Competitive Distortions of Bank Bailouts
Michael Koetter, Felix Noth
Abstract
This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.
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Greater Efficiency through More Competition in the Health Care Sector?
Ingmar Kumpmann
WSI-Mitteilungen,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
More competition among health insurers is often recommended as a means towards enhancing efficiency in the health care sector. In this paper the effects of competition among health insurers on costs and quality of medical services are discussed. It is argued that if insurers competed with each other, costs would not decrease - on the contrary, they would increase since competing organisations are less capable of counterbalancing the strong market position of health care providers than the state or a cartel of health insurers. In addition, competition may lead to a segmentation of the market: on the one hand insurers with low premiums who only offer access to rather unpopular physicians. On the other hand insurers who guarantee free choice of medical practitioners but have higher premiums. A restriction of the free choice of medical practitioners weakens competition among physicians for patients.
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Do Women Benefit from Competitive Markets? Product Market Competition and the Gender Pay Gap in Germany
Boris Hirsch, Michael Oberfichtner, Claus Schnabel
Economics Bulletin,
No. 2,
2012
Abstract
Using a large linked employer–employee dataset for Germany with a direct plant-level measure of product market competition and controlling for job-cell fixed effects, we investigate whether relative wages of women benefit from strong competition. We find that the unexplained gender pay gap is about 2.4 log points lower in West German plants that face strong product market competition than in those experiencing weak competition, whereas no such link shows up for East Germany.
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The Structural Determinants of the US Competitiveness in the Last Decades: A 'Trade-Revealing' Analysis
Massimo Del Gatto, Filippo di Mauro, Joseph Gruber, Benjamin Mandel
ECB Working Paper,
No. 1443,
2012
Abstract
We analyze the decline in the U.S. share of world merchandise exports against the backdrop of a model-based measure of competitiveness. We preliminarily use constant market share analysis and gravity estimations to show that the majority of the decline in export shares can be associated with a declining share of world income, suggesting that the dismal performance of the U.S. market share is not a sufficient statistic for competitiveness. We then derive a computable measure of country-sector specific real marginal costs (i.e. competitiveness) which, insofar it is inferred from actual trade ows, is referred to as 'revealed'. Brought to the data, this measure reveals that most U.S. manufacturing industries are losing momentum relative to their main competitors, as we find U.S. revealed marginal costs to grow by more than 38% on average. At the sectoral level, the "Machinery" industry is the most critical.
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The Impact of Firm and Industry Characteristics on Small Firms’ Capital Structure
Hans Degryse, Peter de Goeij, Peter Kappert
Small Business Economics,
No. 4,
2012
Abstract
We study the impact of firm and industry characteristics on small firms’ capital structure, employing a proprietary database containing financial statements of Dutch small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) from 2003 to 2005. The firm characteristics suggest that the capital structure decision is consistent with the pecking-order theory: Dutch SMEs use profits to reduce their debt level, and growing firms increase their debt position since they need more funds. We further document that profits reduce in particular short-term debt, whereas growth increases long-term debt. We also find that inter- and intra-industry effects are important in explaining small firms’ capital structure. Industries exhibit different average debt levels, which is in line with the trade-off theory. Furthermore, there is substantial intra-industry heterogeneity, showing that the degree of industry competition, the degree of agency conflicts, and the heterogeneity in employed technology are also important drivers of capital structure.
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State Aid in the Enlarged European Union: Taking Stock
Jens Hölscher, Nicole Nulsch, Johannes Stephan
From Global Crisis to Economic Growth. Which Way to Take?, Vol. 1,
2012
Abstract
In the early phase of transition that started with the 1990s, Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) pursued economic restructuring that involved massive injections of state support. With reference to the history of state aids in centrally planned economies we display state aid practices of CEECs since full EU membership and analyse whether their industrial policies during and after transition challenged the European state aid legislation and whether these fit into the EUs strategy of ‘less but better targeted aid’. Therefore, qualitative analysis in case studies is used to supplement a quantitative description of state aid levels in East and West. Findings suggest that in recent years a level playing field across the EU has indeed emerged. In fact, the most pronounced differences in this respect are not observed between CEECs and the EU-15 but rather between Northern and Southern member states.
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Enhancing Market Power by Reducing Switching Costs
Jan Bouckaert, Hans Degryse, Thomas Provoost
Economics Letters,
No. 3,
2012
Abstract
A proportional decrease in switching costs increases competition and social welfare. However, a lump-sum decrease in switching costs softens competition and does not invariably increase social welfare.
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Foreword: Competing: Important Stimuli for Knowledge Cities to Become Prosperous
Peter Franz
T. Yigitcanlar, K. Metaxiotis, J. Carrillo (eds), Building Prosperous Knowledge Cities. Policies, Plans and Metrics,
2012
Abstract
The author discusses the role of competitions in urban development strategies based on the cooperation of higher education institutions. The experience with similar strategies in regional policy and in innovation policy is reflected upon. After the presentation of some cases, the advantages and disadvantages of development strategies based on competitions are compared.
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Intellectual Property Rights Policy, Competition and Innovation
Daron Acemoglu, Ufuk Akcigit
Journal of the European Economic Association,
No. 1,
2012
Abstract
To what extent and in what form should the intellectual property rights (IPR) of innovators be protected? Should a company with a large technology lead over its rivals receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited advantage? In this paper, we develop a dynamic framework for the study of the interactions between IPR and competition, in particular to understand the impact of such policies on future incentives. The economy consists of many industries and firms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers in an industry can copy the technology of the leader. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth rate and welfare. The most important result from this exercise is that full patent protection is not optimal; instead, optimal policy involves state-dependent IPR protection, providing greater protection to technology leaders that are further ahead than those that are close to their followers. This is because of a trickle-down effect: providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technology leaders that are less advanced than this threshold.
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Political Institutionalisation and Governance of the German Metropolitan Regions: A Comparative Study
Peter Franz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 11,
2011
Abstract
In Germany, some cities and districts try to react to the challenges of global location competition by the constitution of metropolitan regions. Thus new forms of intermunicipal co-operation on a regional scale emerge. Within the context of a national policy for spatial development eleven such metropolitan regions have been defined in Germany, and local activities supporting their constitution were encouraged. In spite of differing results and success in the eleven regions this process of political institutionalisation has led to partially similar institutional forms. This study compares the institutionalisaton process in the German metropolitan regions with the help of an idealtype model of institutionalisation steps. In addition, the design of the comparative study also allows testing potential effects of intervening factors as the regions’ monocentricity / polycentricity and the existence of Laender borders in a region on cooperative success. The study comes to the result that so far only few metropolitan regions have reached the stage of advanced institutionalisation and co-operation. The diversity of the institutionalisation paths prevents a „best practice“ recommendation at the present state of knowledge. As the constitution process in the regions still proceeds in a highly dynamic way, this study should be repeated within a five years’ period.
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