Juniorprofessorin Lena Tonzer, Ph.D.

Juniorprofessorin Lena Tonzer, Ph.D.
Aktuelle Position

seit 9/17

Juniorprofessorin

Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg

seit 5/14

Leiterin der Forschungsgruppe Regulierung internationaler Finanzmärkte und Banken

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

seit 5/14

Leiterin der International Banking Library

Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Forschungsschwerpunkte

  • Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrisen
  • Integration auf Finanzmärkten
  • Bankenregulierung

Lena Tonzer ist seit September 2017 Juniorprofessorin an der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg (ESF-Projekt Die politische Ökonomie der europäischen Bankenunion) und seit Mai 2014 Mitglied der Abteilung Finanzmärkte am IWH. Seit 2019 ist sie zudem SUERF Research Affiliate. Sie forscht zu den Themen Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrisen, Integration auf Finanzmärkten und Bankenregulierung.

Lena Tonzer studierte an der Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen und promovierte am Europäischen Hochschulinstitut (EUI) in Florenz, Italien.

Ihr Kontakt

Juniorprofessorin Lena Tonzer, Ph.D.
Juniorprofessorin Lena Tonzer, Ph.D.
Mitglied - Abteilung Finanzmärkte
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Publikationen

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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation

Michael Koetter Thomas Krause Lena Tonzer

in: European Journal of Political Economy, im Erscheinen

Abstract

Most countries in the European Union (EU) delay the transposition of European Commission (EC) directives, which aim at reforming banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance. We compile a systematic overview of these delays to investigate if they result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems. Transposition delays pertaining to the three Banking Union directives differ considerably across the 28 EU members. Bivariate regression analyses suggest that existing national bank regulation and supervision drive delays the most. Political factors are less relevant. These results are qualitatively insensitive to alternative estimation methods and lag structures. Multivariate analyses highlight that well-stocked deposit insurance schemes speed-up the implementation of capital requirements, banking systems with many banks are slower in implementing new bank rescue and resolution rules, and countries with a more intensive sovereign-bank nexus delay the harmonization of EU deposit insurance more.

Publikation lesen

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Drivers of Systemic Risk: Do National and European Perspectives Differ?

Claudia M. Buch Thomas Krause Lena Tonzer

in: Journal of International Money and Finance, 2019

Abstract

With the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Central Bank has been granted the power to impose stricter regulations than the national regulator if systemic risks are not adequately addressed at the national level. We ask whether there is a cross-border externality in the sense that a bank’s systemic risk differs when applying a national versus a European perspective. On average, banks’ contribution to systemic risk is similar at the two regional levels, and so is the ranking of banks. Generally, larger banks and banks with a lower share of loans are more systemically important. The effects of these variables are qualitatively but not quantitatively similar at the national versus the European level.

Publikation lesen

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Central Bank Transparency and Cross-border Banking

Stefan Eichler Helge Littke Lena Tonzer

in: Journal of International Money and Finance, Nr. 6, 2017

Abstract

We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent and operates in a stable economic environment. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.

Publikation lesen

Arbeitspapiere

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Interactions Between Regulatory and Corporate Taxes: How Is Bank Leverage Affected?

F. Bremus Kirsten Schmidt Lena Tonzer

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 16, 2018

Abstract

Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn ineffective. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.

Publikation lesen

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Did the Swiss Exchange Rate Shock Shock the Market?

Manuel Buchholz Gregor von Schweinitz Lena Tonzer

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 9, 2018

Abstract

The Swiss National Bank abolished the exchange rate floor versus the Euro in January 2015. Based on a synthetic matching framework, we analyse the impact of this unexpected (and therefore exogenous) shock on the stock market. The results reveal a significant level shift (decline) in asset prices in Switzerland following the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. While adjustments in stock market returns were most pronounced directly after the news announcement, the variance was elevated for some weeks, indicating signs of increased uncertainty and potentially negative consequences for the real economy.

Publikation lesen

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Macroprudential Policy and Intra-group Dynamics: The Effects of Reserve Requirements in Brazil

Chris Becker Matias Ossandon Busch Lena Tonzer

in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere, Nr. 21, 2017

Abstract

This paper examines whether intra-group dynamics matter for the transmission of macroprudential policy. Using novel bank-level data on the Brazilian banking system, we investigate the effect of reserve requirements targeting headquarter banks’ deposit share on credit supply by their municipal bank branches. For identification purposes, we exploit that reserve requirements are adjusted following global economic cycles. Our results reveal a lending channel of reserve requirements for branches whose parent banks are more exposed to targeted deposits. Branch ownership and exposure to internal liquidity are central in explaining the results. Our findings reveal limitations in current macroprudential policy frameworks.

Publikation lesen
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