Gesetzgebung, Regulierung und Faktormärkte

Traditionell wird die Regulierung von Finanz- und Arbeitsmärkten isoliert analysiert. Die neue Abteilung „Gesetzgebung, Regulierung und Faktormärkte“ erforscht systematisch die Interaktion von Regulierungen der Finanz- und Arbeitsmärkte und deren Auswirkungen auf die langfristige realwirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Dies wird erreicht, indem wachstums- und strukturrelevante Aspekte der Rahmenbedingungen an Finanz- und Arbeitsmärkten gemeinsam erforscht werden. Das Alleinstellungsmerkmal der neuen Abteilung ist die Untersuchung der Interdependenz von staatlicher Regulierung im Bereich der Finanz- und Arbeitsmärkte und der realwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.

Ihr Kontakt

Professorin Merih Sevilir, Ph.D.
Professorin Merih Sevilir, Ph.D.
Leiter - Abteilung Gesetzgebung, Regulierung und Faktormärkte
Nachricht senden +49 345 7753-808

Referierte Publikationen

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Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data

Andres Drenik Simon Jäger Pascuel Plotkin Benjamin Schoefer

in: Review of Economics and Statistics, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We estimate how much firms differentiate pay premia between regular and outsourced workers in temp agency work arrangements. We leverage unique Argentinian administrative data that feature links between user firms (the workplaces where temp workers perform their labor) and temp agencies (their formal employers). We estimate that a high-wage user firm that pays a regular worker a 10% premium pays a temp worker on average only a 4.9% premium, compared to what these workers would earn in a low-wage user firm in their respective work arrangements—the midpoint between the benchmarks for insiders (one) and the competitive spot-labor market (zero).

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Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

Reint E. Gropp Thomas Mosk Steven Ongena Ines Simac Carlo Wix

in: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments — without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk. We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

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Marginal Jobs and Job Surplus: A Test of the Efficiency of Separations

Simon Jäger Benjamin Schoefer Josef Zweimüller

in: Review of Economic Studies, im Erscheinen

Abstract

We present a test of Coasean theories of efficient separations. We study a cohort of jobs from the introduction through the repeal of a large age- and region-specific unemployment benefit extension in Austria. In the treatment group, 18.5% fewer jobs survive the program period. According to the Coasean view, the destroyed marginal jobs had low joint surplus. Hence, after the repeal, the treatment survivors should be more resilient than the ineligible control group survivors. Strikingly, the two groups instead exhibit identical post-repeal separation behavior. We provide, and find suggestive evidence consistent with, an alternative model in which wage rigidity drives the inefficient separation dynamics.

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What Does Codetermination Do?

Simon Jäger Shakked Noy Benjamin Schoefer

in: ILR Review, Nr. 4, 2022

Abstract

The authors provide a comprehensive overview of codetermination, that is, worker representation in firms’ governance and management. The available micro evidence points to zero or small positive effects of codetermination on worker and firm outcomes and leaves room for moderate positive effects on productivity, wages, and job stability. The authors also present new country-level, general-equilibrium event studies of codetermination reforms between the 1960s and 2010s, finding no effects on aggregate economic outcomes or the quality of industrial relations. They offer three explanations for the institution’s limited impact. First, existing codetermination laws convey little authority to workers. Second, countries with codetermination laws have high baseline levels of informal worker voice. Third, codetermination laws may interact with other labor market institutions, such as union representation and collective bargaining. The article closes with a discussion of the implications for recent codetermination proposals in the United States.

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The Cleansing Effect of Banking Crises

Reint E. Gropp Steven Ongena Jörg Rocholl Vahid Saadi

in: Economic Inquiry, Nr. 3, 2022

Abstract

We assess the cleansing effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis. U.S. regions with higher levels of supervisory forbearance on distressed banks see less restructuring in the real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs are lost when more distressed banks remain in business. In these regions, the banking sector has been less healthy for several years after the crisis. Regions with less forbearance experience higher productivity growth after the crisis with more firm entries, job creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. Forbearance is greater for state-chartered banks and in regions with weaker banking competition and more independent banks.

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Arbeitspapiere

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Banking Deregulation and Consumption of Home Durables

H. Evren Damar Ian Lange Caitlin McKennie Mirko Moro

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 4, 2022

Abstract

We exploit the spatial and temporal variation of the staggered introduction of interstate banking deregulation across the U.S. to study the relationship between credit constraints and consumption of durables. Using the American Housing Survey from 1981 to 1989, we link the timing of these reforms with evidence of a credit expansion and household responses on many margins. We find evidence that low-income households are more likely to purchase new appliances after the deregulation. These durable goods allowed households to consume less natural gas and spend less time in domestic activities after the reforms.

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The Adverse Effect of Contingent Convertible Bonds on Bank Stability

Melina Ludolph

in: IWH Discussion Papers, Nr. 1, 2022

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of issuing contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds on bank risk. I apply a matching-based difference-in-differences approach to banklevel data for 246 publicly traded European banks and 61 CoCo issues from 2008−2018. My estimation results reveal that issuing CoCo bonds that meet the criteria for additional tier 1 (AT1) capital results in significantly higher z-scores one to three years after the issuance. Rather than having a net negative impact, issuing CoCos seems to impede a positive time trend towards greater bank stability. This study adds to the empirical literature on the risk-effect of contingent convertibles by identifying the causal effect of AT1 CoCo bonds on reported risk changes over a three-year post-treatment horizon based on a comprehensive sample of European banks. The results confirm theoretical predictions that currently outstanding CoCo bonds create incentives for excessive risk-taking.

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Corporate Loan Spreads and Economic Activity

Anthony Saunders Alessandro Spina Sascha Steffen Daniel Streitz

in: SSRN Working Paper, 2021

Abstract

We use secondary corporate loan-market prices to construct a novel loan-market-based credit spread. This measure has considerable predictive power for economic activity across macroeconomic outcomes in both the U.S. and Europe and captures unique information not contained in public market credit spreads. Loan-market borrowers are compositionally different and particularly sensitive to supply-side frictions as well as financial frictions that emanate from their own balance sheets. This evidence highlights the joint role of financial intermediary and borrower balance-sheet frictions in understanding macroeconomic developments and enriches our understanding of which type of financial frictions matter for the economy.

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Capital Misallocation and Innovation

Christian Schmidt Yannik Schneider Sascha Steffen Daniel Streitz

in: SSRN Solutions Research Paper Series, 2020

Abstract

This paper documents that "zombie" lending by undercapitalized banks distorts competition and impedes corporate innovation. This misallocation of capital prevents both the exit of zombie and entry of healthy firms in affected industries adversely impacting output and competition. Worse, capital misallocation depresses patent applications, particularly in high technology- and R&D-intensive sectors, and industries with neck- and-neck competition. We strengthen our results using an IV approach to address reverse causality and innovation survey data from the European Commission. Overall, our results are consistent with externalities imposed on healthy firms through the misallocation of capital.

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Dynamic Equity Slope

Matthijs Breugem Stefano Colonnello Roberto Marfè Francesca Zucchi

in: University of Venice Ca' Foscari Department of Economics Working Papers, Nr. 21, 2020

Abstract

The term structure of equity and its cyclicality are key to understand the risks drivingequilibrium asset prices. We propose a general equilibrium model that jointly  explainsfour important features of the term structure of equity: (i) a negative unconditionalterm premium, (ii) countercyclical term premia, (iii) procyclical equity yields, and (iv)premia to value and growth claims respectively increasing and decreasing with thehorizon. The economic mechanism hinges on the interaction between heteroskedasticlong-run growth — which helps price long-term cash flows and leads to countercyclicalrisk premia — and homoskedastic short-term shocks in the presence of limited marketparticipation — which produce sizeable risk premia to short-term cash flows. The slopedynamics hold irrespective of the sign of its unconditional average. We provide empirical support to our model assumptions and predictions.

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