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Professor Michael Koetter, PhD

Professor Michael Koetter, PhD
Current Position

seit 9/16

Head of the Department of Financial Markets

Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association 

seit 9/16

Professor of Financial Economics

Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg

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Research Interests
  • corporate investment allocation and aggregate growth
  • financial intermediation
  • financial stability and banking regulation
  • risk taking and competition
  • real implications of monetary and economic policy

Michael Koetter is Professor of Financial Economics at the University of Magdeburg and head of the Department of Financial Markets at IWH since September 2016. The department is host to the annual FIN-FIRE conference on challenges to financial stability.

Contemporary research interests cover broadly three main areas. First, the role of micro- and macro-prudential regulation for the stability of financial systems. Second, the role of financial intermediaries to re-allocate productive resources amongst firms, sectors, and countries. Third, the political economy of financial and economic systems with regards to market structure and risk-resilience.

Michael Koetter obtained his PhD in economics from Utrecht University and his MSc in international economics from the University of Maastricht. Before joining IWH, he was a Professor at Frankfurt School of Finance & Management (2012-2016) and the University of Groningen (2006-2012). He is currently also member of the scientific advisory board of the Research Data and Service Center of Deutsche Bundesbank, an editor at the Economics of Transition, and the Vice President of the IBEFA association.

Your contact

Professor Michael Koetter, PhD
Professor Michael Koetter, PhD
Leiter - Department Financial Markets
Send Message +49 345 7753-727

Publications

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Cross-border Transmission of Emergency Liquidity

Thomas Kick Michael Koetter Manuela Storz

in: Journal of Banking & Finance, forthcoming

Abstract

We show that emergency liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve transmitted to non-U.S. banking markets. Based on manually collected holding company structures, we identify banks in Germany with access to U.S. facilities. Using detailed interest rate data reported to the German central bank, we compare lending and borrowing rates of banks with and without such access. U.S. liquidity shocks cause a significant decrease in the short-term funding costs of the average German bank with access. This reduction is mitigated for banks with more vulnerable balance sheets prior to the inception of emergency liquidity. We also find a significant pass-through in terms of lower corporate credit rates charged for banks with the lowest pre-crisis leverage, US-dollar funding needs, and liquidity buffers. Spillover effects from U.S. emergency liquidity provision are generally confined to short-term rates.

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Crises and Rescues: Liquidity Transmission Through Global Banks

Michael Koetter Claudia M. Buch C. T. Koch

in: International Journal of Central Banking, forthcoming

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Too Connected to Fail? Inferring Network Ties from Price Co-movements

Jakob Bosma Michael Koetter Michael Wedow

in: Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, forthcoming

Abstract

We use extreme value theory methods to infer conventionally unobservable connections between financial institutions from joint extreme movements in credit default swap spreads and equity returns. Estimated pairwise co-crash probabilities identify significant connections among up to 186 financial institutions prior to the crisis of 2007/2008. Financial institutions that were very central prior to the crisis were more likely to be bailed out during the crisis or receive the status of systemically important institutions. This result remains intact also after controlling for indicators of too-big-to-fail concerns, systemic, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks. Both CDS-based and Equity-based connections are significant predictors of bailouts.

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Working Papers

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Effectiveness and (In)Efficiencies of Compensation Regulation: Evidence from the EU Banker Bonus Cap

Stefano Colonnello Michael Koetter Konstantin Wagner

in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 7, 2018

Abstract

We study if the regulation of bank executive compensation has unintended consequences. Based on novel data on CEO and non-CEO executives in EU banking, we show that capping the variable-to-fixed compensation ratio did not induce executives to abandon the industry. Banks indemnified executives sufficiently for the shock to retain them by raising fixed and lowering variable compensation while complying with the cap. At the same time, banks‘ risk-adjusted performance deteriorated due to increased idiosyncratic risk. Collateral damage for the financial system as a whole appears modest though, as average co-movement of banks with the market declined under the cap.

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Delay Determinants of European Banking Union Implementation

Michael Koetter Thomas Krause Lena Tonzer

in: IWH Discussion Papers, No. 24, 2017

Abstract

To safeguard financial stability and harmonise regulation, the European Commission substantially reformed banking supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance via EU directives. But most countries delay the transposition of these directives. We ask if transposition delays result from strategic considerations of governments conditional on the state of their financial, regulatory, and political systems? Supervisors might try to protect national banking systems and local politicians maybe reluctant to surrender national sovereignty to deal with failed banks. Alternatively, intricate financial regulation might require more implementation time in large and complex financial and political systems. We therefore collect data on the transposition delays of the three Banking Union directives and investigate observed delay variation across member states. Our correlation analyses suggest that existing regulatory and institutional frameworks, rather than banking market structure or political factors, matter for transposition delays.

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Do We Want These Two to Tango? On Zombie Firms and Stressed Banks in Europe

Manuela Storz Michael Koetter Ralph Setzer Andreas Westphal

in: ECB Working Paper, 2017

Abstract

We show that the speed and type of corporate deleveraging depends on the interaction between corporate and financial sector health. Based on granular bank-firm data pertaining to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) from five stressed and two non-stressed euro area economies, we show that “zombie” firms generally continued to lever up during the 2010–2014 period. Whereas relationships with stressed banks reduce SME leverage on average, we also show that zombie firms that are tied to weak banks in euro area periphery countries increase their indebtedness even further. Sustainable economic recovery therefore requires both: deleveraging of banks and firms.

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Related Topics

Financial Institutions Financial Markets Policy Evaluation Monetary Policy The new Europe Risk Regulation
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