Who Benefits from Mandatory CSR? Evidence from the Indian Companies Act 2013
Jitendra Aswani, N. K. Chidambaran, Iftekhar Hasan
Emerging Markets Review,
March
2021
Abstract
We examine the value impact of mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) spending required by the Indian Companies Act of 2013 for large and profitable Indian firms. We find that the external mandate is value decreasing, even after controlling for prior voluntary CSR activity by firms affected by the mandate. We also find that there is systematic crosssectional variation across firms. Firms that are profitable and firms in the Fast Moving Consumer Goods sector that voluntarily engaged in CSR, benefit from CSR. Industrial firms and firms with high capital expenditures are negatively impacted by the mandate. We conclude that a one-size-fits-all approach to CSR is sub-optimal and value decreasing.
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Lending Effects of the ECB’s Asset Purchases
Michael Koetter
Journal of Monetary Economics,
December
2020
Abstract
Between 2010 and 2012, the European Central Bank absorbed €218 billion worth of government securities from five EMU countries under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP). Detailed security holdings data at the bank level affirms an effective lending stimulus due to the SMP. Exposed banks contract household lending, but increase commercial lending substantially. Holding non-SMP securities from stressed EMU countries amplifies the commercial lending response. The SMP also improved liquidity buffers and profitability without compromising credit quality.
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Dynamic Equity Slope
Matthijs Breugem, Stefano Colonnello, Roberto Marfè, Francesca Zucchi
University of Venice Ca' Foscari Department of Economics Working Papers,
Nr. 21,
2020
Abstract
The term structure of equity and its cyclicality are key to understand the risks drivingequilibrium asset prices. We propose a general equilibrium model that jointly explainsfour important features of the term structure of equity: (i) a negative unconditionalterm premium, (ii) countercyclical term premia, (iii) procyclical equity yields, and (iv)premia to value and growth claims respectively increasing and decreasing with thehorizon. The economic mechanism hinges on the interaction between heteroskedasticlong-run growth — which helps price long-term cash flows and leads to countercyclicalrisk premia — and homoskedastic short-term shocks in the presence of limited marketparticipation — which produce sizeable risk premia to short-term cash flows. The slopedynamics hold irrespective of the sign of its unconditional average. We provide empirical support to our model assumptions and predictions.
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Tournament Incentives and Acquisition Performance
Iftekhar Hasan, Marco Navone, Thomas To, Eliza Wu
Review of Corporate Finance Studies,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives on corporate acquisition performance. Measuring tournament incentives as the compensation ratio between the CEO and other senior executives, we show that acquirers with greater tournament incentives experience lower announcement returns. Further analysis shows that the negative effect is driven by the risk-seeking behavior of senior executives induced by tournament incentives. Our results are robust to alternative identification strategies. Our evidence highlights that senior executives, in addition to the CEO, play an influential role in acquisition decisions.
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Investor Relations and IPO Performance
Salim Chahine, Gonul Colak, Iftekhar Hasan, Mohamad Mazboudi
Review of Accounting Studies,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
We analyze the value of investor relations (IR) strategies to IPO firms. We find that firms that are less visible and have inexperienced management tend to hire IR consultants prior to the issue date. IR consultants help create positive news coverage before an IPO, as reflected in a more optimistic tone of published media. Their presence is associated with higher underpricing at the IPO date but with lower long-run returns. IR-backed IPOs also exhibit disproportionately higher insider-related agency problems, as IR-induced higher underpricing tends to occur primarily in IPOs where underwriter and venture capitalist agency conflicts are more severe. These findings suggest that the IR programs of IPO firm are mostly short-term oriented and facilitate the ulterior motives of some insiders (underwriters and venture capitalists) targeting higher first-day returns.
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Why are some Chinese Firms Failing in the US Capital Markets? A Machine Learning Approach
Gonul Colak, Mengchuan Fu, Iftekhar Hasan
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,
June
2020
Abstract
We study the market performance of Chinese companies listed in the U.S. stock exchanges using machine learning methods. Predicting the market performance of U.S. listed Chinese firms is a challenging task due to the scarcity of data and the large set of unknown predictors involved in the process. We examine the market performance from three different angles: the underpricing (or short-term market phenomena), the post-issuance stock underperformance (or long-term market phenomena), and the regulatory delistings (IPO failure risk). Using machine learning techniques that can better handle various data problems, we improve on the predictive power of traditional estimations, such as OLS and logit. Our predictive model highlights some novel findings: failed Chinese companies have chosen unreliable U.S. intermediaries when going public, and they tend to suffer from more severe owners-related agency problems.
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Democracy and Credit
Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan, Steven Ongena
Journal of Financial Economics,
Nr. 2,
2020
Abstract
Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizable negative effect on loan spreads: a 1-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.
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How to Talk Down Your Stock Performance
Andreas Barth, Sasan Mansouri, Fabian Wöbbeking, Severin Zörgiebel
SSRN Discussion Papers,
2020
Abstract
We process the natural language of verbal firm disclosures in order to study the use of context specific language or jargon and its impact on financial performance. We observe that, within the Q&A of earnings conference calls, managers use less jargon in responses to tougher questions, and after a quarter of bad economic success. Moreover, markets interpret the lack of precise information as a bad signal: we find lower cumulative abnormal returns and a higher implied volatility following earnings calls where managers use less jargon. These results support the argument that context specific language or jargon helps to efficiently and precisely transfer information.
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National Culture and Housing Credit
Chrysovalantis Gaganis, Iftekhar Hasan, Fotios Pasiouras
Journal of Empirical Finance,
March
2020
Abstract
Using a sample of around 30 countries over the period 2001–2015, this study provides evidence that deeply rooted cultural differences are significantly associated with the use of mortgage debt. More detailed, we find that power distance and uncertainty avoidance have a negative impact on the value of the total outstanding residential loans to GDP. This finding is robust across various specifications and the use of alternative measures of mortgage debt. In contrast, trust has a positive and robust impact on all the measures of mortgage debt. Other dimensions of national culture like long-term orientation, individualism, and indulgence, also appear to matter; however, their impact depends on the control variables and the employed measure of mortgage debt.
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Benchmark on Themselves: CEO-directors’ Influence on the CEO Compensation
Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Yun Zhu
Managerial Finance,
Nr. 7,
2019
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms.
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