presse@iwh-halle.de
Pills or puts?
Shuo Xia
Financial Times, February 2, 2024
We propose a novel mechanism how central bank interventions can affect the real economy: direct corporate debt purchases by a central bank can increase the effectiveness of the banklending channel.
A growing recent literature relies on a precautionary pricing motive embedded in representative agent DSGE models with sticky prices and wages to generate negative output effects of uncertainty shocks.
This paper revisits the question about the role of culture for comparative development differences by considering heterogeneity in patience as a central factor.
We study the implications of multi-period mortgage loans for monetary policy, considering several realistic modifications – fixed interest rate contracts, lower bound constraint on newly granted loans, and possibility for the collateral constraint to become slack – to an otherwise standard DSGE model with housing and financial intermediaries.
The extent to which a country can benefit from trade openness crucially depends on its ease of reallocating resources. However, we know little about the role of domestic frictions in shaping the effects of trade policy.
We offer new evidence on the real effects of credit shocks in the presence of employment protection regulations by exploiting a unique provision in Spanish labor laws: dismissal rules are less stringent for Spanish firms with fewer than 50 employees, lowering the cost of hiring new workers.
We pin down a new mechanism behind comparative advantage by pointing out that countries differ in their ability to adjust to technological change. We take stock of the pattern extensively documented in the labor literature whereby more efficient machines displace workers from codifiable (routine) tasks.
This paper examines the links between the internationalization mode of firms and market imperfections in product and labor markets.
This paper analyzes the effects of policy rates on financial intermediaries' risk-taking decisions. We consider an economy where (i) intermediaries have market power in granting loans, (ii) intermediaries monitor borrowers which lowers their probability of default, and (iii) monitoring is not observable which creates a moral hazard problem.
We show that analyst valuations became less accurate and more pessimistic following a large drop in accounting earnings that did not reveal new information about firm value.