Why Do Banks Provide Leasing?
D. Bülbül, Felix Noth, M. Tyrell
Journal of Financial Services Research,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
Banks are engaging in leasing activities at an increasing rate, which is demonstrated by aggregated data for both European and U.S. banking companies. However, little is known about leasing activities at the bank level. The contribution of this paper is the introduction of the nexus of leasing in banking. Beginning from an institutional basis, this paper describes the key features of banks’ leasing activities using the example of German regional banks. The banks in this sample can choose from different types of leasing contracts, providing the banks with a degree of leeway in conducting business with their clients. We find a robust and significant positive impact of banks’ leasing activities on their profitability. Specifically, the beneficial effect of leasing stems from commission business in which the bank acts as a middleman and is not affected by the potential defaults of customers.
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Im Fokus: Nach dem EU-Beitritt stoppt die institutionelle Konvergenz in den mittel- und osteuropäischen EU-Staaten
Marina Grusevaja, Toralf Pusch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2013
Abstract
Die institutionelle Konvergenz wird seit der Gründung der Europäischen Union als Voraussetzung für die wirt-schaftliche Konvergenz angesehen. In den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern wurde eine institutionelle Konvergenz de jure bzw. eine Harmonisierung ex ante durch die Verpflichtung der EU-Beitrittskandidaten zur Übernahme des Acquis Communautaire angestrebt. Die institutionelle Angleichung der neuen Mitgliedstaaten an die EU-Normen sollte die Grundlage für ein schnelleres Wachstum (und damit für die wirtschaftliche Konvergenz in der EU) legen. In diesem Beitrag wird unter Verwendung der „Transition Indicators“ der Europäischen Bank für Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (EBRD) mit Hilfe einer Clusteranalyse das Vorhandensein einer insti¬tutionellen Konvergenz de facto in den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern analysiert. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine tatsächliche institutionelle Annäherung nur bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre stattgefunden hat. Seitdem ist in den neuen Mitgliedstaaten eine Tendenz zur Stagnation bzw. Divergenz der institutionellen Entwicklung zu verzeichnen. Die untersuchten Länder scheinen in ihren regionalen Clubs (Clustern) „festzustecken“, statt sich de facto weiter an die EU-Normen anzugleichen.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 13,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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Towards Deeper Financial Integration in Europe: What the Banking Union Can Contribute
Claudia M. Buch, T. Körner, Benjamin Weigert
German Council of Economic Experts Working Paper 02/2013,
No. 2,
2013
Abstract
The agreement to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe is a major step towards a Banking Union, consisting of centralized powers for the supervision of banks, the restructuring and resolution of distressed banks, and a common deposit insurance system. In this paper, we argue that the Banking Union is a necessary complement to the common currency and the Internal Market for capital. However, due care needs to be taken that steps towards a Banking Union are taken in the right sequence and that liability and control remain at the same level throughout. The following elements are important. First, establishing a Single Supervisory Mechanism under the roof of the ECB and within the framework of the current EU treaties does not ensure a sufficient degree of independence of supervision and monetary policy. Second, a European institution for the restructuring and resolution of banks should be established and equipped with sufficient powers. Third, a fiscal backstop for bank restructuring is needed. The ESM can play a role but additional fiscal burden sharing agreements are needed. Direct recapitalization of banks through the ESM should not be possible until legacy assets on banks’ balance sheets have been cleaned up. Fourth, introducing European-wide deposit insurance in the current situation would entail the mutualisation of legacy assets, thus contributing to moral hazard.
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Effects of Specification Choices on Efficiency in DEA and SFA
Michael Koetter, Aljar Meesters
Efficiency and Productivity Growth: Modelling in the Financial Services Industry,
2013
Abstract
This chapter assesses the sensitivity of bank cost-efficiency scores obtained with stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis. We compare CE scores of either type for a large cross-country sample of EU banks from 1996 until 2010. The results show that CE measures differ considerably depending on specification choices across parametric and nonparametric methods. The chapter documents the reasons for these differences in terms of theoretical, sample, and further specification choices.
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Stale Information, Shocks, and Volatility
Reint E. Gropp, A. Kadareja
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
No. 6,
2012
Abstract
We propose a new approach to measuring the effect of unobservable private information on volatility. Using intraday data, we estimate the effect of a well-identified shock on the volatility of stock returns of European banks as a function of the quality of public information available about the banks. We hypothesize that as publicly available information becomes stale, volatility effects and its persistence increase, as private information of investors becomes more important. We find strong support for this idea in the data. We further show that stock volatility is higher just before important announcements if information is stale.
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Financial Crisis Risk, ECB “Non-standard“ Measures, and the External Value of the Euro
Stefan Eichler
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
I study the impact of banking and sovereign debt crisis risk of EMU member states on the external value of the euro. Using a regime switching model, I find that the external value of the euro has significantly responded to financial crisis risk during the period of November 2008–November 2011, while no significant effect is found for the period from February 2006 to October 2008. This suggests that the monetary expansion and interest rate cuts associated with the ECB's “non-standard” measures may have reduced the external value of the euro.
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Does Central Bank Staff Beat Private Forecasters?
Makram El-Shagi, Sebastian Giesen, A. Jung
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2012
Abstract
In the tradition of Romer and Romer (2000), this paper compares staff forecasts of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) for inflation and output with corresponding private forecasts. Standard tests show that the Fed and less so the ECB have a considerable information advantage about inflation and output. Using novel tests for conditional predictive ability and forecast stability for the US, we identify the driving forces of the narrowing of the information advantage of Greenbook forecasts coinciding with the Great Moderation.
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Does the ECB Act as a Lender of Last Resort During the Subprime Lending Crisis?: Evidence from Monetary Policy Reaction Models
Stefan Eichler, K. Hielscher
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
We investigate whether the ECB aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in EMU member countries. We find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ECB has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increases, while no significant effect is identified for the pre-crisis period and relatively tranquil EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). These findings suggest that the ECB acts as a Lender of Last Resort for vulnerable EMU countries.
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Fiscal Policy and the Great Recession in the Euro Area
Mathias Trabandt, Günter Coenen, Roland Straub
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
How much did fiscal policy contribute to euro area real GDP growth during the Great Recession? We estimate that discretionary fiscal measures have increased annualized quarterly real GDP growth during the crisis by up to 1.6 percentage points. We obtain our result by using an extended version of the European Central Bank's New Area-Wide Model with a rich specification of the fiscal sector. A detailed modeling of the fiscal sector and the incorporation of as many as eight fiscal time series appear pivotal for our result.
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