Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association
University of Bonn
in: Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming
Do economic incentives govern information diffusion in markets? Using international banks’ advisory activities in corporate takeovers as their source of private information, we show in supervisory data that banks with closer ties to the target, but not the acquirer, advisor trade profitably in the target’s stock prior to the deal announcement. This trading behavior is associated with a higher premium paid by the acquirer without compromising the deal success. As the incentives of informed traders are aligned only with those of the target shareholders, which are represented by the target advisor, our evidence suggests strategic information transmission among these banks.
in: Review of Finance, forthcoming
We study the interaction of expansionary rate-based monetary policy and quantitative easing, despite their concurrent implementation, by exploiting heterogeneous banks and the introduction of negative monetary-policy rates in a fragmented euro area. Quantitative easing increases credit supply less, translating into weaker employment growth, when banks’ funding costs do not decrease. Using administrative data from Germany, we uncover that among banks selling their securities, central-bank reserves remain disproportionately with high-deposit banks that are constrained due to sticky customer deposits at the zero lower bound. Affected German banks lend relatively less to firms while increasing their interbank exposure in the euro area.
in: European Economic Review, Vol. 161 (1), 2024
Externalities and social preferences, such as altruism, play a key role in the choice of social interactions, which in turn affect the diffusion of a pandemic. We build a dynamic epidemiological model with endogenous social interactions in a frictional environment, also in a variant with heterogeneous agents and a network structure. Taking into account agents’ endogenous behavior and altruism generates markedly different predictions relative to a naïve epidemiological model with exogenous contact rates. Congestion and commitment inefficiencies arise, even under full altruism, and call for policy intervention. We derive the efficient allocation, and show how the Ramsey planner can mitigate the respective externalities.
in: CEPR Discussion Papers, forthcoming
When monetary policy is constrained, how large a scal transfer substitutes for a given interest rate cut? Using full-population Danish administrative data, we estimate household consumption responses to adjustable-rate mortgage resets and to unanticipated cash inheritances. A 1 percentage point rate cut maps to uniform transfers of approximately $1,000 per person over 5 years, totaling 1.3% of GDP. These macro-equivalent policies operate through distinct balance-sheet channels with dierent distributional incidence: rate cuts disproportionately stimulate high-income mortgage holders, while transfers are progressive. Marginal propensities to consume vary only modestly across income and liquid-wealth distributions, limiting eciency gains from targeting.
