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Professor Michael Koetter, PhD

Professor Michael Koetter, PhD
Current Position

since 10/20

Vice President

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) – Member of the Leibniz Association

since 9/16

Head of the Department of Financial Markets

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association 

since 9/16

Professor of Financial Economics

Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

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Research Interests
  • corporate investment allocation and aggregate growth
  • financial intermediation
  • financial stability and banking regulation
  • risk taking and competition
  • real implications of monetary and economic policy

Michael Koetter is a member of the executive board of the institute. He is Professor of Financial Economics at the Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg and head of the Financial Markets department at IWH. The department is host to the annual FIN-FIRE conference on challenges to financial stability.

His research interests concern generally the causal effects of policy actions on financial and non-financial agents’ behaviour. Specific topics are the role of micro- and macro-prudential regulation for the stability of financial systems as well as whether and how financial intermediaries help or hinder the re-allocation of productive resources amongst firms, sectors, and countries. The political economy of financial and economic systems with regards to market structure and risk-resilience is another topic of interest.

Michael Koetter obtained his PhD in economics from Utrecht University and his MSc in international economics from the University of Maastricht. Prior to joining IWH, he was a Professor at Frankfurt School of Finance & Management (2012-2016) and the University of Groningen (2006-2012). He currently serves as a member of the scientific advisory board of the Research Data and Service Center of Deutsche Bundesbank, an editor at the Economics of Transition, and the Vice President of the IBEFA association.

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Professor Michael Koetter, PhD
Professor Michael Koetter, PhD
Leiter - Department Financial Markets
Send Message +49 345 7753-727 Personal page

Publications

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Political Cycles in Bank Lending to the Government

Michael Koetter Alexander Popov

in: Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming

Abstract

We study how political party turnover after German state elections affects banks’ lending to the regional government. We find that between 1992 and 2018, party turnover at the state level leads to a sharp and substantial increase in lending by local savings banks to their home-state government. This effect is accompanied by an equivalent reduction in private lending. A statistical association between political party turnover and government lending is absent for comparable cooperative banks that exhibit a similar regional organization and business model. Our results suggest that political frictions may interfere with government-owned banks’ local development objectives.

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Equity Crowdfunding: High-quality or Low-quality Entrepreneurs?

Daniel Blaseg Douglas Cumming Michael Koetter

in: Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice, forthcoming

Abstract

Equity crowdfunding (ECF) has potential benefits that might be attractive to high-quality entrepreneurs, including fast access to a large pool of investors and obtaining feedback from the market. However, there are potential costs associated with ECF due to early public disclosure of entrepreneurial activities, communication costs with large pools of investors, and equity dilution that could discourage future equity investors; these costs suggest that ECF attracts low-quality entrepreneurs. In this paper, we hypothesize that entrepreneurs tied to more risky banks are more likely to be low-quality entrepreneurs and thus are more likely to use ECF. A large sample of ECF campaigns in Germany shows strong evidence that connections to distressed banks push entrepreneurs to use ECF. We find some evidence, albeit less robust, that entrepreneurs who can access other forms of equity are less likely to use ECF. Finally, the data indicate that entrepreneurs who access ECF are more likely to fail.

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Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Moritz Stieglitz

in: Economic Inquiry, No. 1, 2021

Abstract

Theoretically, bank's loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalization. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers' investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank‐firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalized banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands‐off approach is associated with improved borrowers' performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.

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Working Papers

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Completing the European Banking Union: Capital Cost Consequences for Credit Providers and Corporate Borrowers

Michael Koetter Thomas Krause Eleonora Sfrappini Lena Tonzer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 4, 2021

Abstract

The bank recovery and resolution directive (BRRD) regulates the bail-in hierarchy to resolve distressed banks without burdening tax payers. We exploit the staggered implementation of the BRRD across 15 European Union (EU) member states to identify banks’ capital cost and capital structure responses. In a first stage, we show that average capital costs of banks increased. WACC hikes are lowest in the core countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) compared to formerly stressed EMU and non-EMU countries. This pattern is driven by changes in the relative WACC weight of equity in response to the BRRD, which indicates enhanced financial system resilience. In a second stage, we document asymmetric transmission patterns of banks’ capital cost changes on to corporates’ borrowing terms. Only EMU banks located in core countries that exhibit higher WACC are those that also increase firms’ borrowing cost and contract credit supply. Hence, the BRRD had unintended consequences for selected segments of the real economy.

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Benign Neglect of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking or Ignorant Monitoring?

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Moritz Stieglitz

in: IWH Discussion Papers, forthcoming

Abstract

Theoretically, bank‘s loan monitoring activity hinges critically on its capitalisation. To proxy for monitoring intensity, we use changes in borrowers‘ investment following loan covenant violations, when creditors can intervene in the governance of the firm. Exploiting granular bank-firm relationships observed in the syndicated loan market, we document substantial heterogeneity in monitoring across banks and through time. Better capitalised banks are more lenient monitors that intervene less with covenant violators. Importantly, this hands-off approach is associated with improved borrowers‘ performance. Beyond enhancing financial resilience, regulation that requires banks to hold more capital may thus also mitigate the tightening of credit terms when firms experience shocks.

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Do Asset Purchase Programmes Shape Industry Dynamics? Evidence from the ECB's SMP on Plant Entries and Exits

Manfred Antoni Michael Koetter Steffen Müller Talina Sondershaus

in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 12, 2019

Abstract

Asset purchase programmes (APPs) may insulate banks from having to terminate relationships with unproductive customers. Using administrative plant and bank data, we test whether APPs impinge on industry dynamics in terms of plant entry and exit. Plants in Germany connected to banks with access to an APP are approximately 20% less likely to exit. In particular, unproductive plants connected to weak banks with APP access are less likely to close. Aggregate entry and exit rates in regional markets with high APP exposures are also lower. Thus, APPs seem to subdue Schumpeterian cleansing mechanisms, which may hamper factor reallocation and aggregate productivity growth.

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Keywords

Financial Institutions Financial Markets Financial Stability Policy Evaluation Monetary Policy The new Europe Risk Regulation Real Estate SME (small and medium enterprises)
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