Strukturwandel und Produktivität
Die Abteilung Strukturwandel und Produktivität untersucht Prozesse strukturellen Wandels, die beispielsweise durch Globalisierung oder technologische Neuerungen erzeugt werden können. Struktureller Wandel führt zu Aufschwung und Niedergang von Regionen, Wirtschaftszweigen und Betrieben und hat direkte Konsequenzen für die betroffenen Arbeitnehmer. Wir erforschen die Auswirkungen strukturellen Wandels empirisch mit Hilfe mikroökonometrischer Verfahren. Die Abteilung stellt zudem das Sekretariat des Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet), das ein Zentrum für Forschung und Politikberatung rund um die Themen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Produktivität ist.
Im Fokus unserer Arbeit stehen Produktivität, Innovationstätigkeit und Arbeitsmarktergebnisse wie zum Beispiel Beschäftigung und Lohnniveau. Ein besonderes Augenmerk liegt auf dem Transformationsprozess in Ostdeutschland. Diese wissenschaftlich und wirtschaftspolitisch relevanten Forschungsfragen werden durch die Abteilung im Forschungscluster "Institutionen und soziale Normen" sowie im Forschungscluster "Produktivität und Innovationen" analysiert.
Vertical Grants and Local Public Efficiency. The Inference-disturbing Effect of Fiscal Equalization
in: Public Finance Review , im Erscheinen
The existing empirical literature on the impact of vertical grants on local public-sector efficiency yields mixed results. Given the fact that vertical financial equalization systems often reduce differences in fiscal capacity, we argue that empirical studies based on cross-sectional data may yield a positive relationship between grants and efficiency of public service production even when the underlying causal effect is not. We provide a simple illustrative theoretical model to show the logic of our argument and illustrate its relevance by an empirical case study for the German state of Saxony-Anhalt. We show that our main argument of an inference-disturbing effect applies to those existing studies that are more optimistic about the impact of vertical grants. Finally, we argue that it may disturb the inference drawn from studies in a number of other countries where vertical grants—intended or not—concentrate in fiscally weak municipalities.
Do Employers Have More Monopsony Power in Slack Labor Markets?
in: Industrial and Labor Relations Review , im Erscheinen
This article confronts monopsony theory’s predictions regarding workers’ wages with observed wage patterns over the business cycle. Using German administrative data for the years 1985 to 2010 and an estimation framework based on duration models, the authors construct a time series of the labor supply elasticity to the firm and estimate its relationship to the unemployment rate. They find that firms possess more monopsony power during economic downturns. Half of this cyclicality stems from workers’ job separations being less wage driven when unemployment rises, and the other half mirrors that firms find it relatively easier to poach workers. Results show that the cyclicality is more pronounced in tight labor markets with low unemployment, and that the findings are robust to controlling for time-invariant unobserved worker or plant heterogeneity. The authors further document that cyclical changes in workers’ entry wages are of similar magnitude as those predicted under pure monopsonistic wage setting.
Size of Training Firms and Cumulated Long-Run Unemployment Exposure – The Role of Firms, Luck, and Ability in Young Workers’ Careers
in: International Journal of Manpower , im ErscheinenPublikation lesen
Why Is there Resistance to Works Councils In Germany? An Economic Perspective
in: Economic and Industrial Democracy , im Erscheinen
Recent empirical research generally finds evidence of positive economic effects for works councils, for example with regard to productivity and – with some limitations – to profits. This makes it necessary to explain why employers’ associations have reservations about works councils. On the basis of an in-depth literature analysis, this article shows that beyond the generally positive findings, there are important heterogeneities in the impact of works councils. The authors argue that those groups of employers that tend to benefit little from employee participation in terms of productivity and profits may well be important enough to shape the agenda of their employers’ organization and have even gained in importance within their organizations in recent years. The authors also discuss the role of deviations from profit-maximizing behavior like risk aversion, short-term profit-maximization and other non-pecuniary motives, as possible reasons for employer resistance.
Does Administrative Status Matter for Urban Growth? – Evidence from Present and Former County Capitals in East Germany
in: Growth and Change , Nr. 1, 2018
Public sector activities are often neglected in the economic approaches used to analyze the driving forces behind urban growth. The institutional status of a regional capital is a crucial aspect of public sector activities. This paper reports on a quasi-natural experiment on county towns in East Germany. Since 1990, cities in East Germany have demonstrated remarkable differences in population development. During this same period, many towns have lost their status as a county seat due to several administrative reforms. Using a difference-in-difference approach, the annual population development of former county capitals is compared to population change in towns that have successfully held on to their capital status throughout the observed period. The estimations show that maintaining county capital status has a statistically significant positive effect on annual changes in population. This effect is furthermore increasing over time after the implementation of the respective reforms.
Firm Wage Premia, Industrial Relations, and Rent Sharing in Germany
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 2, 2018
This paper investigates the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. OLS regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed effects decomposition of workers’ wages by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) document that average premia are larger in firms bound by collective agreements and in firms with a works council, holding constant firm performance. RIF regressions show that premia are less dispersed among covered firms but more dispersed among firms with a works council. Hence, deunionisation is the only among the suspects investigated that contributes to explaining the marked rise in the premia dispersion over time.
“The Good News about Bad News”: Feedback about Past Organisational Failure and its Impact on Worker Productivity
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 1, 2018
Failure in organisations is a very common phenomenon. Little is known about whether past failure affects workers’ subsequent performance. We conduct a field experiment in which we follow up a failed mail campaign to attract new volunteers with a phone campaign pursuing the same goal. We recruit temporary workers to carry out the phone campaign and randomly assign them to either receive or not receive information about the previous failure and measure their performance. We find that informed workers perform better – in terms of both numbers dialed (about 14% improvement) and completed interviews (about 20% improvement) – regardless of whether they had previously worked on the failed mail campaign. Evidence from a second experiment with student volunteers asked to support a campaign to reduce food waste suggests that the mechanism behind our finding relates to contextual inference: Informing workers/volunteers that they are pursuing a goal that is hard to attain seems to add meaning to the work involved, leading them to exert more effort.
Explaining Wage Losses after Job Displacement: Employer Size and Lost Firm Rents
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 32, 2017
Why does job displacement, e.g., following import competition, technological change, or economic downturns, result in permanent wage losses? The job displacement literature is silent on whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We therefore estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums. Premiums are measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects approach, as described in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Using German administrative data, we find that wage losses are, on average, fully explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses in wages and premiums are minor for workers displaced from small plants and strongly increase with pre-displacement firm size, which provides an explanation for the large and persistent wage losses that have been found in previous studies mostly focusing on displacement from large employers.
Who Benefits from GRW? Heterogeneous Employment Effects of Investment Subsidies in Saxony Anhalt
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 27, 2017
The paper estimates the plant level employment effects of investment subsidies in one of the most strongly subsidized German Federal States. We analyze the treated plants as a whole, as well as the influence of heterogeneity in plant characteristics and the economic environment. Modifying the standard matching and difference-in-difference approach, we develop a new procedure that is particularly useful for the evaluation of funding programs with individual treatment phases within the funding period. Our data base combines treatment, employment and regional information from different sources. So, we can relate the absolute effects to the amount of the subsidy paid. The results suggest that investment subsidies have a positive influence on the employment development in absolute and standardized figures – with considerable effect heterogeneity.
Measuring Indirect Effects of Unfair Employer Behavior on Worker Productivity – A Field Experiment
in: IWH-Diskussionspapiere , Nr. 26, 2017
We present a field experiment in which we set up a call-center to study how the productivity of workers is affected if managers treat their co-workers in an unfair way. This question cannot be studied in long-lived organizations since workers may change their career expectations (and hence effort) when managers behave unfairly towards co-workers. In order to rule out such confounds and to measure productivity changes of unaffected workers in a clean way, we create an environment where employees work for two shifts. In one treatment, we lay off parts of the workforce before the second shift. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that, in the layoff treatment, the productivity of the remaining, unaffected workers drops by 12 percent. We show that this result is not driven by peer effects or altered beliefs about the job or the managers’ competence, but rather related to the workers’ perception of unfair behavior of employers towards co-workers. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a survey among professional HR managers. We also show that the effect of unfair behavior on the productivity of unaffected workers is close to the upper bound of the direct effects of wage cuts on the productivity of affected workers. This suggests that the price of an employer’s unfair behavior goes well beyond the potential tit-for-tat of directly affected workers.