We find that a firm’s stock price drops when its compensation peer firm announces a severe say-on-pay voting failure. This price drop causes a reduction in the focal firm CEO’s pay in the following period. The effect on CEO pay is stronger when the board of directors is more powerful, when the proxy advisor holds a negative view of the CEO’s pay, and when the hired compensation consultant is less reputable. Directors who cut their CEO’s pay following the price drop receive more voting support from investors than other directors. Our findings show that the peer firm’s voting failure induces a market-feedback effect for focal firm directors.

We show an equivalence result in the standard representative agent New Keynesian model after demand, wage markup and correlated price markup and TFP shocks: assuming sticky prices and flexible wages yields identical allocations for GDP, consumption, labor, inflation and interest rates to the opposite case- flexible prices and sticky wages. This equivalence result arises if the price and wage Phillips curves' slopes are identical and generalizes to any pair of price and wage Phillips curve slopes such that their sum and product are identical. Nevertheless, the cyclical implications for profits and wages are substantially different. We discuss how the equivalence breaks when these factor-distributional implications matter for aggregate allocations, e.g. in New Keynesian models with heterogeneous agents, endogenous firm entry, and non-constant returns to scale in production. Lastly, we point to an econometric identification problem raised by our equivalence result and discuss possible solutions thereof.

Does information leakage in a target's social networks increase its stock price prior to a merger announcement? Evidence reveals that a target with more social connections indeed experiences a higher pre-announcement price run-up. This effect does not exist during or after the merger announcement, or in windows ending two months before the announcement. It is more pronounced among targets with severe asymmetric information, and weaker when the information about the upcoming merger is publicly available prior to the announcement. It is also weaker in expedited deals such as tender offers.

This paper investigates the relationship between heterogeneity in sectoral price stickiness and the response of the economy to aggregate real shocks. We show that sectoral heterogeneity reduces inflation persistence for a constant average duration of price spells, and that inflation persistence can fall despite duration increases associated with increases in heterogeneity. We also find that sectoral heterogeneity reduces the persistence and volatility of interest rate and output gap for a constant price spells duration, while the qualitative impact on inflation volatility tends to be positive. A relevant policy implication is that neglecting price stickiness heterogeneity can impair the economic dynamics assessment.

Accurate macroeconomic forecasts are essential for effective policy decisions, yet their precision depends on the accuracy of the underlying assumptions. This paper examines the extent to which assumption errors affect forecast accuracy, introducing the average squared assumption error (ASAE) as a valid instrument to address endogeneity. Using double/debiased machine learning (DML) techniques and partial linear instrumental variable (PLIV) models, we analyze GDP growth forecasts for Germany, conditioning on key exogenous variables such as oil price, exchange rate, and world trade. We find that traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques systematically underestimate the influence of assumption errors, particularly with respect to world trade, while DML effectively mitigates endogeneity, reduces multicollinearity, and captures nonlinearities in the data. However, the effect of oil price assumption errors on GDP forecast errors remains ambiguous. These results underscore the importance of advanced econometric tools to improve the evaluation of macroeconomic forecasts.

We study the corporate-loan pricing decisions of a major, systemic bank during the Greek financial crisis. A unique aspect of our data set is that we observe both the actual interest rate and the “break-even rate” (BE rate) of each loan, as computed by the bank’s own loan-pricing department (in effect, the loan’s marginal cost). We document that low-BE-rate (safer) borrowers are charged significant markups, whereas high-BE-rate (riskier) borrowers are charged smaller and even negative markups. We rationalize this de facto cross-subsidization through the lens of a dynamic model featuring depressed collateral values, impaired capital-market access, and limit pricing.

Zur Erinnerung: Nach Jahren von Inflationsraten nahe null war die Inflationsrate in Deutschland 2022 nach der Corona-Pandemie und dem Überfall Russlands auf die Ukraine auf knapp 7% gestiegen, ähnlich hoch wie zur Energiekrise 1973/74. Die Gründe dafür sind bekannt: expansive Geld- und Finanzpolitik sowie steigende Energiepreise und Nachholeffekte beim Konsum, verbunden mit Lieferkettenproblemen gerade im Handel mit China. Seitdem haben Zentralbanken wie die EZB eine weiche Landung hingelegt. Ohne große Verluste beim Wachstum (zumindest global gesehen) wurde die Inflationsrate auf 1,6% im September 2024 gedrückt. Ein großer Erfolg?

We analyze how creditor rights affect the nonsynchronicity of global corporate credit default swap spreads (CDS-NS). CDS-NS is negatively related to the country-level creditor-control rights, especially to the “restrictions on reorganization” component, where creditor-shareholder conflicts are high. The effect is concentrated in firms with high investment intensity, asset growth, information opacity, and risk. Pro-creditor bankruptcy reforms led to a decline in CDS-NS, indicating lower firm-specific idiosyncratic information being priced in credit markets. A strategic-disclosure incentive among debtors avoiding creditor intervention seems more dominant than the disciplining effect, suggesting how strengthening creditor rights affects power rebalancing between creditors and shareholders.