Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper 02/2013,
No. 2,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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Financial Crisis Risk, ECB “Non-standard“ Measures, and the External Value of the Euro
Stefan Eichler
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of banking and sovereign debt crisis risk of EMU member states on the external value of the euro. Using a regime switching model, I find that the external value of the euro has significantly responded to financial crisis risk during the period of November 2008–November 2011, while no significant effect is found for the period from February 2006 to October 2008. This suggests that the monetary expansion and interest rate cuts associated with the ECB's “non-standard” measures may have reduced the external value of the euro.
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Does Central Bank Staff Beat Private Forecasters?
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen, A. Jung
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2012
Abstract
In the tradition of Romer and Romer (2000), this paper compares staff forecasts of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) for inflation and output with corresponding private forecasts. Standard tests show that the Fed and less so the ECB have a considerable information advantage about inflation and output. Using novel tests for conditional predictive ability and forecast stability for the US, we identify the driving forces of the narrowing of the information advantage of Greenbook forecasts coinciding with the Great Moderation.
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Does the ECB Act as a Lender of Last Resort During the Subprime Lending Crisis?: Evidence from Monetary Policy Reaction Models
Stefan Eichler, K. Hielscher
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
We investigate whether the ECB aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in EMU member countries. We find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ECB has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increases, while no significant effect is identified for the pre-crisis period and relatively tranquil EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). These findings suggest that the ECB acts as a Lender of Last Resort for vulnerable EMU countries.
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Fiscal Policy and the Great Recession in the Euro Area
Mathias Trabandt, Günter Coenen, Roland Straub
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
How much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real GDP growth during the Great Recession? We estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized quarterly real GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6 percentage points. We obtain our result by using an extended version of the European Central Bank's New Area-Wide Model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector. A detailed modeling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of as many as eight fiscal time series appear pivotal for our result.
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Central Bank, Trade Unions, and Reputation – Is there Room for an Expansionist Manoeuvre in the European Union?
Toralf Pusch, A. Heise
A. Heise (ed.), Market Constellation Research: A Modern Governance Approach to Macroeconomic Policy. Institutionelle und Sozial-Ökonomie, Bd. 19,
2011
Abstract
The objective of this reader is manifold: On the one hand, it intends to establish a new perspective at the policy level named 'market constellations': institutionally embedded systems of macroeconomic governance which are able to explain differences in growth and employment developments. At the polity level, the question raised is whether or not market constellations can be governed and, thus, whether institutions can be created which will provide the incentives necessary for favourable market constellations.
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What Might Central Banks Lose or Gain in Case of Euro Adoption – A GARCH-Analysis of Money Market Rates for Sweden, Denmark and the UK
Herbert S. Buscher, Hubert Gabrisch
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 9,
2011
Abstract
This study deals with the question whether the central banks of Sweden, Denmark and the UK can really influence short-term money markets and thus, would lose this influence in case of Euro adoption. We use a GARCH-M-GED model with daily money market rates. The model reveals the co-movement between the Euribor and the shortterm interest rates in these three countries. A high degree of co-movement might be seen as an argument for a weak impact of the central bank on its money markets. But this argument might only hold for tranquil times. Our approach reveals, in addition, whether there is a specific reaction of the money markets in turbulent times. Our finding is that the policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) has indeed a significant impact on the three money market rates, and there is no specific benefit for these countries to stay outside the Euro area. However, the GARCH-M-GED model further reveals risk divergence and unstable volatilities of risk in the case of adverse monetary shocks to the economy for Sweden and Denmark, compared to the Euro area. We conclude that the danger of adverse monetary developments cannot be addressed by a common monetary
policy for these both countries, and this can be seen as an argument to stay outside the Euro area
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Central and Eastern European Countries in the Global Financial Crisis: A Typical Twin Crisis?
Diemo Dietrich, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Post-Communist Economies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
This paper shows that during the Great Recession, banking and currency crises occurred simultaneously in Central and Eastern Europe. Events, however, differed widely from what happened during the Asian crisis that usually serves as the model case for the concept of twin crises. We look at three elements that help explaining the nature of events in Central and Eastern Europe: the problem of currency mismatches, the relation between currency and banking crises, and the importance of multinational banks for financial stability. It is shown that theoretical considerations concerning internal capital markets of multinational banks help understand what happened on capital markets and in the financial sector of the region. We discuss opposing effects of multinational banking on financial stability and find that institutional differences are the key to understand differing effects of the global financial crisis. In particular, we argue that it matters if international activities are organized by subsidiaries or by cross-border financial services, how large the share of foreign currency-denominated credit is and whether the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. Based on these three criteria we give an explanation why the pattern of the crisis in the Baltic States differed markedly from that in Poland and the Czech Republic, the two largest countries of the region.
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Central Banks, Trade Unions and Reputation – Is there Room for an Expansionist Manoeuvre in the European Union?
Toralf Pusch, A. Heise
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
2010
Abstract
It is now a few years since the introduction of the common currency, and Europe is still experiencing high unemployment. The conventional logic attributes this problem to flaws in the labour market. In this article we look at the changes that occur if labour unions and the Central Bank have different options to choose from in a climate of uncertainty. In a single-stage game the most probable outcome is a high unemployment rate. Results change dramatically if the game is repeated. However, this effect does not occur if the Central Bank puts a too high weight on price stability. Secondly, if the trade unions do not possess the capability for coordinating and moderating their wage claims, a full employment equilibrium is out of range.
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Finanzielle Instabilität und Krise in den Post-Transformations-Ländern
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
Contagion was only the trigger of the unexpectedly severe crisis in European post-transition countries. Rather, increasing financial fragility of the countries since 2001, after their banking and financial sector was overtaken by international financial institutions, was the origin. Euphoric expectations induced an asset price inflation followed by an increasing debt burden of the private sector, which was fueled by net capital inflows. This study argues that simple concepts of demand reduction do not offer any way out of the crisis. A second transition is necessary, which establishes a new growth model being robust against speculative capital flows and offering high growth rates.
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