This article shows that when a compensation peer firm experiences a significant failure in its say-on-pay (SOP) voting, the focal firm’s stock price is adversely affected, resulting in reduced CEO pay in the subsequent period. This pay-reduction effect is amplified when the board is more powerful, when proxy advisors express concerns about CEO pay, and when the compensation consultant lacks quality. Directors who react to the price drop and cut the CEO’s pay receive higher votes in future director elections, implying a market feedback effect for directors of the focal firm triggered by their peers’ SOP voting failure.

This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.

How durable are the political accountability effects of the worst pandemic in a century? We track the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on political preferences through its “high” and “low” phases in the Czech Republic. Uniquely, we ask about the effects of both the health and the economic costs of the pandemic measured at both personal and municipality levels. Consistent with the literature, we estimate effects suggestive of political accountability of leaders during “high” pandemic phases without higher support for non-democratic alternatives. However, we also find that the pandemic political accountability effects are mostly short-lived, and do not extend to the first post-pandemic elections.

There is growing evidence on the role of economic conditions in the recent successes of populist and extremist parties. However, little is known about the role of over-indebtedness, even though debtor distress has grown in Europe following the financial crisis. We study the unique case of the Czech Republic, where by 2017, nearly one in ten citizens had been served at least one debtor distress warrant even though the country consistently features low unemployment. Our municipality-level difference-in-differences analysis asks about the voting consequences of a rise in debtor distress following a 2001 deregulation of consumer-debt collection. We find that debtor distress has a positive effect on support for (new) extreme right and populist parties, but a negative effect on a (traditional) extreme-left party. The effects of debtor distress we uncover are robust to whether and how we control for economic hardship; the effects of debtor distress and economic hardship are of similar magnitude, but operate in opposing directions across the political spectrum.

Lowering carbon intensity in manufacturing is necessary to transform current production technologies. We test if local agents’ preferences, revealed by vote shares for the Green party during local elections in Germany, relate to the carbon intensity of investments in production technologies. Our sample comprises all investment choices made by manufacturing establishments from 2005-2017. Our results suggest that ecological preferences correlate with significantly fewer carbon-intensive investment projects while investments stimulating growth and reducing carbon emissions increase by 14 percentage points. Both results are more distinct in federal states where the Green Party enjoys political power and local ecological preferences are high.

Wir untersuchen die kurz- und langfristigen Auswirkungen eines starken Anstiegs chinesischer Importe auf Wahlergebnisse in Europa. Populistische sowie links- und rechtsextreme Parteien gewannen erst viele Jahre nach dem Höhepunkt des China-Schocks bedeutenden Zuwachs an Wählerstimmen. Wir zeigen, dass die Auswirkungen von Importschocks überwiegend zugunsten populistischer Parteien ausfallen. In geringerem Maße profitieren in der kurzen Frist zudem linksextreme Parteien, langfristig hingegen rechtsextreme Parteien. Die Effekte auf das Wahlverhalten sind jedoch moderat und wir schlussfolgern, dass Importschocks den Aufstieg der politischen Ränder nur in begrenztem Maße erklären können.

We investigate public preferences for equity-enhancing policies in access to early child care, using a survey experiment with a representative sample of the German population (n ≈ 4, 800). We observe strong misperceptions about migrant-native inequalities in early child care that vary by respondents’ age and right-wing voting preferences. Randomly providing information about the actual extent of inequalities has a nuanced impact on the support for equity-enhancing policy reforms: it increases support for respondents who initially underestimated these inequalities, and tends to decrease support for those who initially overestimated them. This asymmetric effect leads to a more consensual policy view, substantially decreasing the polarization in policy support between under- and overestimators. Our results suggest that correcting misperceptions can align public policy preferences, potentially leading to less polarized debates about how to address inequalities and discrimination.

We provide first evidence for the long-run causal impact that Chinese imports to European regions had on voting outcomes and revisit earlier estimates of the short-run impact for a methodological reason. The fringes of the political spectrum gained ground many years after the China shock plateaued and, unlike an earlier study by Colantone and Stanig (2018b), we do not find any robust evidence for a short-run effect on far-right votes. Instead, far-left and populist parties gained in the short run. We identify persistent long-run effects of import shocks on voting. These effects are biased towards populism and, to a lesser extent, to the far-right.