The Reverse Revolving Door in the Supervision of European Banks
Stefano Colonnello, Michael Koetter, Alex Sclip, Konstantin Wagner
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 25,
2023
Abstract
We show that around one third of executive directors on the boards of national supervisory authorities (NSA) in European banking have an employment history in the financial industry. The appointment of executives without a finance background associates with negative valuation effects. Appointments of former bankers, in turn, spark positive stock market reactions. This „proximity premium“ of supervised banks is a more likely driver of positive valuation effects than superior financial expertise or intrinsic skills of former executives from the financial industry. Prior to the inception of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, the presence of former financial industry executives on the board of NSA associates with lower regulatory capital and faster growth of banks, pointing to a more lenient supervisory style.
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Staggered Completion of the European Banking Union: Transposition Dates of the BRRD
Michael Koetter, Thomas Krause, Eleonora Sfrappini, Lena Tonzer
IWH Technical Reports,
No. 1,
2021
Abstract
In May 2014, the European Commission published the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The directive introduces rules on bank resolution and restructuring including a bailin tool. It constitutes the legal foundation underlying the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Member countries of the European Union (EU) had to transpose this directive into national law by 31 December 2014 and implement the rules on resolution and restructuring of failing banks from 1 January 2015 onwards. However, many countries delayed the implementation. We assemble a dataset on national transposition dates of the BRRD across the EU-27 countries.
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26.01.2017 • 8/2017
IWH Policy Talk „Faraway or Close? Supervisors and Central Bankers“
New after-work event series at IWH starts with Ignazio Angeloni, ECB
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European Bank Efficiency and Performance: The Effects of Supranational Versus National Bank Supervision
Rients Galema, Michael Koetter
T. Beck, B. Casu (eds): The Palgrave Handbook of European Banking, London,
2016
Abstract
This chapter explores European bank efficiency and performance. First, the authors provide an overview of the key estimation methods for efficiency and discuss selected applications to the European banking sector. Second, they apply stochastic frontier analysis to investigate the extent to which the reallocation of supervisory powers is associated with efficiency differences between European banks. In doing so, the discussion focuses particularly on whether direct supervision by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as opposed to national competent authority (NCA) is related to cost and profit efficiency.
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11.08.2016 • 34/2016
2016 stress tests: Italian banks don’t look worse than German large commercial banks
The European Banking Authority today presented the results of the 2016 stress tests. They show that most European banks appear more or less stable. “What worries me is, however, that the Italian banks do not look worse than the large German commercial banks,” says Reint E. Gropp, president of the Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). “It appears that both Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank would benefit significantly from an increase in equity. The stress test was also missing two crucial points: One, the effect of a long lasting low interest rate environment on banks was not simulated. And second, the test did not take into consideration that many small institutions could fail at the same time. This is not an unlikely scenario, given how small banks in particular struggle with shrinking interest margins,“ says Gropp. Finally, the stress test should not distract from the urgency to solve the problems in the Italian banking system.
Reint E. Gropp
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