This study examines why people engage in unethical pro-organizational behavior (UPB) by focusing on an overlooked mechanism: the mere fact of being a subordinate at the workplace. To establish a causal relationship, we conducted an online experiment with 615 full-time employees. We primed participants with private versus work-related contexts before instructing them to follow a rule that was beneficial for the organization but potentially unethical. We find that individuals high in power distance orientation engage to a greater extent in UPB after being primed on their work-related identity. Our results further emphasize that empowering leadership can mitigate this effect: For participants high in power distance, empowering messages eliminated the priming effect; their UPB levels matched those in the private control group. Thus, our study makes three key contributions: First, we add to the discussion of UPB antecedents. Second, we identify organizations that may be particularly vulnerable. Third, we point to strategies that could reduce UPB.

Do economic incentives govern information diffusion in markets? Using international banks’ advisory activities in corporate takeovers as their source of private information, we show in supervisory data that banks with closer ties to the target, but not the acquirer, advisor trade profitably in the target’s stock prior to the deal announcement. This trading behavior is associated with a higher premium paid by the acquirer without compromising the deal success. As the incentives of informed traders are aligned only with those of the target shareholders, which are represented by the target advisor, our evidence suggests strategic information transmission among these banks.

This paper examines how political networks influence insider trading in China. Using biographical data to construct chairman–politician social networks, we find that firms with stronger political networks engage in significantly less insider trading. The effect is stronger for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and for long-standing or high-ranking connections. The muted trading persists during periods when insiders possess valuable private information, including prior to M&A announcements and major policy events. The evidence suggests that personal political networks function as informal governance mechanisms that discipline managerial opportunism when formal governance through state ownership is absent.