Protect and Survive? Did Capital Controls Help Shield Emerging Markets from the Crisis?
Makram El-Shagi
Economics Bulletin,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
Using a new dataset on capital market regulation, we analyze whether capital controls helped protect emerging markets from the real economic consequences of the 2009 financial and economic crisis. The impact of the crisis is measured by the 2009 forecast error of a panel state space model, which analyzes the business cycle dynamics of 63 middle-income countries. We find that neither capital controls in general nor controls that were specifically targeted to derivatives (that played a crucial role during the crisis) helped shield economies. However, banking regulation that limits the exposure of banks to global risks has been highly successful.
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The Role of Investment Banking for the German Economy: Final Report for Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt/Main
Michael Schröder, M. Borell, Reint E. Gropp, Z. Iliewa, L. Jaroszek, G. Lang, S. Schmidt, K. Trela
ZEW-Dokumentationen, Nr. 12-01,
No. 1,
2011
Abstract
The aim of this study is to assess the contributions of investment banking to the economy with a particular focus on the German economy. To this end we analyse both the economic benefits and the costs stemming from investment banking.
The study focuses on investment banks as this part of banking is particularly relevant for financing companies as well as the development and use of specific products to support the needs of private and professional clients. The assessment of benefits and costs of investment banking has been conducted from a European perspective. Nevertheless there is a focus on the German economy to allow a more detailed analysis of certain aspects as for example the use of derivatives by German companies, the success of M&As in Germany or the effect of securitization on loan supply and GDP in Germany. For comparison purposes other European countries and also the U.S. have been taken into account.
The last financial crisis has shown the negative impacts of banks on the financial system and the whole economy. In a study on the contribution of investment banks to systemic risk we quantify the negative side of the investment banking business.
In the last part of the study we assess how the effects of regulatory changes on investment banking. All important changes in banking and capital market regulation are taken into account such as Basel III, additional capital requirements for systemically important financial institutions, regulation of OTC derivatives and specific taxes.
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What Can Currency Crisis Models Tell Us about the Risk of Withdrawal from the EMU? Evidence from ADR Data
Stefan Eichler
Journal of Common Market Studies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
We study whether ADR (American depositary receipt) investors perceive the risk that countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain could leave the eurozone to address financial problems produced by the sub-prime crisis. Using daily data, we analyse the impact of vulnerability measures related to currency crisis theories on ADR returns. We find that ADR returns fall when yield spreads of sovereign bonds or CDSs (credit default swaps) rise (i.e. when debt crisis risk increases); when banks' CDS premiums rise or stock returns fall (i.e. when banking crisis risk increases); or when the euro's overvaluation increases (i.e. when the risk of competitive devaluation increases).
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Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Effects of Alternative Schemes on Bank Lending and Risk-taking
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
No. 2,
2012
Abstract
We analyse the effects of policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalise risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance without reference to new activities, like granting lump sum transfers or establishing bad banks, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
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Stock Market-Induced Currency Crises: A New Type of Twins
Stefan Eichler, Dominik Maltritz
Review of Development Economics,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
This paper explores the link between currency crises and the stock market in emerging economies. By integrating foreign stock market investors in a currency crisis model, we reveal a new fundamental inconsistency as a potential crisis trigger: since emerging economies' stock markets often have high returns, whereas central bank reserves grow slowly or decline, the amount of reserves foreign investors can deplete when selling their stocks and repatriating the proceeds grows over time and is considerably higher than funds that have been invested in the stock market. Capital withdrawals of foreign stock market investors can trigger currency crises by depleting central bank reserves, particularly in successful countries with booming stock markets and large foreign investment.
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Central and Eastern European Countries in the Global Financial Crisis: A Typical Twin Crisis?
Diemo Dietrich, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner
Post-Communist Economies,
No. 4,
2011
Abstract
This paper shows that during the Great Recession, banking and currency crises occurred simultaneously in Central and Eastern Europe. Events, however, differed widely from what happened during the Asian crisis that usually serves as the model case for the concept of twin crises. We look at three elements that help explaining the nature of events in Central and Eastern Europe: the problem of currency mismatches, the relation between currency and banking crises, and the importance of multinational banks for financial stability. It is shown that theoretical considerations concerning internal capital markets of multinational banks help understand what happened on capital markets and in the financial sector of the region. We discuss opposing effects of multinational banking on financial stability and find that institutional differences are the key to understand differing effects of the global financial crisis. In particular, we argue that it matters if international activities are organized by subsidiaries or by cross-border financial services, how large the share of foreign currency-denominated credit is and whether the exchange rate is fixed or flexible. Based on these three criteria we give an explanation why the pattern of the crisis in the Baltic States differed markedly from that in Poland and the Czech Republic, the two largest countries of the region.
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Die Entwicklung der Corporate Governance deutscher Banken seit 1950
R. H. Schmidt, Felix Noth
Bankhistorisches Archiv,
No. 2,
2011
Abstract
The present paper gives an overview of the development of Corporate Governance of German banks since the 1950s. The focus will be on economic analysis. The most striking changes in Corporate Governance occurred with the ownership structure of commercial banks, in particular with the major joint-stock banks. In addition to that, the capital market has become a core element of Corporate Governance in all major German banks, which have replaced their prior concentration on the interests of a broadly defined circle of stakeholders by a one-sided concentration on shareholders’ interests. In contrast, with savings banks and cooperative cooperative banks, Corporate Governance has remained unchanged for the most part. Exceptions to this are the regional state banks: in their case, after they had turned away from traditional business models and in particular following the discontinuation of the guarantee obligation, the problems of their Corporate Governance, which were already discernible beforehand, became quite obvious. If you include the financial crisis, beginning in 2007, in the analysis, it becomes evident that it was precisely a Corporate Governance unilaterally geared to shareholders’ interest and the efficiency of the capital market that materially contributed to the evolution and widening of the crisis.
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Neo-liberalism, the Changing German Labor Market, and Income Distribution: An Institutionalist and Post Keynesian Analysis
John B. Hall, Udo Ludwig
Journal of Economic Issues,
2010
Abstract
This inquiry relies on an Institutionalist and Post Keynesian analysis to explore Germany's neo-liberal project, noting cumulative effects emerging as measurable economic and societal outcomes. Investments in technologies generate rising output-to-capital ratios. Increasing exports offset the Domar problem, but give rise to capital surpluses. National income redistributes in favor of capital. Novel labor market institutions emerge. Following Minsky, good times lead to bad: as seeming successes of neo-liberal policies are accompanied by financial instability, growing disparities in household incomes, and sharp declines in German exports on world markets, resulting in one of the deepest, recent contractions in the industrialized world.
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Taxing Banks: Do it properly or not at all
Ulrich Blum, Diemo Dietrich
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2010
Abstract
Taxing banks in favor of a mutual fund to safeguard future financial stability has been subject to an intensive public debate. The currently proposed solution, however, will not provide any protection against systemic risks. We argue that using tax revenues to reduce public debt would bring down the risk premium that government has to pay and thereby improves the capability of economic policy to stabilize the economy in future times of distress. Anything else is associated with the risk that bank capital is devastated which would hamper the economic recovery.
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Government Interventions in Banking Crises: Assessing Alternative Schemes in a Banking Model of Debt Overhang
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
Abstract
We evaluate policy measures to stop the fall in loan supply following a banking crisis. We apply a dynamic framework in which a debt overhang induces banks to curtail lending or to choose a fragile capital structure. Government assistance conditional on new banking activities, like on new lending or on debt and equity issues, allows banks to influence the scale of the assistance and to externalize risks, implying overinvestment or excessive risk taking or both. Assistance granted without reference to new activities, like establishing a bad bank, does not generate adverse incentives but may have higher fiscal costs.
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