The current European Debt Crisis has led to a reinforced effort to identify the sources of risk and their influence on yields of European Government Bonds. Until now, the potentially nonlinear influence and the theoretical need for interactions reflecting flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity has been widely disregarded. I estimate government bond yields of the Euro-12 countries without Luxembourg from May 2003 until December 2011. Using penalized spline regression, I find that the effect of most explanatory variables is highly nonlinear. These nonlinearities, together with flight patterns of flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity, can explain the co-movement of bond yields until September 2008 and the huge amount of differentiation during the financial and the European debt crisis without the unnecessary assumption of a structural break. The main effects are credit risk and flight-to-liquidity, while the evidence for the existence of flight-to-quality and liquidity risk (the latter measured by the bid-ask spread and total turnover of bonds) is comparably weak.

Islamic finance is based on ethical principles in line with Islamic religious law. Despite its low share of the global financial market, Islamic finance has been one of this sector's fastest growing components over the last decades and has gained further momentum in the wake of the financial crisis. The paper examines the development of and possible prospects for Islamic finance, with a special focus on Europe. It compares Islamic and conventional finance, particularly as concerns risks associated with the operations of respective institutions, as well as corporate governance. The paper also analyses empirical evidence comparing Islamic and conventional financial institutions with regard to their: (i) efficiency and profitability; and (ii) stability and resilience. Finally, the paper considers the conduct of monetary policy in an Islamic banking context. This is not uncomplicated given the fact that interest rates - normally a cornerstone of monetary policy - are prohibited under Islamic finance. Liquidity management issues are thus discussed here, with particular reference to the euro area.

Using a unique data set on French firms, we show that credit constrained firms that face liquidity shocks are more likely to default on their payments to suppliers. Credit constrained firms pass on a sizeable fraction of such shocks to their suppliers. This is consistent with the idea that firms provide liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate credit constraints. We show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches unconstrained firms. Liquidity appears to be allocated from firms with access to outside finance to credit constrained firms along supply chains.

With the world financial crisis came the rediscovery of the active role fiscal policy could play in remedying the situation. More recently, the Euro Crisis, with its mounting funding costs facing governments of a number of Southern EU member states and Ireland, has called this strategy into question. Opposing this view, the main point of this contribution is to elaborate on the link between rising sovereign risk premia in the Eurozone and a major feature of the financial crisis - elevated uncertainty after the Lehman collapse. Theoretically, this link is developed with reference to Keynes' liquidity preference theory. The high explanatory power of rising uncertainty in financial markets and the detrimental effects of fiscal austerity on the evolution of sovereign risk spreads are demonstrated empirically by means of panel regressions and supplementary correlation analyses.

This article explores the determinants of banking sector fragility in the eurozone. For this purpose, a stock-market-based banking sector fragility indicator is calculated for eight member countries from 1999 to 2009 using the Merton model (1974). Using a panel framework, it is found that the macroeconomic environment, the structure of the banking sector and the intensity of banking regulation all have an effect on banking sector fragility in the eurozone.

In the first months of 2012 there were some mild signs of improvement in the world economy, to a large degree due to political measures taken in the euro area at the end of 2011. In particular, the ECB secured financing of banks by offering liquidity for as longs as three years and by easing standards for collateral. However, the southern countries of the euro area will stay in recession for most of the year 2012: planned fiscal consolidation in Spain and Italy has a magnitude of about 3% relative to GDP, in Portugal and Greece the restriction is even larger. The structural reforms need time to take beneficial effects, and the real sector is largely out of reach of the expansive monetary policy.

Zur Jahreswende 2011/2012 hat die weitere Zuspitzung der Schulden- und Vertrauenskrise im Euroraum die weltwirtschaftlichen Aussichten deutlich eingetrübt. Auch Deutschland wird sich von der Verschlechterung der internationalen Konjunktur nicht abkoppeln können, und das deutsche Bruttoinlandsprodukt dürfte im Jahr 2012 mit 0,3% nur schwach zunehmen. Darüber hinaus sind die Risiken groß. Sollten etwa die Refinanzierungskosten im deutschen Bankensystem, anders als in dieser Prognose unterstellt, stark zunehmen, würde die gesamtwirtschaftliche Produktion 2012 wohl schrumpfen. Zentrale Aufgabe der Wirtschaftspolitik ist es gegenwärtig, das Vertrauen der Finanzmärkte in die Staatsfinanzen der Euroraum-Länder zu kräftigen. Von den Vorschlägen dafür, wie dies gelingen soll, verspricht der vom Sachverständigenrat vorgeschlagene Schuldentilgungspakt den besten Erfolg.

The World Financial Crisis has shaken the fundamentals of international banking

and triggered a downward spiral of asset prices. To prevent a further meltdown of

markets, governments have intervened massively through rescues measures aimed at recapitalizing banks and through liquidity support. We use a detailed, banklevel dataset for German banks to analyze how the lending and borrowing of their foreign affiliates has responded to domestic (German) and to US crisis support schemes. We analyze how these policy interventions have spilled over into

foreign markets. We identify loan supply shocks by exploiting that not all banks

have received policy support and that the timing of receiving support measures

has differed across banks. We find that banks covered by rescue measures of the

German government have increased their foreign activities after these policy

interventions, but they have not expanded relative to banks not receiving support.

Banks claiming liquidity support under the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program

have withdrawn from foreign markets outside the US, but they have expanded

relative to affiliates of other German banks.

Die Erholung der Konjunktur in Polen hatte sich zu Beginn des Jahres 2011 fortgesetzt. Mit einer steigenden Auslastung der Produktionskapazitäten hatten auch die Unternehmensinvestitionen sich wieder stärker belebt. Sie trugen positiv zur Binnennachfrage bei, der wichtigsten Triebkraft der wirtschaftlichen Expansion. Der private Konsum blieb trotz beschleunigter Inflation und einer Mehrwertsteuererhöhung weiter nach oben gerichtet. Die gute Konjunktur hatte auch eine Verbesserung der Arbeitsmarktlage zur Folge: Die Beschäftigung in den Unternehmen stieg wieder kräftiger an, die Arbeitslosenquote verringerte sich aber noch kaum. Im Verlauf des Jahres 2011 hat sich das konjunkturelle Klima allerdings etwas abgekühlt. Die Verschlechterung des außenwirtschaftlichen Umfeldes und damit verbundene Risiken für Nachfrage und Produktion haben die Aussichten für den Prognosezeitraum eingetrübt: Von der Binnennachfrage werden 2012 schwächere Impulse für die wirtschaftliche Expansion kommen. Investitionen in den Unternehmen werden zeitlich nach hinten verschoben, der Beschäftigungsaufbau wird abgebremst werden. Auch der private Konsum wird im kommenden Jahr wohl etwas gedämpfter zunehmen. Leicht entspannt hat sich die Haushaltslage. Das hohe Budgetdefizit von nahezu 8% des Bruttoinlandsproduktes

im Jahr 2010 hat sich im Folgejahr auf etwa 5% verringert und fiel damit geringer aus als ursprünglich veranschlagt. Dafür sind allerdings größtenteils Sondereffekte verantwortlich, während der strukturell verursachte Anteil des Defizits weiter erheblich ist. Angesichts bisheriger Versäumnisse ist die Politik gefordert, die Reform der öffentlichen Finanzen konsequenter als bislang anzugehen und einen Ausweg aus dem weiteren Anstieg der Schuldenquote zu weisen.

Governments often justify interventions into the financial system in the form of bail outs or liquidity assistance with the systemic importance of large banks for the real economy. In this paper, we analyze whether idiosyncratic shocks to loan growth at large banks have effects on real GDP growth. We employ a measure of idiosyncratic shocks which follows Gabaix (forthcoming). He shows that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on US GDP growth. In an application to the banking sector, we find evidence that changes in lending by large banks have a significant short-run impact on GDP growth. Episodes of negative loan growth rates and the Eastern European countries in our sample drive these results.