Accounting for Distress in Bank Mergers

Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.

01. October 2007

Authors Michael Koetter J. W. B. Bos Frank Heid James W. Kolari Clemens J. M. Kool Daniel Porath

Whom to contact

For Journalists

Mitglied der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft LogoTotal-Equality-LogoSupported by the BMWK