Die Insolvenzzahlen sind trotz Corona-Krise im Jahr 2020 stark gesunken. Diese paradoxe Situation kann in erster Linie durch staatliche Unterstützungsmaßnahmen und abwartendes Verhalten bei den Unternehmen erklärt werden. Die Krise traf die meisten Unternehmen am Ende einer langanhaltenden wirtschaftlichen Boomphase und somit haben viele Unternehmen umfangreiche Reserven aufgebaut, die sie in Erwartung eines Nach-Corona Booms aufbrauchen. Obwohl eine Insolvenzwelle ab Frühjahr nicht auszuschließen ist, ist sie doch eher unwahrscheinlich. Der Staat muss seine Kräfte bündeln um ein Wiederaufflammen der Pandemie nach dem Sommer 2021 zu verhindern und gleichzeitig die Stützungsmaßnahmen bereits im Jahr 2021 beenden, um eine „Zombifizierung“ der Wirtschaft zu unterbinden.

This paper investigates the consequences of shutdowns during the Corona crisis on the risk of bankruptcy for firms in Germany and United Kingdom. We use financial statements from the period 2014 to 2018 to predict how pervasive risk of bankruptcy becomes for micro, small, medium, and large firms due to shutdown measures. We estimate distress for firms using their capacity to service their debt. Our results indicate that under three months of shutdown almost all firms in shutdown industries face high risk of bankruptcy. In Germany, about 99% of firms in shutdown industries and in the UK about 98% of firms in shutdown industries are predicted to be under distress. The furlough schemes reduce the risk of bankruptcy only marginally to 97% of firms in shutdown industries in Germany and 95% of firms in shutdown industries in the United Kingdom in case of a three-month shutdown. In sectors that are not shutdown under conservative estimates of contagion of sales losses, our results indicate considerable risk of widespread bankruptcies ranging from 76% of firms in Germany to 69% of firms in the United Kingdom. These early findings suggest that the impact of corona crisis on corporate sector via shutdowns can be severe and subsequent policy should be designed accordingly.

Unternehmensinsolvenzen sind nicht nur für Eigentümer und Gläubiger mit erheblichen Unannehmlichkeiten verbunden, sie haben zumeist auch schwerwiegende Auswirkungen auf die Arbeitnehmer, die dadurch in aller Regel ihre Arbeitsplätze verlieren. Insbesondere Insolvenzen großer Unternehmen mit mehreren Tausend Beschäftigten – prominente Fälle sind beispielsweise Schlecker, Praktiker oder Air Berlin – führen gelegentlich dazu, dass die Schicksale der betroffenen Arbeitnehmer auch in den Fokus einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit geraten. Das Interesse von Politik und Medien lässt jedoch meist schnell wieder nach, obwohl Unternehmensinsolvenzen natürlich weitaus häufiger vorkommen. Zwar ist die Zahl der Unternehmensinsolvenzen seit einigen Jahren rückläufig, dennoch waren 2018 deutschlandweit fast 20 000 Unternehmen und 200 000 Arbeitsplätze betroffen.

Schließungen und Massenentlassungen großer Unternehmen stoßen aufgrund der damit verbundenen Folgen für betroffene Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer meist auf breites öffentliches Interesse. Tatsächlich zeigt sich, dass die Verdienstausfälle betroffener Arbeitnehmer – bestehend aus Lohneinbußen bei späterer Wiederbeschäftigung und Beschäftigungsausfällen – deutlich mit der Größe des entlassenden Betriebs zunehmen. Dies liegt vor allem daran, dass aus Großbetrieben entlassene Arbeitnehmer im Gegensatz zu denen, die einen Arbeitsplatz in kleinen Betrieben verlieren, deutliche Lohneinbußen hinnehmen müssen, weil sie danach oft in kleineren und schlechter bezahlenden Betrieben beschäftigt sind. Zwar erleiden auch aus Kleinbetrieben entlassene Arbeitnehmer deutliche Verdienstausfälle, ihre Lohneinbußen sind aber geringer. Sie können sich bei der Entlohnung sogar verbessern, sofern sie das Glück haben, eine Anstellung in einem Großbetrieb zu finden.

Large, well-known firms that file for bankruptcy typically receive a lot of public attention. However, most bankrupt firms are rather small and we still know little about the effects of bankruptcies on workers. This report analyses the effects of bankruptcies on earnings and employment prospects of affected workers.

Zahlreiche Studien zeigen, dass unfreiwillige Arbeitsplatzverluste zu hohen und langfristigen Einkommensverlusten bei betroffenen Arbeitnehmern führen. Die vorliegende Studie verwendet Befragungsdaten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), um erstmals umfassend zu untersuchen, ob und in welchem Ausmaß Verluste im individuellen Arbeitseinkommen durch alternative Einkommensquellen, Reaktionen anderer Haushaltsmitglieder und durch staatliche Umverteilung ausgeglichen werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Verdienstverluste vor allem durch staatliche Umverteilung kompensiert werden, wohingegen andere Kanäle nur eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Ein Vergleich internationaler empirischer Evidenz zu den Verdienstausfällen nach Arbeitsplatzverlusten spricht nicht dafür, dass staatliche Umverteilung den Anreiz, Verluste durch eigene Anstrengungen selbst auszugleichen, vermindert.

This paper reports the results of several investigations into the determinants of company shutdowns using administrative data for Germany. We show that between 1975 and 2008, the average shutdown rate has risen considerably in western Germany. For most of the time, shutdown rates in eastern Germany were higher, but they have converged to the western level recently. The shutdown risk falls with company size and is substantially higher for young companies. Shutdown rates initially decline as companies age, reaching a minimum at ages 15 to 18, and then rise again. Companies begin to shrink several years before closure, and the remaining workforce becomes on average more skilled, more female and older in companies about to close compared to surviving ones.

This paper investigates whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums, the latter being measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects wage decomposition. Using new German administrative data on displacements from small and large employers, we find that wage losses are to a large extent explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses strongly increase with pre-displacement employer size. This provides an explanation for large and persistent wage losses reported in previous displacement studies typically focusing on large employers, only.

Using survey data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP), this paper analyses the extent to which alternative income sources, reactions within the household context, and redistribution by the state attenuate earnings losses after job displacement. Applying propensity score matching and fixed effects estimations, we find that income from self‐employment reduces the earnings gap only slightly and severance payments buffer losses in the short run. On the household level, we find little evidence for an added worker effect whereas redistribution by the state within the tax and transfer system mitigates income losses substantially.

We study the effect of job displacement due to bankruptcies on earnings and employment prospects of displaced workers and analyse whether extended potential unemployment benefit duration (PBD) ameliorates the negative consequences of job loss. Using German administrative linked employer-employee data, we find that job loss has long-lasting negative effects on earnings and employment. Displaced workers also more often end up in irregular employment relationships (part-time, marginal part-time employment, and temporary agency work) than their non-displaced counterparts. Applying a regression discontinuity approach that exploits a three months PBD extension at the age threshold of 50 we find hardly any effects of longer PBD on labour market outcomes of displaced workers.

This article analyzes the development of employment levels and worker flows before bankruptcies, plant closure without bankruptcies and mass layoffs. Utilizing administrative plant-level data for Germany, we find no systematic employment reductions prior to mass layoffs, a strong and long-lasting reduction prior to closures, and a much shorter shadow of death preceding bankruptcies. Employment reductions in closing plants, in contrast to bankruptcies and mass layoffs, do not come along with increased worker flows. These patterns point to an intended and controlled shrinking strategy for closures without bankruptcy and to an unintended collapse for bankruptcies and mass layoffs.

Using German survey data, we investigate the relationship between involuntary job loss and regional mobility. Our results show that job loss has a strong positive effect on the propensity to relocate. We also analyse whether displaced workers who relocate to a different region after job loss are better able to catch up with non-displaced workers in terms of labour market performance than those staying in the same region. Our findings do not support this conjecture as we find substantial long-lasting earnings losses for movers and stayers and even slightly but not significantly higher losses for movers.

We use rich German administrative data to estimate new measures of skill transferability between manufacturing and other sectors. These measures capture the value of workers' human capital when applied in different sectors and are directly related to workers' displacement costs. We estimate these transferability measures using a selection correction model, which addresses workers' endogenous mobility, and a novel selection instrument based on the social network of workers. Our results indicate substantial heterogeneity in how workers can transfer their skills when they move across sectors, which implies heterogeneous displacement costs that depend on the sector to which workers reallocate.

Using a 50 % sample of all private sector establishments in Germany, we report that spinoffs are larger, initially employ more skilled and more experienced workers, and pay higher wages than other startups. We investigate whether spinoffs are more likely to survive than other startups, and whether spinoff survival depends on the quality and size of their parent companies, as suggested in some of the theoretical and empirical literature. Our estimated survival models confirm that spinoffs are generally less likely to exit than other startups. We also distinguish between pulled spinoffs, where the parent company continues after they are founded, and pushed spinoffs, where the parent company stops operations. Our results indicate that in western and eastern Germany and in all sectors investigated, pulled spinoffs have a higher probability of survival than pushed spinoffs. Concerning the parent connection, we find that intra-industry spinoffs and spinoffs emerging from better-performing or smaller parent companies are generally less likely to exit.

This paper introduces a large-scale administrative panel data set on corporate bankruptcy in Germany that allows for an econometric analysis of involuntary exits where previous studies mixed voluntary and involuntary exits. Approximately 83 % of all bankruptcies occur in plants with not more than 10 employees, and 61 % of all bankrupt plants are not older than 5 years. The descriptive statistics and regression analysis indicate substantial negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk but confirm negative size dependence for mature plants only. Our results corroborate hypotheses stressing increasing capabilities and positional advantage, both predicting negative age dependence with respect to bankruptcy risk due to productivity improvements. The results are not consistent with the theories explaining age dependence via imprinting or structural inertia.

Using a large administrative data set for Germany, this article compares employment developments in exiting and surviving establishments. Applying a matching approach, we find a clear “shadow of death” effect reflecting lingering illness: in both West and East Germany establishments shrink dramatically already several years before closure, employment growth rates differ strongly between exiting and surviving establishments, and this difference becomes stronger as exit approaches. Moreover, we provide first evidence that prior to exit the workforce becomes on average more skilled, more female, and older in exiting compared to surviving establishments. These effects are more clearly visible in West than in East Germany.

Using a large administrative dataset, this paper compares the development of new establishments’ survival chances in East and West Germany for the period 1994 – 2008. A central question is whether convergence with respect to survival rates between East and West Germany can be observed. Using methods of survival analysis, I find that new establishments’ survival chances do not differ strongly between East and West Germany at the beginning of the observation period. In 1998 and 1999 the exit hazard increases strongly in East but not in West Germany, which is likely to be due to a change in the subsidy policy affecting East Germany. Since the turn of the millennium, the difference in establishments’ exit hazard between East and West Germany becomes smaller, indicating that there is convergence with respect to establishments’ survival chances.

Using comprehensive data for West Germany, this paper investigates the determinants of establishment exit. We find that between 1975 and 2006 the average exit rate has risen considerably. In order to test various “liabilities” of establishment survival identified in the literature, we analyzed the impact of establishment size and put a special focus on differences between young and mature establishments. Our empirical analysis shows that the mortality risk falls with establishment size, which confirms the liability of smallness. The probability of exit is substantially higher for young establishments which are not more than 5 years old, thus confirming the liability of newness. There also exists a liability of aging since exit rates first decline over time, reaching a minimum at ages 15–18, and then rise again somewhat. The determinants of exit differ substantially between young and mature establishments, suggesting that young establishments are more vulnerable in a number of ways.