We assemble data about executives on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking, which reveal that 40% have an employment history in the financial industry. Appointment patterns to NSA boards differ substantially across countries. Generally, the appointment of former finance professionals as prudential supervisors is inconsequential for banks‘ valuations, capitalization, and asset growth. The exception are positive, but short-lived valuation effects for those banks whose alumni are appointed as executives of directly responsible NSA boards. Circumstantial evidence suggests that a “proximity bias“ is a more likely driver of this effect inste

We study the interaction of expansionary rate-based monetary policy and quantitative easing, despite their concurrent implementation, by exploiting heterogeneous banks and the introduction of negative monetary-policy rates in a fragmented euro area. Quantitative easing increases credit supply less, translating into weaker employment growth, when banks’ funding costs do not decrease. Using administrative data from Germany, we uncover that among banks selling their securities, central-bank reserves remain disproportionately with high-deposit banks that are constrained due to sticky customer deposits at the zero lower bound. Affected German banks lend relatively less to firms while increasing their interbank exposure in the euro area.

We develop a theory in which a lower cost of job loss reduces the compensating wage premium workers require to join risky young firms. Lower labor costs encourage high-upside experimentation and raise productivity. Because experimentation is not directly observable, we exploit its life-cycle structure: experimentation risk is concentrated among young firms and resolved as firms mature. Using Danish matched employer-employee data and labor-market variation, we show that higher job-finding rates are associated with a lower young-mature wage differential. A randomized survey experiment supports the mechanism: worsening unemployment prospects increases the premium workers require to accept employment at higher-failure-risk young firms.

Does debt overhang distort only investment? This paper analyzes the subsequent effects of debt overhang on firm-level outcomes. Using an event study for German firms from 2004 to 2021, we find that, relative to comparable firms in the same industry and year, highly indebted firms do not merely invest less, which is the classic overhang result. They also hire less, and the two margins together translate into slower sales growth. The composition of the adjustment, however, depends on the firm’s growth regime. Highly indebted firms that keep expanding slow their hiring but raise capital per worker over the long run, substituting capital for labour along a flatter expansion path. Highly indebted firms that contract shed workers with no offsetting change in capital intensity: they scale down rather than restructure. These patterns hold in normal times as well as in crises and are concentrated among small and medium-sized limited-liability firms. Debt overhang is therefore not a pure investment wedge but a persistent drag on firm scale, whose incidence across inputs is determined by whether the firm is growing or shrinking.

Socioeconomic inequalities shape who accesses early childcare, even in countries that claim universal provision. This entrenched inequality limits child development, women’s employment and gender equality — but governments have clear tools to close the gap.

We study the impact of stricter and more harmonized banking regulation along the income distribution using household survey data for 25 EU countries. Exploiting country-level heterogeneity in the implementation of European Banking Union directives allows us to control for confounders and identify effects. Our results show that these regulatory reforms aimed at increasing financial system resilience affect households heterogeneously and result in a widening of the income distribution. These results are dependent on a country’s ex-ante regulatory stringency, and more pronounced in countries with stronger bank dependence. Furthermore, we find that more stringent regulation reduces income growth for low-income households primarily due to exits from employment, whereas affluent households tend to experience increased growth rates for employee and self-employed income.

We revisit the employer size wage effect (ESWE) – arguably the most basic and influential departure from the law of one price for labor. Our main result is that this canonical fact disappears completely across establishments within the same firm, even though they operate in different local labor markets. We uncover and dissect this fact by including a firm fixed effect in otherwise standard cross-sectional regressions of wages on establishment size. We implement this demanding specification in population-wide triple-linked firm-establishment-employee data in Germany. This result is new in the ESWE literature (for which our paper also provides the first systematic meta-analysis). This wage-size decoupling is hard to square with the view that employment is determined along a finitely elastic employerspecific labor supply curve – i.e., employers pay exactly the minimum needed for the quantity of labor, but no more – the foundation of the monopsony view. By contrast, large multi-establishment firms (MEF) appear to hire off their labor supply curves (or those curves are very elastic), pay wage premia above the monopsonistic minimum, and leave excess labor supply. We find some evidence for a reemergence of the ESWE within low-premium MEFs. Overall, at least for the 25% of German employment in large firms for which the ESWE disappears, wage setting and employment determination may be better accounted for by alternative models, namely accommodating above-market-clearing wage premia and rationing of labor supply, such as efficiency wage theories.