The Emergence of Wage Coordination in the Central Western European Metal Sector and its Relationship to European Economic Policy
Vera Glassner, Toralf Pusch
Abstract
In the European Monetary Union the transnational coordination of collective wage bargaining has acquired increased importance on the trade union agenda. The metal sector has been at the forefront of these developments. This paper addresses the issue of crossborder coordination of wage setting in the metal sector in the central western European region, that is, in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, where coordination practices have become firmly established in comparison to other sectors. When testing the interaction of wage developments in the metal sector of these three countries, relevant macroeconomic (inflation and labour productivity) and sector-related variables (employment, export-dependence) are considered with reference to the wage policy guidelines of the European Commission and the European Metalworkers’ Federation. Empirical evidence can be found for a wage coordination effect in the form of increasing compliance with the wage policy guidelines of the European Metalworkers’ Federation. The evidence for compliance with the stability-oriented wage guideline of the European Commission is weaker.
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The (never) ending story of the truck toll system – a contract theory view
Niels Krap
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2005
Abstract
After long-lasting negotiations, representatives of the Federal Government and the consortium Toll Collect signed a 17,000 pages contract on 20 September, 2002. It was fixed that Toll Collect had to develop and afterwards operate a system for the automatic collection of a satellite-supported distance-based truck toll until the end of August 2003. However, technical difficulties in the development of the new system led to delays to an unexpected extent. In this article, it is examined whether the results of the renegotiations that followed were consistent to the economics of contract theory. It can be shown that both contracting parties were bound to the contractual relation, so that the preliminary termination of the contract by the Federal Minister of Transport on 17 February, 2004 became void by an agreement only few days later. Additionally, it could be identified that the contract set correct incentives for both parties, Federal Government and Toll Collect, and covered the possibility of efficient renegotiation.
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Profits of East German industrial companies are slowly catching up
Hans-Ulrich Brautzsch, Udo Ludwig
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 3,
2004
Abstract
The article is concerned with the development of unit costs in eastern and western German manufacturing firms from the early 90’s onwards. By 2001 unit costs in the east had fallen almost to the corresponding western level, which in part is due to the suspension of the existing labour agreements in the second half of the 90’s. Nonetheless, the rate of return in the east remains smaller than in the west, which is mainly induced by the high costs of rebuilding the capital stock. It follows that unit labour costs can not be the sole basis for the wage bargaining process.
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“Law on loyalty to collectively agreed standards“ - no means for adjusting competitive conditions in construction industry
Andrea Besenthal
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2004
Abstract
Due to the increasing competition from abroad which is able to offer services for lower prices because of lower wage standards the stress of competition intensifies in Germany. With regard to West Germany the East German companies - paying lower wages – represent an immediate business competition. The supporter of the Tariftreuegesetze (laws concerning the construction industry which restrict public contracts only to contractors who pay union wages) see the laws` advantage in eliminating the existing differences in competitive conditions, which emerge from differences on the wage level. The IWH study concludes that the named wage laws do not seem necessary from an economic point of view.
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Uncovered Workers in Plants Covered by Collective Bargaining: Who Are They and How Do They Fare?
Boris Hirsch, Philipp Lentge, Claus Schnabel
Abstract
In Germany, employers used to pay union members and non-members in a plant the same union wage in order to prevent workers from joining unions. Using recent administrative data, we investigate which workers in firms covered by collective bargaining agreements still individually benefit from these union agreements, which workers are not covered anymore, and what this means for their wages. We show that about 9 percent of workers in plants with collective agreements do not enjoy individual coverage (and thus the union wage) anymore. Econometric analyses with unconditional quantile regressions and firm-fixed-effects estimations demonstrate that not being individually covered by a collective agreement has serious wage implications for most workers. Low-wage non-union workers and those at low hierarchy levels particularly suffer since employers abstain from extending union wages to them in order to pay lower wages. This jeopardizes unions' goal of protecting all disadvantaged workers.
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