We find that a firm’s stock price drops when its compensation peer firm announces a severe say-on-pay voting failure. This price drop causes a reduction in the focal firm CEO’s pay in the following period. The effect on CEO pay is stronger when the board of directors is more powerful, when the proxy advisor holds a negative view of the CEO’s pay, and when the hired compensation consultant is less reputable. Directors who cut their CEO’s pay following the price drop receive more voting support from investors than other directors. Our findings show that the peer firm’s voting failure induces a market-feedback effect for focal firm directors.

Does information leakage in a target's social networks increase its stock price prior to a merger announcement? Evidence reveals that a target with more social connections indeed experiences a higher pre-announcement price run-up. This effect does not exist during or after the merger announcement, or in windows ending two months before the announcement. It is more pronounced among targets with severe asymmetric information, and weaker when the information about the upcoming merger is publicly available prior to the announcement. It is also weaker in expedited deals such as tender offers.

Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm’s CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms’ performance.

We study the corporate-loan pricing decisions of a major, systemic bank during the Greek financial crisis. A unique aspect of our data set is that we observe both the actual interest rate and the “break-even rate” (BE rate) of each loan, as computed by the bank’s own loan-pricing department (in effect, the loan’s marginal cost). We document that low-BE-rate (safer) borrowers are charged significant markups, whereas high-BE-rate (riskier) borrowers are charged smaller and even negative markups. We rationalize this de facto cross-subsidization through the lens of a dynamic model featuring depressed collateral values, impaired capital-market access, and limit pricing.

We study whether and how EU banks comply with tighter macroprudential policy (MPP). Observing contractual details for more than one million securitized loans, we document an elusive risk-shifting response by EU banks in reaction to tighter loan-to-value (LTV) restrictions between 2009 and 2022. Our staggered difference-in-differences reveals that banks respond to these MPP measures at the portfolio level by issuing new loans after LTV shocks that are smaller, have shorter maturities, and show a higher collateral valuation while holding constant interest rates. Instead of contracting aggregate lending as intended by tighter MPP, banks increase the number and total volume of newly issued loans. Importantly, new loans finance especially properties in less liquid markets identified by a new European Real Estate Index (EREI), which we interpret as a novel, elusive form of risk-shifting.

This paper investigates the impact of manager-investor interaction quality on stock returns by utilizing an online IPO roadshow dataset and leveraging a word-embedding model. We find that such interactions are positively valued, as reflected in initial returns. The effect is particularly pronounced for firms characterized by higher levels of information asymmetry, greater investor attention, increased question uncertainty, or discussions on topics not covered in prospectus. Additionally, our research reveals that effective management communication leads to increased first-day turnover rates and thus higher returns. These heightened returns persist up to 180 days following the IPO, without displaying a significant long-term reversal associated with interaction quality. These findings underscore the meaningful impact of the quality of manager-investor interactions on firm valuation.