Professor Shuo Xia, PhD

Professor Shuo Xia, PhD
Current Position

since 4/19

Assistant Professor of Economics, esp. Financial Economics

Leipzig University

since 1/19

Head of the Research Group Matching and Incentives in Financial Markets

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association

since 9/18

Economist in the Department of Financial Markets

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association

Research Interests

  • corporate governance
  • corporate finance

Shuo Xia is Assistant Professor of Economics at Leipzig University since April 2019 and a member of the Department of Financial Markets since September 2018. His research focuses on corporate finance and corporate governance.

Shuo Xia earned his bachelor's degree from Beijing University of Technology and a master's degree from University of Essex and VU Amsterdam. He received his PhD from Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Your contact

Professor Shuo Xia, PhD
Professor Shuo Xia, PhD
Mitglied - Department Financial Markets
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Publications

Working Papers

Lame-Duck CEOs

Marc Gabarro Sebastian Gryglewicz Shuo Xia

in: SSRN Working Papers, 2018

Abstract

We examine the relationship between protracted CEO successions and stock returns. In protracted successions, an incumbent CEO announces his or her resignation without a known successor, so the incumbent CEO becomes a “lame duck.” We find that 31% of CEO successions from 2005 to 2014 in the S&P 1500 are protracted, during which the incumbent CEO is a lame duck for an average period of about 6 months. During the reign of lame duck CEOs, firms generate an annual four-factor alpha of 11% and exhibit significant positive earnings surprises. Investors’ under-reaction to no news on new CEO information and underestimation of the positive effects of the tournament among the CEO candidates drive our results.

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Selection Versus Incentives in Incentive Pay: Evidence from a Matching Model

Shuo Xia

in: SSRN Working Papers, 2018

Abstract

Higher incentive pay is associated with better firm performance. I introduce a model of CEO-firm matching to disentangle the two confounding effects that drive this result. On one hand, higher incentive pay directly induces more effort; on the other hand, higher incentive pay indirectly attracts more talented CEOs. I find both effects are essential to explain the result, with the selection effect accounting for 12.7% of the total effect. The relative importance of the selection effect is the largest in industries with high talent mobility and in more recent years.

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