Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.

We investigate whether a firm’s exposure to climate change, as proxied by disclosures during quarterly earnings conference calls, provides forward-looking information to investors regarding the long-term association of stock prices with current earnings and the book values of equity. Following a key regulatory mandate around the formation of the cap-and-trade program to reduce emissions related to climate change, firms’ climate change exposure decreases the association between current earnings and stock prices while increasing the relevance of book values of equity (i.e., historical earnings). However, these relationships flip when the sentiment around climate change exposure is negative, suggesting that the risks related to climate change exposure provide forward-looking information to investors when they evaluate the ability of current earnings to predict firm values. Such a relationship is stronger for new economy firms and is sensitive to conservative accounting. We also observe that the inclusion of climate change disclosure to our models improves the joint ability of earnings and book values to predict stock prices.

We review an empirical literature that studies how political polarization affects financial decisions. We first discuss the degree of partisan segregation in finance and corporate America, the mechanisms through which partisanship may influence financial decisions, and the available data sources used to infer individuals’ partisan leanings. We then describe and discuss the empirical evidence. Our review suggests an economically large and often growing partisan gap in the financial decisions of households, corporate executives, and financial intermediaries. Partisan alignment between individuals explains team and financial relationship formation, with initial evidence suggesting that high levels of partisan homogeneity may be associated with economic costs. We conclude by proposing several promising directions for future research.

This paper analyzes the impact of reduced tax incentives for equity financing on banks' regulatory capital ratios under the Basel III regime. We are particularly interested in a recent interest rate cut in the Italian corporate equity allowance, which reduces the relative tax advantage of equity financing. The results show that banks respond to this increased tax disparity by significantly reducing their regulatory capital while at the same time reducing their risk-taking. The decline in capital is more pronounced for small banks and outweighs the initial capital gains from the introduction of this tax instrument. Our results challenge the use of equity allowances, in that financial stability gains persist only as long as costly tax subsidies remain intact and diminish as the size of the subsidy is reduced.