Financial System Adaptability and Resilience
Financial Systems differ between countries. Their configuration is sticky and does not change suddenly. A well-functioning financial system is essential for economic development by efficiently allocating capital to the highest net present value projects.
However, the resilience of financial systems is frequently challenged. For example, the Great Financial Crisis of 2007/08 was a large blow from within the system: New financial instruments fuelled a credit bubble in the United States' housing markets, which almost brought down the global financial system when it eventually burst. The crisis triggered hefty government interventions and regulatory actions to make financial systems more resilient.
More frequently, challenges like the Covid-19 pandemic, the climate crisis and the green transition of economies, and the energy crisis triggered by the war in Ukraine, again highlight the crucial importance of resilient financial systems that adapt themselves and facilitate adequate responses to shocks of the real economy alike.
The research group “Financial System Adaptability and Resilience” investigates three critical aspects of financial system adaptability and resilience. First, it uses the occurrence of major natural disasters in the United States and Germany to analyse the impact of these events on financial systems. Natural disasters are becoming more frequent and more severe because of climate change. Therefore, evidence about the role of banks in providing funding to spur economic recovery is critical.
Investigations across different configurations of financial systems, such as bank- vs. market-based economies (e. g., Germany vs. the United States), allow for highlighting which components of financial systems seem better equipped to increase financial systems resiliency.
Second, the climate crisis requires economies to transform production technologies in order to source sustainable and renewable energy inputs. By using micro-data on German plants and their headquarters' banking relationships and information about the local and federal state leading political parties in Germany, the group aims to investigate the effects of political preferences for the green transition. This group's research will thereby enhance our understanding how climate policies balance the necessary need to reduce emissions with the economic burden imposed on agents during any large-scale transition of societies.
Third, the group's research analyses the role of culture in economies. The idea is that various aspects of culture, like religion, can work as a device that holds societies together and facilitate economic transactions. Using well-established empirical laboratories coming from significant natural disasters (for example, Hurricane Katrina in 2005), the group investigates whether local economies with a higher cultural imprint coming from religion found it easier to recover faster. Other incidents for which culture can play a vital role are big corporate scandals.
Using the Volkswagen Scandal from 2015, research by this group analyses the essential role of cultural imprints for consumer reactions in responding to large corporate scandals. This is important since government and regulatory intervention tend to come late or insufficient to punish corporate wrongdoings.
Workpackage 1: Development of Financial Systems after Significant Natural Disasters
Workpackage 2: Financial Systems' Role in the Economies' Green Transition
Workpackage 3: Cultural Aspects within Financial Systems
Research Cluster
Financial Resilience and RegulationYour contact

- Department Financial Markets
EXTERNAL FUNDING
08.2022 ‐ 07.2025
OVERHANG: Debt overhang and green investments - the role of banks in climate-friendly management of emission-intensive fixed assets
The collaborative project “Debt Overhang and Green Investments” (OVERHANG) aims to investigate the role of banks in the climate-friendly management of emission-intensive fixed assets. This will identify policy-relevant insights on financial regulation, government-controlled lending and financial stability, as well as raise awareness among indebted stakeholders.
01.2015 ‐ 12.2019
Interactions between Bank-specific Risk and Macroeconomic Performance
07.2016 ‐ 12.2018
Relationship Lenders and Unorthodox Monetary Policy: Investment, Employment, and Resource Reallocation Effects
Leibniz Association
We combine a number of unique and proprietary data sources to measure the impact of relationship lenders and unconventional monetary policy during and after the European sovereign debt crisis on the real economy. Establishing systematic links between different research data centers (Forschungsdatenzentren, FDZ) and central banks with detailed micro-level information on both financial and real activity is the stand-alone proposition of our proposal. The main objective is to permit the identification of causal effects, or their absence, regarding which policies were conducive to mitigate financial shocks and stimulate real economic activities, such as employment, investment, or the closure of plants.
Refereed Publications

Political Uncertainty and Bank Loan Contracts: Does Government Quality Matter?
in: Journal of Financial Services Research, December 2021
Abstract
We investigate the relation between political uncertainty and bank loan spreads using a sample of loan contracts for the G20 firms during the period from 1982 to 2015. We find that banks charge firms higher loan spreads and require more covenants during election years when domestic political risks are elevated. Greater differences in the support ratios of opinion polls on candidates lead to the lower cost of bank loans. This political effect also lessens when the government quality of the borrower’s country is better than that of the lender’s country. Better quality government can lower the political risk component of bank loan spreads.

The Impact of Political Uncertainty on Institutional Ownership
in: Journal of Financial Stability, December 2021
Abstract
This paper provides original evidence from institutional investors that political uncertainty greatly affects investment behavior. Using institutional holdings of common stock, we find that institutions significantly reduce their holdings by 0.8–2.3% points during presidential election years. Such effect holds for gubernatorial elections with cross-state-border difference-in-difference analysis and for tests using a political uncertainty index. The effect is the opposite for American Depository Receipts (ADRs). In addition, we find that institutions benefit financially from the observed strategy, and such strategy is in line with predicted outcomes of presidential election polls.

Banking Globalization, Local Lending, and Labor Market Effects: Micro-level Evidence from Brazil
in: Journal of Financial Stability, October 2021
Abstract
Recent financial crises have prompted the interest in understanding how banking globalization interacts with domestic institutions in shaping foreign shocks’ transmission. This paper uses regional banking data from Brazil to show that a foreign funding shock to banks negatively affects lending by their regional branches. This effect increases in the presence of frictions in internal capital markets, which affect branches’ capacity to access funding from other regions via intra-bank linkages. These results also matter on an aggregate level, as municipality-level credit and job flows drop in exposed regions. Policies aiming to reduce the fragmented structure of regional banking markets could moderate the propagation of foreign shocks.

Stock Price Fragility and the Cost of Bank Loans
in: Journal of Empirical Finance, September 2021
Abstract
This study examines whether the flow volatility experienced by institutional investors affects firms’ financing costs. Using Greenwood and Thesmar’s (2011) stock price fragility measure, we find that there is a positive relationship between fragility and firms’ costs of bank loans. This effect is most pronounced when lenders rely more on institutional shareholders to discipline corporate management, or when loans are made by relationship lenders, suggesting that unstable flows could weaken institutional investors’ monitoring effectiveness and strengthen relationship banks’ bargaining power.

Political Cycles in Bank Lending to the Government
in: Review of Financial Studies, No. 6, 2021
Abstract
We study how political party turnover after German state elections affects banks’ lending to the regional government. We find that between 1992 and 2018, party turnover at the state level leads to a sharp and substantial increase in lending by local savings banks to their home-state government. This effect is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in private lending. A statistical association between political party turnover and government lending is absent for comparable cooperative banks that exhibit a similar regional organization and business model. Our results suggest that political frictions may interfere with government-owned banks’ local development objectives.
Working Papers

Corporate Governance Structures and Financial Constraints in Multinational Enterprises – An Analysis in Selected European Transition Economies on the Basis of the IWH FDI Micro Database 2013 –
in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 3, 2015
Abstract
In our analysis, we consider the distribution of decision power over financing and investment between MNEs’ headquarters and foreign subsidiaries and its influence on the foreign affiliates’ financial restrictions. Our research results show that headquarters of multinational enterprises have not (yet) moved much decision power to their foreign subsidiaries at all. We use data from the IWH FDI Micro Database which contains information on corporate governance structures and financial restrictions of 609 enterprises with a foreign investor in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and East Germany. We match data from Bureau van Dijk’s AMADEUS database on financial characteristics. We find that a high concentration of decision power within the MNE’s headquarter implicates high financial restrictions within the subsidiary. Square term results show, however, that the effect of financial constraints within the subsidiary decreases and finally turns insignificant when decision power moves from headquarter to subsidiary. Thus, economic policy should encourage foreign investors in the case of foreign acquisition of local enterprises to leave decision power within the enterprise and in the case of Greenfield investment to provide the newly established subsidiaries with as much power over corporate governance structures as possible.