conditions, and that the interaction between subjective individual and regional deprivation affects perceptions of shared struggle and systemic unfairness. Through a large-scale survey experiment in Britain addressing geographical self-selection, we provide causal evidence that poor individuals in poor regions express political resentment, whereas in affluent regions the political attitudes of poor and wealthy individuals are indistinguishable. Our findings stress 1) the importance of egocentric mechanisms whereby local economies shape individual prospects; 2) the significance of subjective beliefs over objective information on deprivation; 3) the mobilization potential of highlighting regional deprivation by political entrepreneurs; 4) the relevance of place-based policies to mitigate political discontent.

We examine how connections to German federal parliamentarians influence firm dynamics using a novel dataset linking politicians and election candidates to the universe of firms. To identify the causal effects of political access, we exploit (i) new appointments to the company leadership team and (ii) discontinuities around the marginal seat of party election lists. Results reveal that political connections reduce firm exits and gradually increase employment growth, with heterogeneous productivity effects depending on the political mandate. Incorporating data on credit ratings, subsidies, and procurement contracts allows us to identify the mechanisms driving the effects over the politician’s career.

We study the implications of forging stronger political ties with the US on the sensitivities of stock returns around the world to a global common factor – the global financial cycle. Using voting patterns at the United Nations as a measure of political ties with the US along with various measures of the global financial cycle, we document evidence indicating that stronger political ties with the US amplify the sensitivities of stock returns in developing countries to the global financial cycle. We explore several channels and find that a deepening of financial linkages along with a reduction in information asymmetries and an amplification of sentiment are potentially important factors behind this result.

In accordance with its statutes, the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) pursues an intensive bilateral knowledge transfer on the basis of excellent scientific research with its partners in the non-academic community. In so doing, the IWH contributes to better informed decision making on a societal level. The overarching goal is to foster mutually beneficial exchanges that involve the provision of evidence-based knowledge to society (transfer from the academic to the non-academic community) and the integration of questions of public interest into its research agenda (transfer from the non-academic to the academic community).

We examine the effect of political ties with the US on sovereign yields and ratings at various horizons. We find beneficial effects across both short- and long-term yields and ratings. Specifically, we find that stronger political ties with the US affect mainly the level of the yield curve of foreign sovereign bonds. These results imply that the market perceives political ties with the US as having both near- and long-term beneficial consequences.

Does investors’ political ideology shape international capital allocation? We provide evidence from two settings—syndicated corporate loans and equity mutual funds—to show ideological alignment with foreign governments affects the cross-border capital allocation by U.S. institutional investors. Ideological alignment on both economic and social issues plays a role. Our empirical strategy ensures direct economic effects of foreign elections or government ties between countries are not driving the result. Ideological distance between countries also explains variation in bilateral investment. Combined, our findings imply ideological alignment is an important, omitted factor in models of international capital allocation.

This paper examines whether state-to-state political ties help firms obtain better terms when raising funds in global capital markets. Focusing on the Yankee bonds market, we find that issuances by firms from countries with close political ties with the US feature lower yield spreads, higher issuance amounts, and longer maturities. Such an association is more pronounced for firms located in low income and highly indebted countries as well as firms in government-related industries, first-time issuers, and relatively smaller firms. Our study provides evidence supporting the notion that country-level political relationship is an important factor when raising capital in international markets.

This paper investigates whether state-to-state political ties with the United States affect the pricing of global syndicated loans. We find that a one-standard-deviation improvement in state political ties between the U.S. and the government of a borrower’s home country is associated with a 14.7 basis points lower loan spread, shaving off about 11.8 million USD in interest payments over the duration of the average loan for borrowers. Results also show that the effect of political ties is stronger for narrower and more concentrated loan syndicates, when lead arrangers are U.S. banks, during periods in which the U.S. is engaged in armed conflicts, when the U.S. president belongs to the Republican Party, and for borrowers with better balance sheets and prior lending relationships. Notably, not all firms benefit equally, as cross-listed firms and firms in countries with strong institutional quality and ability to attract institutional investors are much less affected by political ties.

Do stronger political ties with a global superpower improve sovereign borrowing conditions? We use data on voting at the United Nations General Assembly along with foreign aid flows to construct an index of political ties and find evidence that suggests stronger political ties with the US is associated with both better sovereign credit ratings and lower yields on sovereign bonds especially among lower income countries. We use official heads-of-state visits to the White House and coalition forces troop contributions as additional measures of the strength of political ties to further reinforce our findings.