Changing Forces of Gravity: How the Crisis Affected International Banking
Claudia M. Buch, Katja Neugebauer, Christoph Schröder
ZEW Discussion Paper, No. 14-006,
2014
Abstract
The global financial crisis has brought to an end a rather unprecedented period of banks’ international expansion. We analyze the effects of the crisis on international banking. Using a detailed dataset on the international assets of all German banks with foreign affiliates for the years 2002-2011, we study bank internationalization before and during the crisis. Our data allow analyzing not only the international assets of the banks’ headquarters but also of their foreign affiliates. We show that banks have lowered their international assets, both along the extensive and the intensive margin. This withdrawal from foreign markets is the result of changing market conditions, of policy interventions, and of a weakly increasing sensitivity of banks to financial frictions.
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The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk-taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Reint E. Gropp, C. Gruendl, Andre Guettler
Review of Finance,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
In 2001, government guarantees for savings banks in Germany were removed following a lawsuit. We use this natural experiment to examine the effect of government guarantees on bank risk-taking. The results suggest that banks whose government guarantee was removed reduced credit risk by cutting off the riskiest borrowers from credit. Using a difference-in-differences approach we show that none of these effects are present in a control group of German banks to whom the guarantee was not applicable. Furthermore, savings banks adjusted their liabilities away from risk-sensitive debt instruments after the removal of the guarantee, while we do not observe this for the control group. We also document that yield spreads of savings banks’ bonds increased significantly right after the announcement of the decision to remove guarantees, while the yield spread of a sample of bonds issued by the control group remained unchanged. The evidence implies that public guarantees may be associated with substantial moral hazard effects.
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How Important are Hedge Funds in a Crisis?
Reint E. Gropp
FRBSF Economic Letters, No. 11,
No. 11,
2014
Abstract
Before the 2007–09 crisis, standard risk measurement methods substantially underestimated the threat to the financial system. One reason was that these methods didn’t account for how closely commercial banks, investment banks, hedge funds, and insurance companies were linked. As financial conditions worsened in one type of institution, the effects spread to others. A new method that more accurately accounts for these spillover effects suggests that hedge funds may have been central in generating systemic risk during the crisis.
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Do Better Capitalized Banks Lend Less? Long-run Panel Evidence from Germany
Claudia M. Buch, Esteban Prieto
International Finance,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
Higher capital features prominently in proposals for regulatory reform. But how does increased bank capital affect business loans? The real costs of increased bank capital in terms of reduced loans are widely believed to be substantial. But the negative real-sector implications need not be severe. In this paper, we take a long-run perspective by analysing the link between the capitalization of the banking sector and bank loans using panel cointegration models. We study the evolution of the German economy for the past 44 years. Higher bank capital tends to be associated with higher business loan volume, and we find no evidence for a negative effect. This result holds both for pooled regressions as well as for the individual banking groups in Germany.
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Regional House Price Dynamics and Voting Behavior in the FOMC
Stefan Eichler, Tom Lähner
Economic Inquiry,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of house price gaps in Federal Reserve districts on the voting behavior in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) from 1978 to 2010. Applying a random effects ordered probit model, we find that a higher regional house price gap significantly increases (decreases) the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC casts interest rate votes in favor of tighter (easier) monetary policy. In addition, our results suggest that Bank presidents react more sensitively to regional house price developments than Board members do.
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Banks’ Financial Distress, Lending Supply and Consumption Expenditure
H. Evren Damar, Reint E. Gropp, Adi Mordel
Abstract
We employ a unique identification strategy linking survey data on household consumption expenditure to bank-level data to estimate the effects of bank financial distress on consumer credit and consumption expenditures. We show that households whose banks were more exposed to funding shocks report lower levels of non-mortgage liabilities. This, however, does not result in lower levels of consumption. Households compensate by drawing down liquid assets to smooth consumption in the face of a temporary adverse lending supply shock. The results contrast with recent evidence on the real effects of finance on firms’ investment and employment decisions.
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Did Consumers Want Less Debt? Consumer Credit Demand versus Supply in the Wake of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis
Reint E. Gropp, J. Krainer, E. Laderman
Abstract
We explore the sources of household balance sheet adjustment following the collapse of the housing market in 2006. First, we use microdata from the Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey to document that banks cumulatively tightened consumer lending standards more in counties that experienced a house price boom in the mid-2000s than in non-boom counties. We then use the idea that renters, unlike homeowners, did not experience an adverse wealth shock when the housing market collapsed to examine the relative importance of two explanations for the observed deleveraging and the sluggish pickup in consumption after 2008. First, households may have optimally adjusted to lower wealth by reducing their demand for debt and implicitly, their demand for consumption. Alternatively, banks may have been more reluctant to lend in areas with pronounced real estate declines. Our evidence is consistent with the second explanation. Renters with low risk scores, compared to homeowners in the same markets, reduced their levels of nonmortgage debt and credit card debt more in counties where house prices fell more. The contrast suggests that the observed reductions in aggregate borrowing were more driven by cutbacks in the provision of credit than by a demand-based response to lower housing wealth.
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Zur Wirtschaftspolitik: Strukturreformen auch in Deutschland erforderlich!
Oliver Holtemöller, Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Tobias Knedlik, Axel Lindner, Götz Zeddies
Konjunktur aktuell,
No. 1,
2014
Abstract
Die günstige konjunkturelle Lage in Deutschland scheint der Wirtschaftspolitik den Blick auf die mittel- bis langfristigen Probleme zu verstellen. Im Bereich der Finanzpolitik liegt der Fokus derzeit auf der Ausweitung von Sozialleistungen. Wachstumsfreundliche Maßnahmen stehen hinten an. Zwar plant die neue Koalition zusätzliche investive Ausgaben, die grundsätzlich das Produktionspotenzial erhöhen könnten. Aber die konsumtiven Ausgaben stehen eindeutig im Vordergrund. Das wichtige Thema der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen wird auf die lange Bank geschoben, obwohl das Auslaufen der aktuellen Regeln Dringlichkeit gebietet und die Anreizprobleme des aktuellen Länderfinanzausgleichs offenkundig sind. Letztere könnten durch eine höhere Steuerautonomie der Bundesländer, etwa durch Zuschlagsrechte bei der Einkommensteuer, abgemildert werden. Im Bereich der Geldpolitik besteht derzeit die Gefahr, dass das mittelfristige Inflationsziel unterschritten wird. Es gibt zwar noch einige geldpolitische Instrumente, die für zusätzliche Liquiditätsbereitstellung genutzt werden könnten. Allerdings ist die Wirkung der Maßnahmen durch Probleme im Bankensektor derzeit gestört. Deshalb hat der im Jahr 2014 anstehende Stresstest eine hohe Bedeutung für die Wiederherstellung des Vertrauens im Bankensektor. Die Bankenunion sollte beherzt vollendet und nicht durch immer weitere Abstriche in ihrer Wirkung gefährdet werden. Die Europäische Kommission untersucht, ob der hohe deutsche Leistungsbilanzüberschuss auf ein gesamtwirtschaftliches Ungleichgewicht hinweist. Gegenwärtig gibt es allerdings kaum Anzeichen dafür, dass die gesamtwirtschaftliche Lage in Deutschland ungleichgewichtig ist. Der Leistungsbilanzüberschuss erklärt sich daraus, dass in einer alternden Gesellschaft wie der deutschen viel gespart wird und auch wegen der in Zukunft zu erwartenden Knappheit des Faktors Arbeit nicht genug rentierliche Investitionsprojekte im Land zu finden sind. Aus dieser Perspektive steht die Wirtschaftspolitik vor zwei Aufgaben: zum einen, die Risiken ungleichgewichtiger wirtschaftlicher Entwicklungen im Ausland für die Zukunft zu senken, um deutsche Anlagen vor Wertverlusten zu schützen. Zum anderen würde eine erfolgreiche Zuwanderungs- und Integrationspolitik über bessere langfristige Wachstumsperspektiven auch die Attraktivität von Investitionen im Inland erhöhen.
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In Search for Yield? Survey-based Evidence on Bank Risk Taking
Claudia M. Buch, S. Eickmeier, Esteban Prieto
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
No. 43,
2014
Abstract
Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.
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Sovereign Credit Risk, Banks' Government Support, and Bank Stock Returns around the World: Discussion of Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez
Reint E. Gropp
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 46 (s1),
s1
2014
Abstract
In the years leading up to the 2008–09 financial crisis, many banks around the world greatly expanded their balance sheets to take advantage of cheap and abundantly available funding. Access to international funding markets, in particular, made it possible for banks to reach a size that in some cases was a large multiple of their home countries’ gross domestic product (GDP). In Iceland, for example, assets of the banking system reached up to 900% of GDP in 2007. Similarly, by the end of 2008, assets in UK and Swiss banks exceeded 500% of their countries’ GDPs, respectively. Banks may also have grown rapidly because they may have wanted to reach too-big-to-fail status in their country, implying even lower funding cost (Penas and Unal 2004).
The depth and severity of the 2008–09 financial crisis and the subsequent debt crisis in Europe, however, have cast doubts on the ability of governments to bail out banks when they experience severe difficulties, in particular, in financially fragile environments and faced with large budget imbalances. This has resulted in as what some observers have dubbed a “doom loop”: the combination of weak public finances and weak banks results in a vicious cycle, in which the funding cost of banks increases, as the ability of governments to bail out banks is called into question, in turn increasing the funding cost of these banks and making the likelihood that the government will actually have to step in even higher, which in turn increases funding cost to the government and so forth.
Against this background, the paper by Correa et al. (2014) explores the link between sovereign rating changes and bank stock returns. They show large negative reactions of stock returns in response to sovereign ratings downgrades for banks that are expected to receive government support in case of failure. They find the strongest effects in developed economies, where the credibility of government bail outs is higher ex ante, while the effects are smaller in developing and emerging economies. In my view, the paper makes a number of important contributions to the extant literature.
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