Interbank Exposures: An Empirical Examination of Contagion Risk in the Belgian Banking System
Hans Degryse, Grégory Nguyen
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
Robust (cross-border) interbank markets are important for the proper functioning of modern financial systems. However, a network of interbank exposures may lead to domino effects following the event of an initial bank failure. We investigate the evolution and determinants of contagion risk for the Belgian banking system over the period 1993–2002 using detailed information on aggregate interbank exposures of individual banks, large bilateral interbank exposures, and cross-border interbank exposures. The "structure" of the interbank market affects contagion risk. We find that a change from a complete structure (where all banks have symmetric links) toward a "multiplemoney-center" structure (where money centers are symmetrically linked to otherwise disconnected banks) has decreased the risk and impact of contagion. In addition, an increase in the relative importance of cross-border interbank exposures has lowered local contagion risk. However, this reduction may have been compensated by an increase in contagion risk stemming from foreign banks.
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Bank Lending, Bank Capital Regulation and Efficiency of Corporate Foreign Investment
Diemo Dietrich, Achim Hauck
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2007
Abstract
In this paper we study interdependencies between corporate foreign investment and the capital structure of banks. By committing to invest predominantly at home, firms can reduce the credit default risk of their lending banks. Therefore, banks can refinance loans to a larger extent through deposits thereby reducing firms’ effective financing costs. Firms thus have an incentive to allocate resources inefficiently as they then save on financing costs. We argue that imposing minimum capital adequacy for banks can eliminate this incentive by putting a lower bound on financing costs. However, the Basel II framework is shown to miss this potential.
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Why do banks hold capital in excess of regulatory requirements? A functional approach
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
DBW-Die Betriebswirtschaft,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
This paper explains why banks hold a capital ratio in excess of regulatory requirements. We demonstrate that banks can use capital ratios as a strategic tool for renegotiating loans with borrowers. Since the ability of banks to commit to a harsh treatment of borrowers depends on the capital ratio in a non-monotonic way, a bank may be forced to exceed capital requirements.
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Schwierigkeiten der Investitionsförderung – Der Fall CargoLifter AG
Mirko Titze
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2006
Abstract
This paper shows how the state of Brandenburg has subsidized large investments. The Focus of this papers is the case of the CargoLifter AG. The government intended to prevent in the mid 90's the total break-down of the economy in the state of Brandenburg, which is particularly affected by structural changes. This kind of policy is highly controversial casing lengthy discussions. After raising approximately 220 millions of Euro in the capital market and receiving nearly 50 million Euros from the state of Brandenburg the CargoLifter AG run into financial difficulties. The Government subsidized the CargoLifter AG as part of the “Gemeinschaftsaufgabe zur Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur - (GA)“. There were arguments to subsidize the CargoLifter AG. This paper analyzes the project management of the company as well as the subsidization with the “Gemeinschaftsaufgabe zur Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur - (GA)“of the state of Brandenburg in terms of their contribution to the insolvency of the CargoLifter AG.
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The role of banking portfolios in the transmission from the currency crises to banking crises - potential effects of Basel II
Tobias Knedlik, Johannes Ströbel
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 21,
2006
Abstract
This paper evaluates the potential effects of the Basel II accord on preventing the transmission from currency crises to financial crises. By analyzing the case study of South Korea, it shows how mismatches on banks’ balance sheets were the primary cause for such a transmission, and models how Basel II would have affected those balance sheets. The paper shows that due to South Korea’s positive credit rating in the months leading up to the crisis, the regulatory capital reserves under Basel II would have been even lower than those under Basel I, and that therefore Basel II would have had adverse effects on the development of the crisis. In the second part, the article analyses whether the behavior of rating agencies has changed since their failure to predict the Asian crisis. The paper finds no robust econometric evidence that rating agencies have started to take micromismatches into account when assigning sovereign ratings. Thus, given the current approach of credit rating agencies, we have reservations concerning the effectiveness of Basel II to prevent the transmission from currency crises to banking crises, both for the case of South Korea and for potential future crises.
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Banks’ Internationalization Strategies: The Role of Bank Capital Regulation
Diemo Dietrich, Uwe Vollmer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 18,
2006
Abstract
This paper studies how capital requirements influence a bank’s mode of entry into foreign financial markets. We develop a model of an internationally operating bank that creates and allocates liquidity across countries and argue that the advantage of multinational banking over offering cross-border financial services depends on the benefit and the cost of intimacy with local markets. The benefit is that it allows to create more liquidity. The cost is that it causes inefficiencies in internal capital markets, on which a multinational bank relies to allocate liquidity across countries. Capital requirements affect this trade-off by influencing the degree of inefficiency in internal capital markets.
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The IWH signals approach: the present potential for a financial crisis in selected Central and East European countries and Turkey
Hubert Gabrisch, Simone Lösel
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2006
Abstract
The steep increase of oil prices, general threats rooting from Iran’s nuclear program, and doubts about the future policy of important central banks recently caused more uncertainties of investors on international financial markets. This explains the higher volatility and the fall of indices on stock markets including those of some Central and East European countries. International investors could respond with adjustments of their portfolio and trigger off a financial crisis. On this background, the article studies the potential for a financial crises in the region mentioned. The analytical tool is the IWH signals approach. The study concludes that the risk of the outbreak of a financial crisis within the next 18 months is rather unrealistic in most countries. A stable economic policy, high real growth rates, a financial system already robust compared to earlier times of transition, and appropriate exchange rate arrangements protect the countries against speculative attacks and portfolio adjustments. When the composite indicator shows deterioration like in the Baltic countries, it turned out to be negligible. For the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the composite indicator even improved. A closer look to individual indicators reveals still some problems in the banking sectors of the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, however, without out major impact on the composite indicator.
This general assessment does not apply to Romania, and, in particular, to Turkey. The composite indicator signals a significant increase of the risk potential for the next 18 months in both countries. There is a considerable need for sound policy action.
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Hausgemachte (Forderungsausfall)-Risiken - IWH Studie: Kreditoreneigenschaften beeinflussen die Liquidität
Henry Dannenberg
inForm Magazin für Risikomanagement Ausgabe 32 März 2006,
2006
Abstract
An IWH study shows that criteria of companies like size, average amount of debits, customer structure and foreign activities are indicators of the grade of risks of bad debt losses. The study also shows that the calculation of capital surplus to cover risks of bad debt losses that are based on criteria of creditors could be possible.
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Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
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Monetary Policy and Bank Lending in Japan: An Agency-based Approach
Diemo Dietrich
Incentives and Economic Behaviour,
2005
Abstract
This paper studies the incentive effects on Japanese banks of a low interest rate policy by the Bank of Japan. It utilizes a simplified version of an overlapping principal-agent-style model of corporate finance originally developed in Dietrich (2003). This model is dedicated to study the monetary policy transmission mechanism by combining arguments of the broad credit channel and the bank lending channel taking into account that banks need to be provided with incentives to monitor entrepreneurs. We argue that stipulating banks to possess some amount of own capital generate these incentives. We denote this capital requirement to be market based and show that this requirement depends crucially on interest rates. After revealing some shortcomings of the credit crunch hypothesis, we apply this approach to the Japanese economy. As a result, a policy of very low interest rates may not only be inefficient but counterproductive to reactivate a stumbled economy via the usual credit channel.
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