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Dennis Hutschenreiter, Ph.D.

Dennis Hutschenreiter, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 1/26

Leiter der Forschungsgruppe Governance und Finanzierung

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 6/22

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Finanzmärkte

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte
  • Finanzmärkte und Realwirtschaft
  • Technologie- und Innovationspolitik
  • Unternehmensführung

Dennis Hutschenreiter ist seit Juni 2022 wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter in der Abteilung Finanzmärkte. Er beschäftigt sich mit den Zusammenhängen von Finanzmärkten und der Realwirtschaft. Insbesondere untersucht er den Einfluss institutioneller Investoren auf Innovationsprozesse, Technologiemärkte und das strategische Verhalten von Unternehmen.

Dennis Hutschenreiter hat an der Universität zu Köln studiert und an der Autonomen Universität Barcelona und der Barcelona School of Economics promoviert.

Ihr Kontakt

Dennis Hutschenreiter, Ph.D.
Dennis Hutschenreiter, Ph.D.
- Abteilung Finanzmärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-839

Publikationen

Zitationen
18

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Institutional Blockholders and Corporate Innovation

Bing Guo Dennis Hutschenreiter David Pérez-Castrillo Anna Toldrà-Simats

in: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 100 (July), 2026

Abstract

The previous literature finds a positive effect of institutional (relative to other investors’) ownership on firms’ innovation output . We study the impact of increases in the concentration of institutional investors’ ownership on firms’ decisions to invest in innovation and their innovation output. By reducing short-term earnings pressure, concentrated institutional investors’ ownership increases managers’ incentives to invest in R&D. However, it decreases firms’ acquisitions of external innovation due to empire-building and dilution concerns. Overall, firms’ future patents and citations decrease. Our results indicate that the previously found positive effect of institutional investors on innovation declines as the ownership of these investors becomes more concentrated. Despite that, we find that blockholder institutional ownership increases firm value. Hence, large institutional investors take measures to preserve the value of their ownership interests, even if they result in reduced innovation.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Common Ownership and CEO Social Ties Across Portfolio Firms

Dennis Hutschenreiter Qianshuo Liu

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 9, 2026

Abstract

This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.

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Common Ownership, Tacit Know-How, and the Market for Technology

Dennis Hutschenreiter

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 3, 2026

Abstract

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.

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From Rivals to Allies? CEO Connections in an Era of Common Ownership

Dennis Hutschenreiter Qianshuo Liu

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 7, 2025

Abstract

Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm’s CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms’ performance.

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