This paper examines the macroeconomic and distributional effects of the European Union’s transition to Net Zero emissions through a gradually increasing carbon tax. I develop a New Keynesian Environmental DSGE model with two household types and distinct energy and non-energy sectors. Five alternative uses of carbon tax revenues are considered: equal transfers to households, targeted transfers to Hand-to-Mouth households, subsidies to green energy firms, and reductions in labor and capital income taxes. In the absence of technological progress, the carbon tax policy induces a persistent increase in energy prices and a reduction in GDP, investment, and consumption. Headline inflation falls below zero in the medium run, reflecting weaker aggregate demand. Distributional outcomes vary significantly depending on the implemented revenue recycling scheme: targeted transfers are the most progressive but entail larger macroeconomic costs, while subsidies and tax cuts mitigate output and investment losses but are less effective in narrowing the consumption gap. A limited foresight scenario, in which agents learn about policy targets sequentially, generates more volatile adjustment paths and temporary inflationary spikes around announcements, but long-run outcomes remain close to the baseline.

Climate policy design must balance emissions mitigation with concerns for fairness, particularly as climate change disproportionately affects the poorest households within and across countries. Integrated Assessment Models used for global climate policy evaluation have so far typically not considered inequality effects within countries. To fill this gap, we develop a global Integrated Assessment Model representing national economies and subnational income, mitigation cost, and climate damage distribution and assess a range of climate policy schemes with varying levels of effort sharing across countries and households. The schemes are consistent with limiting temperature increases to 2 °C and account for the possibility to use carbon tax revenues to address distributional effects within and between countries. We find that carbon taxation with redistribution improves global welfare and reduces inequality, with the most substantial gains achieved under uniform taxation paired with global per capita transfers. A Loss and Damage mechanism offers significant welfare improvements in vulnerable countries while requiring only a modest share of global carbon revenues in the medium term. The poorest households within all countries may benefit from the transfer scheme, in particular when some redistribution is made at the country level. Our findings underscore the potential for climate policy to advance both environmental and social goals, provided revenue recycling mechanisms are effectively implemented. In particular, they demonstrate the feasibility of a welfare improving global climate policy involving limited international redistribution.

We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect of house price changes on mortgage credit supply. Based on approximately 33 million real estate online listings, we construct a quarterly hedonic house price index (HPI) between 2008:q1 and 2017:q4, which we instrument with state-specific RETT changes to isolate the effect on mortgage credit supply by all local German banks. First, a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces HPI by 1.2%. This effect is driven by listings in rural regions. Second, a 1% contraction of HPI induced by an increase in the RETT leads to a 1.4% decline in mortgage lending. This transmission of fiscal policy to mortgage credit supply is effective across almost the entire bank capitalization distribution.

Deutschland befindet sich schon im zweiten Jahr in einer Rezession, und Wachstum ist laut den Prognosen der Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitute auch 2025 kaum zu erwarten. Viel schlimmer ist allerdings, dass neue Prognosen des langfristigen Wachstums im Gleichgewicht (das so genannte Produktionspotenzial) dramatisch niedrigere Wachstumsraten für die nächsten 20 Jahre vorhersagen, wenn sich die Wirtschaftspolitik nicht deutlich ändert. Eine wesentliche Ursache für die Wachstumsschwäche ist die Investitionsschwäche. Um diese anzugehen, reicht das beschlossene Sondervermögen für Infrastruktur nicht aus. Die neue Bundesregierung muss die Bürokratie abbauen und Planungsverfahren verkürzen, eine rationale Klima- und Energiepolitik verfolgen, das Rentensystem mutig in Richtung Kapitaldeckungsverfahren umbauen und eine Einkommensteuerreform auf den Weg bringen, die mittlere Einkommen entlastet.

We study the effects of Tax Authority (IRS) attention on a firm’s financial reporting. We explore whether firms institute a higher degree of accounting conservatism in response to IRS monitoring. Using data on IRS acquisition of public firms’ 10-K financial disclosures to proxy for IRS attention, we find that when firms are under IRS attention, they tend to initiate higher levels of unconditional and, to some extent, conditional accounting conservatism. We alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns by using pre- and post-IRS attention environments between the treated group (firms with IRS attention) and a propensity score that matches the control group of firms (no IRS attention). These results withstand several robustness tests and subsample analyses.

This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.

Am 12. November 2024 hörte das Bundesverfassungsgericht Argumente zu einer Klage einiger FDP-Abgeordneter gegen den Solidaritätszuschlag. IWH-Präsident Reint Gropp war als Sachverständiger geladen und gibt in diesem Beitrag seine Einschätzung zur Thematik wieder.