Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital

The implementation of supranational regulations at the national level often provides national authorities with substantial room to engage in discretion and forbearance. Using evidence from a supranational increase in bank capital requirements, this column shows that national authorities may assist banks' efforts to inflate their regulatory capital to pass such supranational requirements. While supranational rules should be binding in theory, national discretion may effectively undermine them in practice. 

14. Februar 2021

Autoren Reint E. Gropp Thomas Mosk Steven Ongena Ines Simac Carlo Wix

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