Labor is among the most crucial factors of production that maintain a firm's competitiveness. Given its economic importance, drivers of firms' labor investment policy have gained increasing attention in the financial economics literature. This study investigates the relation between stock liquidity and labor investment efficiency. We establish a causal relation between the two phenomena using an exogenous shock to liquidity: the 2001 decimalization of stock trading. We find that labor investment efficiency improves following an increase in stock liquidity, and the effect is prevalent in firms experiencing overinvestment in labor. Our findings further support the argument that stock liquidity improves the efficiency of labor investment by enhancing governance through shareholder exit threat.

This paper investigates the association between CEO’s relative position in the social network and the likelihood of being involved in corporate fraud. Tracing a large sample of US publicly listed firms, we find that CEO network centrality is inversely related to the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. We also document a significant spillover effect of financial reporting behaviour from the dominant (most central) CEO to other CEOs in the same social network, suggesting that the ethical corporate behaviour of CEOs is, on average, influenced by that of their dominant CEO in the network. We further find that the role of CEO network centrality in reducing fraud risk is more prominent in firms with lower auditor quality. Overall, our results suggest that network centrality is an important CEO trait that promotes ethical financial reporting behaviour within social networks.

We examine how executive equity risk-taking incentives affect firms’ choice of debt structure. Using a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms, we document that when executive compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility (i.e., has higher vega), firms reduce their reliance on bank debt financing. We utilize the passage of the Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R option-expensing regulation as an exogenous shock to management option compensation to account for potential endogeneity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the documented effect of vega is amplified among firms with higher growth opportunities and more opaque financial information; we also find vega's effect is mitigated in firms with limited abilities to tap into public debt market. Supplemental analyses suggest that firms with higher vega face more stringent bank loan covenants. We conclude that, by encouraging risk-taking, higher vega reduces firms’ reliance on bank debt financing in order to avoid more stringent bank monitoring.

We conjecture that high stock liquidity negatively affects firm valuation by inducing inefficient investment. Using takeovers of public targets to study the empire-building motive, we find that a liquid firm is more likely than an illiquid firm to acquire a public firm. Such a takeover by a bidder with higher stock liquidity destroys bidder value to a larger degree. These patterns occur in both stock and cash acquisitions and hold after we use decimalization of tick size as a quasi-exogenous shock to stock liquidity. Finally, we show that financial constraints and corporate governance play important roles in the effects of stock liquidity on empire building in mergers and acquisitions.

Using a comprehensive US hedge fund activism dataset from 2003 to 2018, we find that activist hedge funds are about 52% more likely to target firms with female CEOs compared to firms with male CEOs. We find that firm fundamentals, the existence of a “glass cliff,” gender discrimination bias, and hedge fund activists’ inherent characteristics do not explain the observed gender effect. We also find that the transformational leadership style of female CEOs is a plausible explanation for this gender effect: instead of being self-defensive, female CEOs are more likely to communicate and cooperate with hedge fund activists to achieve intervention goals. Finally, we find that female-led targets experience greater increases in market and operational performance subsequent to hedge fund targeting.

This paper examines whether common institutional ownership is associated with CEO connectedness across firms. We document that higher common ownership between two same-industry firms predicts a greater likelihood that a newly appointed CEO has preexisting social ties to the incumbent CEO of the peer firm. To address endogeneity, we use mergers among institutional investors in a stacked difference-in-differences design. In a hiring-firm-peer panel that carries connection status forward from the most recent appointment, exposure to a merger-induced common blockholder approximately doubles the probability that the pair is observed in a connected-CEO state. In a broader firm-pair panel, it increases the probability of CEO connections by 48.7%. We further document that gaining CEO connections through another firm’s CEO appointment is associated with improvements in peer firms’ returns on assets and Tobin’s Q, in both OLS and IV specifications. Peer firms that gain such a connection also experience positive abnormal returns around other firms’ CEO hiring announcements, corresponding to an average increase of $112.5 million in shareholder value. These performance patterns suggest that CEO connections may be valuable from a portfolio-level perspective. Consistent with this interpretation, the association between common ownership and CEO connections is concentrated among product-similar and organizationally complex firms and strengthens after the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when connections appear more valuable. Our findings point to CEO connection as a potential governance channel through which common institutional ownership is linked to firm outcomes, complementing prior work on executive compensation, shareholder voting, and board interlocks.

Firms increasingly rely on markets for technology to acquire innovations developed outside their boundaries, yet acquiring intellectual property rights alone often does not guarantee successful implementation. Many technologies depend on tacit know-how that must be supplied by the provider after the transaction is completed. This paper examines whether common ownership between a technology provider and a potential adopter mitigates this implementation problem. I develop a model in which overlapping institutional investors cause the provider to partially internalize the adopter’s gains from successful implementation, strengthening incentives to transfer tacit know-how. This mechanism operates only when know-how is unverifiable – absent this friction, common ownership leaves matching and outcomes unchanged. Under moral hazard, the model predicts that common ownership increases the likelihood of technology transfer to a given adopter, that this effect is stronger when tacit know-how is more important, and that common ownership improves post-transfer outcomes conditional on adoption. I test these predictions using U.S. patent reassignments between publicly traded firms. Using within-deal variation across competing potential adopters and plausibly exogenous variation from passive index-fund holdings, I show that common ownership increases the likelihood that a firm acquires a technology, particularly when the transferred bundle is more tacit. Common ownership predicts stronger subsequent innovation and higher future firm value, especially when ownership overlap is concentrated among investors with stronger incentives to monitor the provider. These findings show how ownership structure shapes interfirm technology transfer by affecting not only who acquires a technology, but also how much value is created.

Agency theory holds that managerial discretion over stakeholder decisions creates agency costs through altruistic redistribution. We test this claim in a principalagent experiment where agents choose effort and transfers affecting a third party under unenforceable flat-wage contracts. We find that principals set ethically constrained targets and wages that track fairness benchmarks. Agents, however, do not divert resources to stakeholders: transfers are negative on average, and prosocial traits do not increase giving. Instead, contract terms, though unenforceable, systematically shape effort, transfers, and returns. Notably, prosocial agents generate higher total returns. Prosociality appears to mitigate rather than create efficiency losses, suggesting that discretion channels norm-sensitive loyalty rather than stakeholder redistribution.

Institutional common ownership of firm pairs in the same industry increases the likelihood of a preexisting social connection among their CEOs. We establish this relationship using a quasi-natural experiment that exploits institutional mergers combined with firms’ hiring events and detailed information on CEO biographies. In addition, for peer firms, gaining a CEO connection from a hiring firm’s CEO appointment correlates with higher returns on assets, stock market returns, and decreasing product similarity between companies. We find evidence consistent with common owners allocating CEO connections to shape managerial decisionmaking and increase portfolio firms’ performance.

This paper studies whether common ownership affects the direction of technological change. We develop a task-based model in which commonly owned firms internalize wage externalities from labor market rivals, increasing incentives to automate. We establish causality by exploiting institutional investor mergers in a dynamic DiD design, using U.S. data on institutional ownership, establishment-level employment, and automation patents. When institutional investor mergers increase common ownership among labor market rivals, the annual probability of those firms producing an automation patent increases by 3.79 percentage points and employment growth falls by 3.8 percentage points on average. Both effects disappear without labor market overlap.