Der Euro als Triebfeder des deutschen Exports?
Götz Zeddies
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik,
No. 3,
2011
Abstract
The excessive accumulation of debt especially in the southern member states currently challenges European Monetary Union (EMU). Whereas for a long time, preventing a break-up of EMU was indisputable, in the meantime, voices were being raised claiming a withdrawal of Greece from the currency union. Especially in Germany, a withdrawal of individual members from the currency union (or even a complete break-up of EMU) is associated with economic disadvantages. Particularly, it is argued that EMU is of greatest utility for Germany due to the countries’ longstanding wage moderation and strong export orientation. Against this background, this paper analyzes the effects of a withdrawal of individual member states from the currency union on German exports. Thereby, it is assumed that a withdrawal of those countries from EMU would be accompanied by real devaluations. As the analyses show, the impact of a withdrawal of Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal from the currency union on German exports would be rather small. However, since European Monetary Union as a whole is still the most important foreign market for German manufacturers, a complete break-up of EMU could noticeably weaken German export performance.
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What Can Currency Crisis Models Tell Us about the Risk of Withdrawal from the EMU? Evidence from ADR Data
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
We study whether ADR (American depositary receipt) investors perceive the risk that countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain could leave the eurozone to address financial problems produced by the sub-prime crisis. Using daily data, we analyse the impact of vulnerability measures related to currency crisis theories on ADR returns. We find that ADR returns fall when yield spreads of sovereign bonds or CDSs (credit default swaps) rise (i.e. when debt crisis risk increases); when banks' CDS premiums rise or stock returns fall (i.e. when banking crisis risk increases); or when the euro's overvaluation increases (i.e. when the risk of competitive devaluation increases).
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Institutionelle Defizite und wachsende Spannungen in der Euro-Zone
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2007
Abstract
The introduction of the Euro was certainly a success. Nevertheless, behind this success one may find some increasing asymmetries and imbalances across member countries, which may undermine the stability of the common currency in the long run. Tensions include the paralysis of fiscal policy, increasing divergence in per capita income, a high volatility of real state prices, and diverging unit labour cost developments. The given forms of macroeconomic coordination seem not to be appropriate to mitigate the problems. Obviously, countries can compete with wage policy only after currencies and their exchange rates were abolished, and the use of fiscal policy has been restricted. In particular, Germany and Austria were successful in competitive wage policy, while countries like Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and also France did not yet use the competitiveness channel. Germany was able to reduce its unit labour costs more than other countries by labour market reforms and higher indirect taxes in replacing social taxes. However, the advantage may proof to be temporary only, for other countries will be forced to follow the German example. Given an ECB inflation target of 2 %, more competitive wage policy in the Euro area might jeopardize the stability of the currency through deflation and higher unemployment. It does not wonder that the discussion on other and new forms of macroeconomic coordination revived recently. This debate does not only include the introduction of a central EU budget with anti-cyclical effects, but also forms of direct and indirect coordination of national wage policies. In any case, it would be useful to oblige national wage policies to obey the common interest of the Union.
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