We find that foreign institutional investors (FIIs) reduce their investee firms’ tax avoidance. We provide evidence that the effect is driven by the institutional distance between FIIs’ home countries/regions and host countries/regions. Specifically, we find that the effect is driven by the influence of FIIs from countries/regions with high-quality institutions (i.e., common law, high government effectiveness, and high regulatory quality) on investee firms located in countries/regions with low-quality institutions. Furthermore, we show that the effect is concentrated on FIIs with little experience in the investee countries/regions or FIIs with stronger monitoring incentives. Finally, we find that FIIs are more likely to vote against management if the firm has a higher level of tax avoidance.

Using a sample of U.S. listed firms for the 2000–2017 period, we examine how external social networks of top executives and directors affect earnings management in their firms. We find that well-connected firms are more aggressive in managing earnings through both accruals and real activities and that the results are robust after controlling for internal executive social ties. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that earnings management decreases after a socially connected executive or director dies. Additional analysis shows that connections forged by past professional working experiences have a greater impact on earnings management than connections forged by education and other social activities. Moreover, CFO social networks have a greater influence on earnings management than CEO social networks. Finally, we explore the underlying mechanisms, finding that 1) firms that are socially connected to each other show more similarities in their earnings management than firms that do not share a connection, and 2) more connected firms are less likely to incur accounting restatements. Collectively, our findings indicate that the external social networks of top executives and directors are important determinants of both their accrual- and real activity-based earnings management.

We build a large dataset of board of directors with military experience and document a substantial and persistent presence of independent military directors serving on corporate boards. We find that firms with independent military directors are associated with better monitoring outcomes, including less excessive CEO compensation, greater forced CEO turnover–performance sensitivity, and less earnings management.

We investigate the influences of local product market competition on the cost of private debt. Our evidence suggests that the cost of bank loans is significantly higher for firms headquartered in states with greater local product market competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for resident industries. To establish causality, we examine the recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and firm relocations to identify exogenous shocks to local product market competition. We find that the cost of bank loans is lower for firms facing less intense local product market competition after the adoption of IDD and higher for firms relocated to states with more competitive product markets. The results imply that banks value the characteristics of a firm's local product market when approving loan contracts.

This study examines whether and to what extend global equity offerings at the IPO stage may affect issuing firms' ability to borrow in the domestic debt market. Tracking bank loans taken by U.S. IPO firms in the domestic syndicated loan market, we observe that global equity offering firms experience more favorable loan price than that offered to their domestic counterparts. This finding holds for a set of robustness tests of endogeneity issues. We also find that, compared with their domestic counterparts, global equity offering firms are less likely to have financial distress, engage more in international diversification, and are more likely to wait a longer time to apply for syndicated loans.

With the increasing concerns that accompany the rising trends of house sharing economies, regulators impose new laws to counteract housing supply scarcity. In this paper, I investigate whether the ban on short-term entire house listings activated in Berlin in May 2016 had any adverse effects from a household finance perspective. More specifically, I derive short-term rental income and counter-factually compare it with long-term rental income to find that the ban, by decreasing the supply of short-term housing, accelerated short-term rental income but did not have any direct effect on long-term rental income. Commercial home-owners therefore would find renting on the short-term market to be financially advantageous.

We exploit staggered real estate transaction tax (RETT) hikes across German states to identify the effect of house price changes on mortgage credit supply. Based on approximately 33 million real estate online listings, we construct a quarterly hedonic house price index (HPI) between 2008:q1 and 2017:q4, which we instrument with state-specic RETT changes to isolate the effect on mortgage credit supply by all local German banks. First, a RETT hike by one percentage point reduces HPI by 1.2%. This effect is driven by listings in rural regions. Second, a 1% contraction of HPI induced by an increase in the RETT leads to a 1.4% decline in mortgage lending. This transmission of fiscal policy to mortgage credit supply is effective across almost the entire bank capitalization distribution.

In this paper, we use the panel of the first two waves of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey by the European Central Bank to study housing demand of European households and evaluate potential housing market regulations in the post-crisis era. We provide a comprehensive account of the housing decisions of European households between 2010 and 2014, and structurally estimate the housing preference of a simple life-cycle housing choice model. We then evaluate the effect of a tighter LTV/LTI regulation via counter-factual simulations. We find that those regulations limit homeownership and wealth accumulation, reduces housing consumption but may be welfare improving for the young households.