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IWH Treuhand Database
IWH Treuhand Privatisation Micro Database The IWH Treuhand Micro Database is a new...
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East Germany
The Nasty Gap 30 years after unification: Why East Germany is still 20% poorer than the...
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Industrial Cores in East Germany and Its Interaction with the Surrounding Territories—Findings from Four Case Studies
Gerhard Heimpold
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik,
No. 2,
2019
Abstract
Subject to this article is how four cases of so called industrial cores have developed in East Germany since 1990. Industrial cores represent former state-owned firms which were regarded as economically viable by the Treuhand. But there was no chance to privatize them in the short run. The case studies show the development prior to and after privatization. A special focus is laid on the interaction between the respective firm and its spatial environment. To sum up: All four firms are still existent. They provide competitive goods and services. Nonetheless, the interaction with the surrounding region differs from case to case. There were spin-offs in all cases. Organizational units previously belonging to the former state owned firms were split up, and became independent firms. In addition, new firms were established. Partly the establishment of new firms was supported directly by—de facto—structural policy measures implemented by the core firms. Partly the new establishments were simply cases of co-location resulting from a prospering regional environment. Taking the four cases, urban areas obviously formed a particularly fertile economic environment.
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Decision Making by the Treuhandanstalt on Privatization, Restructuring, or Liquidation of Former State-owned Firms in East Germany
Gerhard Heimpold
H.-G. Jeong, G. Heimpold (Hrsg.), Economic Development after German Unification and Implications for Korea. Policy References 18-08. Sejong: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy,
2018
Abstract
Subject to this paper is the decision making by Treuhandanstalt on privatization, restructuring, or liquidation of former state-owned firms in East Germany. To explain: the Treuhandanstalt was the agency at the Federal level tasked with the privatization of the former state-owned firms of the GDR. All former state-owned firms were assigned to the Treuhandanstalt in mid-1990. The notion of Treuhand firms (“Treuhandfirmen”) will be used to characterize this type of firms.
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The Privatisation Activities of the Treuhandanstalt and the Transformation of the East German Corporate Landscape: A New Dataset for First Explorations
Alexander Giebler, Michael Wyrwich
IWH Technical Reports,
No. 1,
2018
Abstract
Even nearly 30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the privatisation and transformation of East Germany's business landscape is controversially discussed in the media and politics. The privatisation process led to enormous structural changes, which were associated with massive job losses. In particular, the stagnating regional development of East Germany is often blamed on the “long shadow” of the privatisation activities of the Treuhandanstalt (THA). From a scientific perspective, however, there are hardly any contributions dealing with the effects of privatisation activities. The IWH-Treuhand Privatisation Micro Database introduced in this technical report is novel as such that it provides comprehensive information on employment and turnover figures for formerly state-owned enterprises for the early 1990s.
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Institutions and Clusters
Ulrich Blum
Handbook on Research on Clusters,
2009
Abstract
We show that transaction costs and external economies, which change institutional arrangements heavily, influence cluster structures. Two types of clusters, (i) the vertical cluster where a hub dominates suppliers that have settled in the vicinity and, (ii), the horizontal cluster where firms share a common platform – historically a natural resource, today often knowledge and competences. Furthermore, non-cluster firms exist. We show, in a model, how these types emerge from the interaction found in firms and the interaction of firms within a network system. Changing transaction costs and externalities influence clusters and produce cluster dynamics. The sustainability of a cluster depends on its ability to stabilize the basis of its existence. This is easier for horizontal clusters that can steadily develop their knowledge and competence platform than for a vertical cluster which heavily depends on product life cycles. We give some evidence for clusters in East Germany, which presents an interesting example. The Treuhand atomized the giant combines, so that the rearrangements may be interpreted as results of fundamental market forces. Therefore major influences on the emerging institutional structure should stem from transaction costs and externalities.
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Der lange Schatten des Sozialismus: Folgen für die Wirtschaftspolitik in Ostdeutschland
Ulrich Blum
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik,
2008
Abstract
East Germany’s economy growth was not able to close, over the last ten years, the lag against the West German economy. This paper inquires into the economic reasons, especially those that can be traced in history. It is shown that the exodus of elites from what was Central Germany started in the 1930s because of the persecution of the Jewish elites. During the period after the Second World War until the construction of the wall in 1961 especially young and qualified people left the Soviet Zone and later the G.D.R. Thus, the elites destroyed in the Third Reich and the Second World War could not be replaced exogenously. In the 1970s, an inadequate economic system destroyed the still existing industrial middle class which was an important base of productivity and helped to generate foreign income because of its export intensity to the Western countries. This generated a current account crisis which was only overcome by a loan from West Germany, the so-called “Strauß-Kredit”. In 1988, however, the fundamental problems again became visible and enforced a change of the economic system. The privatisation strategy by the Treuhand by and large did not sell or restitute enterprises but sold plants out of the fragmented combines. Today, the visible deficit in headquarter function is the most important single obstacle against growth and wealth in the New Lander. It can be expected that this will only disappear within a new technology cycle.
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The East German Cement Cartel: Cartel Efficiency and Policy after Economic Transformation
Ulrich Blum
Eastern Economic Review,
2007
Abstract
In 2003 the German Antitrust Commission (GAC) proved the existence of a cartel in the German cement industry. The German cement producers involved in the case were fined € 661 million for having established quotas to extract additional rents. One of the main centers of this cartel was East Germany, where the East German Cement Combine with its giant facilities had been sold, in the early 1990s, to four large producers by Treuhand in the process of privatizing the economy. Only in respect to in this market did all defendants concede having had a part in forming a cartel.
In this paper, we challenge the argument of excess revenue that the GAC puts forward for the East German market. We argue that legal evidence does not necessarily translate into economic evidence. We show that demand for cement is realized in geographical and, to a more limited extent, in product space. Thus, in the absence of cartels we would expect monopolistic competition to prevail. We argue that any transition in the market regime, from the cartel to the post cartel period, must be traceable in the individual firm’s demand function which differs from the clients’ demand function because of costs for spatial and product differentiation. Within the framework of an econometric model, we cannot identify any structural changes in demand. Most likely, imports from Poland and the Czech Republic were dumped into the East German market and some medium sized producers were responsible for the cartel never working.
Finally the paper shows how difficult it is to generate competition in certain industries even under the umbrella of a well-established market economy, i.e. that of West Germany, and that the openness of the economy, i.e. trans-border shipments, are decisive.
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