This paper studies the interaction between fiscal policy and bondholders against the backdrop of high sovereign debt levels. For our analysis, we investigate the case of Italy, a country that has dealt with high public debt levels for a long time, using a Bayesian structural VAR model. We extend a canonical three variable macro mode to include a bond market, consisting of a fiscal rule and a bond demand schedule for long-term government bonds. To identify the model in the presence of political uncertainty and forward-looking investors, we derive an external instrument for bond demand shocks from a novel news ticker data set. Our main results are threefold. First, the interaction between fiscal policy and bondholders’ expectations is critical for the evolution of prices. Fiscal policy reinforces contractionary monetary policy through sustained increases in primary surpluses and investors provide incentives for “passive” fiscal policy. Second, investors’ expectations matter for inflation, and we document a Fisherian response of inflation across all maturities in response to a bond demand shock. Third, domestic politics is critical in the determination of bondholders’ expectations and an increase in the perceived riskiness of sovereign debt increases inflation and thus complicates the task of controlling price growth.

Die wirtschaftliche Aktivität und das Ausfallrisiko staatlicher Schulden beeinflussen sich gegenseitig. Sinkt die wirtschaftliche Aktivität einer Volkswirtschaft, steigt wegen fallender Steuereinnahmen das Risiko, dass der Staat Zinszahlungen und Tilgungen auf Staatsanleihen nicht zurückzahlen kann. Umgekehrt kann das staatliche Ausfallrisiko seinerseits die wirtschaftliche Aktivität beeinflussen. Steigt das Ausfallrisiko, geraten Banken unter Druck, die Staatsanleihen in ihren Bilanzen führen, und reduzieren die Kreditvergabe an Unternehmen. In der Konsequenz sinkt die wirtschaftliche Aktivität. Dieser Beitrag nutzt hochfrequente News-Ticker-Daten zur Ableitung politischer Ereignisse und davon ausgelöster Fluktuationen im Staatsschuldenrisiko. Diese allein politisch bedingten Fluktuationen ermöglichen es, den Effekt des Staatsschuldenrisikos auf die wirtschaftliche Aktivität zu messen, ohne dass die Schätzung von der gegenläufigen Beziehung der Variablen beeinträchtigt wird. Das Vorgehen wird am Beispiel Italiens erläutert.

The economy is a complex system because market participants do not act independently but adjust their behavior to other agents and to the outcome which emerges from their joint actions (Arthur, 2014). Dependencies among participants can impede policy makers capabilities to influence or steer the course of the economy. Kambhu et al. (2007) argue that to influence developments in financial markets, for instance to prevent crises from spreading, there are only “coarse or indirect options” available for policy makers. Similar to crises which propagate through a complex system, interventions might result in unintended side effects which can also disseminate through the system. Thus, in a complex system, unintended consequences of policy efforts may well be the rule. Policy makers try to ward off or mitigate negative consequences for the economy and society during periods of crisis. For instance, during the Covid crisis large scale support programs for firms in Western economies were set up to avoid bankruptcies. Similarly, during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) set up large scale asset purchase programs as well as additionally longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) which provided immediate support to financial market participants’ liquidity positions and thereby prevented a melt-down of the financial system. During these periods, immediate and abundant liquidity supply is of utmost importance. Meanwhile, crisis measures, due to their massive scale and non-specific target group, may entail unknown or unintended side effects for instance on competition among market participants, firms’ investment behavior, or changes in lending strategies and risk taking behavior of banks. Likewise, new regulatory frameworks such as the introduction of new markets can have consequences previously not thought of. For policy makers it is important to know direct effects of policy interventions but also to be aware of the possibility and impact of indirect or unexpected side effects in order to evaluate measures taken and to learn for future design of regulation or intervention.