Debt Brake Will Intensify Bracket Creep Problem
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Götz Zeddies
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 2,
2017
Abstract
As taxpayers typically pay relatively little attention to low levels of inflation induced income tax bracket creep, policy makers tend to regularly postpone correction of this problem. Eventually, however, the fiscal illusion fades away, and political pressure for tax relief arises once the cumulative increase of the average tax rate exceeds a critical threshold. Using Germany as an example, it is shown that bracket creep can provoke revenue cycles in public budgets that hinder governments’ compliance with the numerical budget rules. An indexation of the tax tariff, which would provide an automatic correction for bracket creep, could prevent such fluctuations and thus provide a favourable framework for the debt brake.
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The German New Fiscal Rule (Schuldenbremse): Previous Agreements Question Success on the Länder Level
Kristina vanDeuverden, Sabine Freye
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 9,
2010
Abstract
Starting in 2011, Germany will have a new fiscal rule to limit indebtedness - the debt brake. To encourage the functioning of this regulation on federal and Länder level, an advice board (Stabilitätsrat) was founded in April 2010. In a first step he selected four key numbers and defined thresholds. This article focuses on the chosen indicators and thresholds on Länder level by evaluating the effectiveness of both, the key figures themselves and their thresholds. We are analyzing time series from 1995 to 2009. The findings show that in general, the chosen figures are able to indicate a possible debt risk. However, the threshold values of the advice board endanger the effectiveness of the debt brake. This danger is especially caused by the mode of calculation: The thresholds are based on an average of German Länder. For this reason, only extremely negative household developments are pointed out. Furthermore, the new German debt brake is fundamentally based on the structural budget balance. Nevertheless, this key figure has not directly been chosen by the board. The approach of the board can be explained by the fact that there is - so far - no agreement between the federal level and the Länder how to calculate the structural balance on the Länder level.
This circumstance is precarious, because the debt brake cannot step really into force without the calculation of the structural budget balance for the Länder. For this reason, we try to close this vacancy by proposing a possible calculating mode for the structural part of the budget. The results of this calculation are indicating that on average the fiscal policy of the Länder was not sustainable. Key numbers as defined by the board indicated this only for a few of the Länder. From our point of view policy urgently has to act – otherwise the debt brake might not be successful.
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“Absurdes Ergebnis“ oder wissenschaftlich fundiert? Die Wahl der Konsolidierungsländer
Sabine Freye
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik,
No. 2,
2009
Abstract
In summer 2009, the federal state of Germany has implemented a debt brake in its constitution. This new concept also includes consolidation payments to five states. These Länder suffer from fiscal constraints caused by debts higher than average. However, until now, the selection criteria for these five Länder are not really obvious. This article contributes to the recent debate by answering the question whether this choice was first of all politically motivated or primarily based on fiscal indicators. The findings show that the selection of the ‘consolidation Länder’ was a mixture of both. Additionally, the results indicate that a main focus on the debt level is not rationale. Fiscal constraints also depend on the economic strength of a federal state, because indebtedness is often caused by weak economic power. Therefore, the consolidation payments will indeed help to decrease the existing structural debts of the Länder, but they are no guarantee that the states will meet the restrictions of the debt brake after the end of these payments in the year 2019.
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Are Public Debts of the German Federal States Influencing their Financial Scope?
Sabine Freye
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 12,
2009
Abstract
The German Federal States have little impact on their budget. Both, revenues and ex-penditures, are basically determined by federal and European law. For a long time, this situation has been causing increasing debts. Today, public debts are again a top issue. The planned federal “debt brake” includes a gradual reduction and an interdiction of structural debts as from 2020. In a short perspective, this means an additional financial limitation to the public budgets. With regard to the described situation, the main question of this paper is: Do the German states actually have financial scope to realize the implementation of the planned “debt brake”? The analyses show that the financial scope for reducing their structural debts is particularly small in the five Federal States benefitting from additional transfers as from 2010. The highest budget restrictions do show the city states Berlin and Bremen.
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