It is widely believed that female students perform better when taught by female professors. However, little is known about the mechanisms explaining these gender match effects. Using administrative records from a German public university, which cover all programs and courses between 2006 and 2018, we show that gender match effects are sizable in smaller classes, but are absent in larger classes. These results suggest that direct and frequent interactions between students and professors are crucial for gender match effects to emerge. In contrast, the mere fact that one’s professor is female is not sufficient to increase performance of female students.

This paper provides new causal evidence on how patent allowances affect firms and their employees based on quasi-random assignment of patent applications to examiners. Exploiting employer-employee records with newly linked German firm data and web-scraped patent documents, we show that patent-induced shocks reduce firm exit, improve productivity, and increase wages, with rent-sharing elasticities between 0.10 and 0.21. Wage gains are broadly observed across occupational tasks, with high heterogeneity: managers benefit disproportionately in publicly traded firms, whereas broader wage increases accrue to workers in non-traded firms. Our findings highlight the role of institutional features and firm organization in shaping how rents are shared.

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.

This paper examines how initial public offerings (IPOs) affect firms' internal organization. We find that IPO firms become more hierarchical and standardized organizations, characterized by additional layers, more managers, smaller control spans, and larger administrative functions. These changes occur mostly in preparation for the IPO and can be only partially explained by growth. IPO firms with greater human capital risk experience larger hierarchical changes. Hierarchical changes help firms standardize employee roles and formalize internal processes. Our results suggest that firms reorganize to reduce their dependence on key individuals' human capital when transitioning to public markets.

*** Reale Netto-Tariflohnverluste 2026/2027 im Öffentlichen Dienst der Länder *** Die Tarifvertragsparteien des öffentlichen Dienstes der Länder haben sich am Wochenende auf einen neuen Tarifabschluss geeinigt. Für die ersten fünf Monate wurde eine „Nullrunde“ vereinbart. Die erste Tariflohnerhöhung von 2,8%, mindestens jedoch 100 Euro pro Monat, erfolgt ab April 2026. Elf Monate später, im März 2027, folgt die nächste Anhebung um 2,0%. Zum Ende der vereinbarten Laufzeit im Januar 2028 werden die regulären Tabellenentgelte nochmals um 1,0% erhöht. Die Tariflohnzuwächse dürften damit leicht über den erwarteten Preissteigerungen liegen. Die derzeit absehbaren zusätzlichen Belastungen durch weiter steigende Sozialabgaben und höhere Lohnsteuern können dadurch jedoch nicht vollständig ausgeglichen werden.

Der Beitrag untersucht die mittelfristige Entwicklung der deutschen Wirtschaft und der öffentlichen Finanzen vor dem Hintergrund der seit 2025 geltenden neuen EU-Fiskalregeln und der jüngsten Lockerung der nationalen Schuldenbremse. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Frage, ob und unter welchen Bedingungen Deutschland die europäischen Vorgaben zu Defizit, Schuldenstand und Nettoprimärausgaben einhalten kann.

The effects of private equity buyouts on employment, productivity, and job reallocation vary tremendously with macroeconomic and credit conditions, across private equity groups, and by type of buyout. We reach this conclusion by examining the most extensive database of U.S. buyouts ever compiled, encompassing thousands of buyout targets from 1980 to 2013 and millions of control firms. Employment shrinks 12% over two years after buyouts of publicly listed firms—on average, and relative to control firms—but expands 15% after buyouts of privately held firms. Postbuyout productivity gains at target firms are large on average and much larger yet for deals executed amid tight credit conditions. A postbuyout tightening of credit conditions or slowing of gross domestic product growth curtails employment growth and intrafirm job reallocation at target firms. We also show that buyout effects differ across the private equity groups that sponsor buyouts, and these differences persist over time at the group level. Rapid upscaling in deal flow at the group level brings lower employment growth at target firms. We relate these findings to theories of private equity that highlight agency problems at portfolio firms and within the private equity industry itself.

Schriftliche Anhörung des Finanzausschusses des Landtags Mecklenburg-Vorpommern

Welche Wachstumsimpulse können zusätzliche, kreditfinanzierte Finanzmittel für Infrastruktur, Klimaneutralität und Verteidigung in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern setzen? Im Rahmen einer schriftlichen Anhörung des Finanzausschusses des Landtages Mecklenburg-Vorpommern beantwortet das IWH Fragen zur Verwendung der Finanzmittel und zur möglichen Wirkung von zusätzlichen Investitionen auf das Produktionspotenzial und das Wirtschaftswachstum in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Angesichts der demographischen Entwicklung ist die Arbeitsproduktivität der Schlüssel zur Verbesserung der Wachstumsaussichten des Landes.