Network investment and the threat of regulation: avoiding monopoly or infrastructure extension
Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, Deutsche Telekom announced its plans for the buildup of a new fiber glass network. At the same time, it formulated the condition that this network was not to be regulated concerning pricing or use by other providers (network access). In order to make this investment possible, in its coalition treaty the big coalition agreed to exclude the new network from the ex-ante regulation and to include this freedom from regulation in the telecommunication law. The question is now how investments can be facilitated and, at the same time, welfare losses through monopoly gains can be avoided. Applying game theory, it can be shown that a regulation authority like the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’, which is responsible for German telecommunication sector, should signal an increasing tolerance for deviations from its calculated and determined regulatory price in the face of increasing uncertainty concerning expected cost and returns. Thus, the threat of regulation alone leads to tolerable prices, without the actual regulation taking place. In the future, the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’ should reduce information asymmetries and the optimal level of tolerance in order to achieve a more precise intervention price and a more effective threat of regulation. The effectiveness of such a threat decreases if the legislation prevents the regulation authority from using this instrument by law. Against this background, the recent Federal Government resolution from March 17th 2006 noveling the telecommunication law heads for the economically right direction but it has to prove its incentive compatibility in the daily legal practice.
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Network Investment and the Threat of Regulation – Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?
Ulrich Blum, Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 7,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, the German telecommunication incumbent Deutsche Telekom announced its plans to build a new broadband fibre optics network. Deutsche Telekom decided as precondition for this new network not to be regulated with respect to pricing and third party access. To develop a regulator's strategy that allows investments and prevents monopolistic prices at the same time, we model an incumbent's decision problem under a threat of regulation in a game-theoretical context. The decision whether to invest or not depends on the probability of regulation and its assumed impact on investment returns. Depending on the incumbent's expectation on these parameters, he will decide if the investment is favourable, and which price to best set. This price is below a non-regulated profit maximising price, since the incumbent tries to circumvent regulation. Thus, we show that the mere threat of a regulator's intervention might prevent supernormal profits without actual price regulation. The regulator, on the other hand, can influence both investment decision and the incumbent's price via his signals on regulation probability and price. These signals an be considered optimal, if they simultaneously allow investment and minimize the incumbent's price.
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Wachstumsorientierte Neuausrichtung des Solidarpaktes II - Langfassung
Joachim Ragnitz
One-off Publications,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
Die ostdeutschen Länder sind gemäß §11 Absatz 3 Finanzausgleichsgesetz (FAG) verpflichtet, in sogenannten Fortschrittsberichten „Aufbau Ost“ jährlich über die Verwendung der ihnen zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel aus dem Solidarpakt II zu berichten. Für die praktische Umsetzung haben sich Bund und Länder auf ein Berechnungsschema geeinigt, das die investive Verwendung der Sonderbedarfsbundesergänzungszuweisungen (SoBEZ) in den Mittelpunkt rückt. Hintergedanke dabei ist die die Solidarpakt-Verhandlungen prägende Vorstellung, daß die Schwäche der ostdeutschen Wirtschaft vor allem auf einer unzureichenden Infrastrukturausstattung beruht. Tatsächlich sind die Ursachen für die Wachstumsschwäche der neuen Länder aber weitaus vielfältiger. Das IWH hat deshalb auf Basis wachstumstheoretischer Überlegungen ein alternatives Rechenschema für den SoBEZ-Nachweis entwickelt, das die „Wachstumsrelevanz“ der öffentlichen Ausgaben in den Vordergrund stellt und deshalb eher den Intentionen des Solidarpaktes II entspricht. Neben den Investitionen in die wirtschaftsnahe Infrastruktur werden dabei u. a. auch Ausgaben für die Forschung und die (weiterführende) Humankapitalbildung einbezogen. Anrechenbar sind diese Ausgaben allerdings nur, wenn sie nicht durch Kreditaufnahme oder Zuweisungen von Dritten finanziert werden und wenn sie über ein normalerweise aus eigenen Mitteln zu tragendes Niveau hinausgehen. Die Argumentation folgt dabei allein ökonomischen Kriterien und ist unabhängig von den tatsächlichen quantitativen Auswirkungen für den Verwendungsnachweis im Solidarpakt II.
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Die Bedeutung interner Kapitalmärkte für die Organisationsform von Unternehmen
Diemo Dietrich
WiSt - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium,
2006
Abstract
Contemporary financial economics has broken new grounds when considering that firms typically have not only a single investment opportunity available conducted by a single manager. A Firm has in fact several projects where headquarters delegates the undertaking to project managers. From this perspective, what conclusions can be drawn regarding the functioning of capital markets? What role do internal capital markets play? What consequences does it have for the borders of a firm?
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Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
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Strategien multinationaler Unternehmen in Ostmitteleuropa - Perspektiven aus der Praxis
Jutta Günther, Istvan Fekete
Willkommene Investoren oder nationaler Ausverkauf? Ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Ostmitteleuropa im 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurter Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte Ostmitteleuropas, Bd. 11,
2006
Abstract
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The Potentials for Technology Transfer via Foreign Direct Investement in Central and East Europe - Results of a Field Study
Judit Hamar, Johannes Stephan
East-West Journal of Economics and Business,
1 & 2
2005
Abstract
Foreign direct investment plays a particularly crucial role for the processes of technological catch-up in Central East Europe. Whilst most countries of this region have received considerable direct investments, the composition of kinds of subsidiaries is different between countries and hence will the prospects for intense technology transfer also differ between countries. This contribution aims to compare the potentials for internal and external technology transfer across countries of Central East Europe by analysing the management-relationship between subsidiaries and their parents and the market-relationships between subsidiaries and their host economy. For this, a firm-level database of some 458 subsidiaries in Estonia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia is analysed empirically.
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Technology Transfer via Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: Theory, Method of Research and Empirical Evidence
Johannes Stephan
Technology Transfer via Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: Theory, Method of Research and Empirical Evidence,
2005
Abstract
Foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies are suggested as one of the main channels of technology transfer to less developed economies. In Central East Europe their presence proved to be a decisive factor to economic restructuring and development. This volume is a unique guide to theory, method of research, and empirical evidence, for technology transfer via foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies. It combines the merits of a core text on technology transfer via FDI with up-to-date empirical evidence.
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Empirical Studies: Results of a Fieldwork Project
Judit Hamar, Johannes Stephan
Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer in Transition Countries: Theory – Method of Research – Empirical Evidence,
2005
Abstract
The second empirical analysis is based on a fieldwork project conducted between 2002 and 2003, which generated a large and unique database on 438 foreign subsidiaries in a selection of CEECs, namelay the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The field work was done between 2002 and 2003 by the use of a concise, two-page questionnaire, sent out to the largest foreign investment subsidiaries in the countries named. The questionnaire is presented in the Appendix to this book.In terms of methodology, the field work analysis focuses on the relationship between subsidiaries of MNEs which invested in CEE and their parent network, on the one hand, and the relationship between the subsidiaries and the local host economy, on the other.
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Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer in Transition Countries: Theory - Method of Research - Empirical Evidence
Johannes Stephan
Studies in Economic Transition. Series edited by J. Hölscher and H. Tomann,
2005
Abstract
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