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Germany’s economy is so bad even sausage factories are closingIWHThe Economist, January 15, 2026
We study how deposit competition affects a bank's decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in deposit costs and corresponding reductions in banks' deposit holdings. Our results are strongest among banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight a hitherto undocumented and unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.
Weltweit höhere Energiepreise infolge des neuen Golfkriegs verschlechtern die Aussichten für die deutsche Konjunktur, auch wenn Mehrausgaben der öffentlichen Hand die gesamtwirtschaftliche Expansion in diesem und im kommenden Jahr stützen werden. Die Produktion dürfte im Jahr 2026 um 0,7% und im Jahr darauf um 1% zunehmen. Ähnliche Expansionsraten sind auch für Ostdeutschland zu erwarten.
This paper examines how initial public offerings (IPOs) affect firms' internal organization. We find that IPO firms become more hierarchical and standardized organizations, characterized by additional layers, more managers, smaller control spans, and larger administrative functions. These changes occur mostly in preparation for the IPO and can be only partially explained by growth. IPO firms with greater human capital risk experience larger hierarchical changes. Hierarchical changes help firms standardize employee roles and formalize internal processes. Our results suggest that firms reorganize to reduce their dependence on key individuals' human capital when transitioning to public markets.
*** Reale Netto-Tariflohnverluste 2026/2027 im Öffentlichen Dienst der Länder *** Die Tarifvertragsparteien des öffentlichen Dienstes der Länder haben sich am Wochenende auf einen neuen Tarifabschluss geeinigt. Für die ersten fünf Monate wurde eine „Nullrunde“ vereinbart. Die erste Tariflohnerhöhung von 2,8%, mindestens jedoch 100 Euro pro Monat, erfolgt ab April 2026. Elf Monate später, im März 2027, folgt die nächste Anhebung um 2,0%. Zum Ende der vereinbarten Laufzeit im Januar 2028 werden die regulären Tabellenentgelte nochmals um 1,0% erhöht. Die Tariflohnzuwächse dürften damit leicht über den erwarteten Preissteigerungen liegen. Die derzeit absehbaren zusätzlichen Belastungen durch weiter steigende Sozialabgaben und höhere Lohnsteuern können dadurch jedoch nicht vollständig ausgeglichen werden.
Der vorliegende Report beschreibt fünf Datenprodukte zu den Fördermaßnahmen im Rahmen des Investitionsgesetzes Kohleregionen (InvKG). Über dieses Programm stellt die Bundesregierung bis zum Jahr 2038 Fördermittel im Umfang von bis zu 41,09 Mrd. Euro zur Verfügung, um die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Folgen des Ausstiegs aus der thermischen Verwertung von Kohle abzufedern. Das InvKG besteht aus einer breiten Palette verschiedener Programme bzw. Programmfamilien. Nach einer Einordnung in den rechtlichen Rahmen geht der Datenreport detailliert ein auf die einzelnen Schritte der Aufbereitung sowie die in den Datenprodukten enthaltenen Informationen. Da das Fördergeschehen einer hohen Dynamik unterliegt, werden die Datenprodukte fortlaufend aktualisiert und erweitert.
Using a market-indicator-based approach, this paper empirically examines whether the stability of the US and EU financial systems is affected by the digital finance revolution driven by BigTechs, FinTechs, and crypto-assets. These three sectors display different downside volatility profiles, with financial intermediaries being particularly sensitive to shocks from the crypto ecosystem only under extremely severe downturns, which are prevented in regulated equity markets. In that vein, we provide evidence that the Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation reduced financial systemic risk in EU. Overall, our empirical analysis shows that markets perceive the performance and riskiness of tech-driven companies and assets in differentiated ways, and that the transmission of shocks from digital finance ecosystems operates uniquely under varying conditions of systemic stress. Finally, we also document asymmetric spillover effects between advanced and emerging economies, with shock transmission from the US and EU to emerging markets being systematically stronger than in the reverse direction.
Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principalagent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find that principals set ethically constrained targets and wages that track fairness benchmarks. Agents, however, do not divert resources to stakeholders: transfers are negative on average, and prosocial traits do not increase giving. Instead, contract terms, though unenforceable, systematically shape effort, transfers, and returns. Notably, prosocial agents generate higher total returns. Prosociality appears to mitigate rather than create efficiency losses, suggesting that discretion channels norm-sensitive loyalty rather than stakeholder redistribution.
Die deutsche Wirtschaft legte im vierten Quartal 2025 um 0,3% zu, nachdem sie in den beiden Quartalen zuvor noch geschrumpft war. Vor allem zum Ende des Jahres 2025 stiegen die privaten und staatlichen Konsumausgaben. Das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) hat damit im Jahr 2025 insgesamt um 0,2% zugenommen. Dabei dürften vor allem die Konsumausgaben die fehlenden Wachstumsimpulse des Außenhandels kompensiert haben. Die jüngsten Indikatoren deuten auf eine leichte konjunkturelle Belebung hin (vgl. Abbildung 1). Laut IWH-Flash-Indikator dürfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) im ersten Quartal 2026 um 0,3% und im zweiten Quartal 2026 um 0,2% steigen.
This study employs bilateral data on external assets to examine the impact of climate policies on the reallocation of international capital. We find that the stringency of climate policy in the destination country is significantly and positively associated with an increase in the allocation of portfolio equity and banking investment to that country. However, it does not show significant effects on the allocation of foreign direct investment and portfolio debt. Our findings are not driven by valuation effects, and we present evidence that suggests diversification, suasion, and uncertainty mitigation as possible underlying mechanisms.
This study examines the institutional demand for mispriced stocks with incongruent expectations implied by the book-to-market (BM) ratio and financial strength. Institutional trading (or institutional demand) is calculated by both changes in institutional ownership (percentage of shares held) and the number of institutional investors from the previous to the current quarter. Market mispricing and expectation errors in value/glamour stocks can be identified by analysing firms’ recent financial strength (measured by FSCORE). Firms are sorted into value stocks (top 30%), middle stocks (between 30% and 70%) and glamour stocks (bottom 30%) by distribution of BM ratios at the end of the previous fiscal year. Firms in the sample are then double sorted by FSCORE and BM: in each BM portfolio, firms are further classified into high-, mid- and low-FSCORE groups. Consistent with the argument of expectation errors in value/glamour stocks (Piotroski and So, 2012), institutional investors buy value stocks with strong fundamentals (underpriced) and sell glamour stocks with weak fundamentals (overpriced). Independent institutions are more likely to take advantage of the mispricing in value/glamour firms than passive institutions. Institutional trading on expectation errors could reduce the abnormal returns to mispriced stocks. Institutional trading patterns on mispriced value/glamour stocks are also documented in global markets. Our research provides new evidence that the institutional investors do exploit the BM anomalies if the mispricing can be identified by both the BM and the recent financial strength. Our study differs from Caglayan, Celiker and Sonaer (2018) as we emphasise that financial institutions, in addition to relying on only the BM values, process information from financial statements to infer firms’ financial strength. This study is also the first to document that institutional demand on mispricing could attenuate the BM anomaly.
