Can Korea Learn from German Unification?
Ulrich Blum
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2011
Abstract
We first analyze pre-unification similarities and differences between the two Germanys and the two Koreas in terms of demographic, social, political and economic status. An important issue is the degree of international openness. “Stone-age” type communism of North Korea and the seclusion of the population prevented inner-Korean contacts and contacts with rest of the world. This may create enormous adjustment costs if institutions, especially informal institutions, change. We go on by showing how transition and integration interact in a potential unification process based on the World Bank Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM) and on the Salter-Swan-Meade model. In doing so, we relate the macro and external impacts on an open economy to its macro-sectoral structural dynamics. The findings suggest that it is of utmost importance to relate microeconomic policies to the macroeconomic ties and side conditions for both parts of the country. Evidence from Germany suggests that the biggest general error in unification was neglecting these limits, especially limitations to policy instruments. Econometric analysis supports these findings. In the empirical part, we consider unification as an “investment” and track down the (by-and-large immediate to medium-term) costs and the (by-and-large long-term) benefits of retooling a retarded communist economy. We conclude that, from a South-Korean
perspective, the Korean unification will become relatively much more expensive than the German unification and, thus, not only economic, but to a much larger degree political considerations must include the tying of neighboring countries into the convergence process. We finally provide, 62 years after Germany’s division and 20 years after unification, an outlook on the strength of economic inertia in order to show that it may take much more than a generation to compensate the damage inflicted by the communist system.
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Aktuelle Trends: Forschungsintensität Ostdeutschlands hält dem europäischen Vergleich stand
Jutta Günther, Katja Wilde, Marco Sunder
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
20 Jahre Deutsche Einheit - Teil 2 -
2010
Abstract
Die Europäische Union (EU) hat mit dem Barcelona-Ziel für Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) eine ebenso umstrittene wie konkrete Messlatte gesetzt: Bis 2010 sollten die FuE-Aufwendungen der EU auf 3% des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) steigen. In Deutschland betrugen die FuE-Ausgaben im Jahr 2007 rund 2,5% des BIP. Im innerdeutschen Vergleich ist die FuE-Leistung Ostdeutschlands unterlegen, dem europäischen Vergleich hält sie durchaus stand. Gegenüber Tschechien, Ungarn und Polen weist Ostdeutschland insgesamt eine höhere FuE-Intensität auf, obschon Tschechien im Bereich der privaten FuE etwas besser abschneidet.
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Signaling Currency Crises in South Africa
Tobias Knedlik
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 19,
2006
Abstract
Currency crises episodes of 1996, 1998, and 2001 are used to identify common country specific causes of currency crises in South Africa. The paper identifies crises by the use of an Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index as introduced by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996). It extends the Signals Approach introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996, 1998) by developing a composite indicator in order to measure the evolution of currency crisis risk in South Africa. The analysis considers the standard suspects from international currency crises and country specifics as identified by the Myburgh Commission (2002) and current literature as potentially relevant indicators.
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