The Roy-Borjas model predicts that international migrants are less educated than nonmigrants because the returns to education are generally higher in developing (migrant-sending) than in developed (migrant-receiving) countries. However, empirical evidence often shows the opposite. Using the case of Mexico-U.S. migration, we show that this inconsistency between predictions and empirical evidence can be resolved when the human capital of migrants is assessed using a two-dimensional measure of occupational skills rather than by educational attainment. Thus, focusing on a single skill dimension when investigating migrant selection can lead to misleading conclusions about the underlying economic incentives and behavioral models of migration.

We investigate how shareholder-debtholder conflict of interest affects the corporate tax avoidance using a unique setting of the affiliated and unaffiliated commercial bankers’ board representation. Consistent with the notion that board representation grants lenders’ access to private information that helps monitor and influence firms’ tax practice, we find that appointments of affiliated banker directors significantly reduce firms’ tax avoidance behavior, while appointing unaffiliated banker directors shows no such effect. The impact of affiliated banker directors on alleviating tax avoidance is stronger among firms with severer conflict of interest between shareholders and debtholders, specifically among firms with weaker corporate governance, higher financial leverage and higher CEO stock ownership.

We investigate the relationships among search symbols, trading performance, and investor participation. We use two specific datasets from Google Trends’ search volume index. The search volume by number ticker significantly predicts high returns and high investor participation when applied by active retail investors investing in large firms. This does not hold true for less active retail investors who use Chinese company name tickers as their search terms. Our results indicate that the heuristic usage of number tickers to search for company information helps active retail investors to obtain better trading performance compared with less active retail investors who use Chinese company name tickers.

We find that a firm’s stock price drops when its compensation peer firm announces a severe say-on-pay voting failure. This price drop causes a reduction in the focal firm CEO’s pay in the following period. The effect on CEO pay is stronger when the board of directors is more powerful, when the proxy advisor holds a negative view of the CEO’s pay, and when the hired compensation consultant is less reputable. Directors who cut their CEO’s pay following the price drop receive more voting support from investors than other directors. Our findings show that the peer firm’s voting failure induces a market-feedback effect for focal firm directors.

Die Weltwirtschaft steht im Frühjahr 2025 im Zeichen sich tiefgreifend ändernder geopolitischer und wirtschaftspolitischer Rahmenbedingungen. Vor dem Hintergrund des Politikwechsels in den USA sind insbesondere in Europa, aber nicht nur dort, neue sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen entstanden. Sie haben zunächst zu einer Lockerung fiskalischer Restriktionen beigetragen, machen aber zumindest längerfristig auch eine Überprüfung finanzpolitischer Prioritäten erforderlich. Zudem hat die US-Regierung begonnen, neue Handelshürden aufzubauen und zusätzliche Unsicherheiten für die wirtschaftlichen Akteure zu schaffen. Dies bremst den globalen Warenhandel und die Produktion sowohl weltweit als auch in den USA selbst, wo erste Anzeichen für eine Abkühlung der Konjunktur sichtbar sind.