Central Banks, Trade Unions and Reputation – Is there Room for an Expansionist Manoeuvre in the European Union?
Toralf Pusch, A. Heise
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics,
2010
Abstract
It is now a few years since the introduction of the common currency, and Europe is still experiencing high unemployment. The conventional logic attributes this problem to flaws in the labour market. In this article we look at the changes that occur if labour unions and the Central Bank have different options to choose from in a climate of uncertainty. In a single-stage game the most probable outcome is a high unemployment rate. Results change dramatically if the game is repeated. However, this effect does not occur if the Central Bank puts a too high weight on price stability. Secondly, if the trade unions do not possess the capability for coordinating and moderating their wage claims, a full employment equilibrium is out of range.
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A Cost Efficient International Lender of Last Resort
Tobias Knedlik
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics,
2010
Abstract
The current reform of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) lending instruments has transformed the Fund towards an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). Current research discusses various general frameworks for installing an ILOLR. However, it remains unclear how the ILOLR should actually operate. This paper discusses six different options for the construction of an ILOLR that supports central banks during currency crises. The paper concludes that the most cost efficient version of the ILOLR would be direct intervention by the IMF using IMF resources, with the option of using additional reserves from central banks. The paper considers measures of cost efficiency, such as cost of borrowing, intervention, and sterilization and moral hazard problems.
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Russia: Overcoming the Effects of Economic Crisis Takes Time
Martina Kämpfe
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 6,
2010
Abstract
The last year's decline of Gross Domestic Product in Russia was harder than in most big economies of the world. The financial crisis has revealed specific circumstances of growth in Russia: The situation deteriorated not only by the downfall of crude oil prices, but especially by the Russian banking sector not being able to satisfy financing demand of the private sector enterprises. So foreign liabilities of enterprises had increased and the dependence of the enterprises on the international financial markets had strengthened. In that way impacts of the global financial crisis affected Russia harder. Although external conditions for the Russian economy improved in the last months due to the rise of world oil prices and global demand for commodities, domestic demand still suffers from small revenues and bad financing conditions for enterprises. Because of its structural weakness it will take Russia longer than other transformation countries to overcome the crisis. Economic growth in the near future will expand much smaller than on last years’ average.
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The Extreme Risk Problem for Monetary Policies of the Euro-Candidates
Hubert Gabrisch, Lucjan T. Orlowski
Abstract
We argue that monetary policies in euro-candidate countries should also aim at mitigating excessive instability of the key target and instrument variables of monetary policy during turbulent market periods. Our empirical tests show a significant degree of leptokurtosis, thus prevalence of tail-risks, in the conditional volatility series of such variables in the euro-candidate countries. Their central banks will be well-advised to use both standard and unorthodox (discretionary) tools of monetary policy to mitigate such extreme risks while steering their economies out of the crisis and through the euroconvergence process. Such policies provide flexibility that is not embedded in the Taylor-type instrument rules, or in the Maastricht convergence criteria.
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Tentative Recovery, Public Debt on the Rise
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
2. Sonderausgabe
2009
Abstract
In autumn 2009, the world economy appears to be growing again. The situation has improved mainly because drastic measures of central banks and governments stabilized the financial sector. More recently, the real economy is supported by fiscal programs taking effect. However, recoveries are usually slow if, as it is the case now, recessions have been intertwined with banking and housing crises. Thus, the industrial economies will not gain much dynamics this year and next, while chances for an upswing in emerging economies are much better.
The German economy stabilized during summer as well, with remarkably robust private consumption. An upswing, however, is, due to several factors, not in sight: Some important export markets will not rebound quickly, and consumption will be dampened by rising unemployment that, up to now, has been contained, not least with the aid of short-term working schemes. All in all, production shrinks by 5% in 2009 and will increase by no more than 1.2% next year. Public deficits are on the rise, with (in relation to GDP) 3.2% this year and 5.2% in 2010.
A credit crunch due to deteriorating balance sheets of banks is a major risk for the German economy. Policy should address this problem by making sure that equity ratios are sufficiently high. One way would be to impose public capital on banks that do not comply with certain regulatory ratios. These should be higher than the ones presently in force. Fiscal policy should begin consolidating in 2011, mainly by dampening the rise of expenditures. Tax cuts are only justified if they are accompanied by very ambitious spending cuts.
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Finanzielle Instabilität und Krise in den Post-Transformations-Ländern
Hubert Gabrisch
Wirtschaftspolitische Blätter,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
Contagion was only the trigger of the unexpectedly severe crisis in European post-transition countries. Rather, increasing financial fragility of the countries since 2001, after their banking and financial sector was overtaken by international financial institutions, was the origin. Euphoric expectations induced an asset price inflation followed by an increasing debt burden of the private sector, which was fueled by net capital inflows. This study argues that simple concepts of demand reduction do not offer any way out of the crisis. A second transition is necessary, which establishes a new growth model being robust against speculative capital flows and offering high growth rates.
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Russia: A Victim to Transition or to the Financial Crisis?
Marina Grusevaja
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2009
Abstract
The global financial crisis has revealed deficiencies of the Russian economic system which are caused by the path of the transformation from central planning to the market economy, and not only attributable to the downfall of crude oil prices. While the worldwide liquidity crunch impaired the availability of loans to enterprises, the situation in Russia has deteriorated especially by the large exposure of the private sector to short-term foreign liabilities and by the one-sided orientation of the economy relying on the natural resources industry. Until the mid-2008, the foreign debt of the private banks and non-banks had increased strongly and had strengthened the dependence of the Russian economy on the developments on the international financial markets. The Ruble devaluation at the end of January 2009 aggravated the situation. The high short-term foreign debt of the private sector and the dependence on exports of natural resources are typical outcomes of the Russian transformation path. Therefore, on the one hand, the banking sector has not being able to satisfy financing demand of the private sector beyond the natural resources industries, enterprises became forced to borrow short-term money abroad. On the other hand, the economic strategy of the past seventeen years has strengthened the influence of the state on the natural resources sector – with the strong priority to develop it further. Hence, the one-sided economic development negatively affects the adaptability of the real-economic sector to change during the crisis period. In essence, the present political preferences of the government are aimed at providing direct financial assistance and at protectionist measures. In the long run, these actions could lead to stronger intervention of the state in the economy. Due to these recent developments, the crisis is likely to continue in Russia longer than in the other transformation countries.
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Banking Integration, Bank Stability, and Regulation: Introduction to a Special Issue of the International Journal of Central Banking
Reint E. Gropp, H. Shin
International Journal of Central Banking,
No. 1,
2009
Abstract
The link between banking integration and financial stability has taken center stage in the wake of the current financial crisis. To what extent is the banking system in Europe integrated? What role has the introduction of the common currency played in this context? Are integrated banking markets more vulnerable to contagion and financial instability? Does the fragmented regulatory framework in Europe pose special problems in resolving bank failures? What policy reforms may become necessary? These questions are of considerable policy interest as evidenced by the extensive discussions surrounding the design and implementation of a new regulatory regime and by the increasing attention coming from academia.
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