The Maximum Level of Fines Restricts the Effect of European Competition Law
Henry Dannenberg, Nicole Steinat
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
In 2006, the fining guidelines for competition law infringements were completely renewed. The aim of this reform was twofold: on the one hand to decrease the incentive for cartelization and on the other hand to increase the likelihood of cartel detection.
The article studies how company’s decision for or against a cartel is influenced by these guidelines. We show that due to the maximum level of fines – which refers to the worldwide group turnover - an effective deterrence level can be achieved only for those companies, which realize just a small part of their turnover in the relevant market. Their incentive to blow the whistle increases with the cartel duration. This leads to a rising instability of cartels where one member generates only a small part of its turnover in the relevant market. In contrast, the deterrence level for companies that realize a large part of their sales in the relevant market is quite low due to the maximum level of fines.
The article gives a short overview of the risk factor competition law – from a company perspective. We illustrate how the expenditures related to cartel law infringements can be calculated. Further on, the minimum profit margins that are necessary for an economically advantageous cartel are determined. We show that for certain types of cartels already small rates of return are sufficient to make cartel participation attractive.
Read article
Enhanced Cooperation in an Enlarged EU
Götz Zeddies, J. Ahrens, Renate Ohr
Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften,
No. 2,
2007
Abstract
The paper addresses the need for more flexibility in the integration process of the European Union after its recent eastward enlargement. The increasing number of decision-makers and the increasing heterogeneity of economic structures, financial constraints, societal preferences, and political interests impeded political decision making in the EU. In order to avoid a rank growth of integration and yet to strengthen the momentum of flexibility, so-called enhanced cooperation appears to be an appropriate instrument to be applied to the overall integration process. In this context the paper analyzes different possible developments of selected common policies in the EU if enhanced cooperation is practised by a sub-group of EU-members. Based on cluster analysis, similarities and distinctions among the EU members with respect to some specific policy realms are elaborated to identify clusters, or clubs, of countries which may apply the instrument of enhanced cooperation in the specific policy fields.
Read article
Führt die Umsetzung des Programms „Stadtumbau Ost“ zur Herausbildung urbaner Regime in ostdeutschen Städten?
Peter Franz
One-off Publications,
No. 5,
2007
Abstract
Many East German cities are suffering from housing vacancies and depopulation. The federal state has launched a subsidy program “Stadtumbau Ost” (City Reconstruction East) to fight the problems caused by these conditions. Cities getting funds from this subsidy program have installed committees and expert circles for making decisions where in the city to remove housing units. The institutionalisation of these decisional structures besides the established local political system is the starting point of the author to examine if these structures already are qualifying as “urban regimes” an approach primarily developed by US-American political scientists.
Read article
Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation within Multinational Corporations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2006
Abstract
We investigate capital allocation across a firm's divisions that differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the outcome of potential debt renegotiations depends on the liquidation value of assets. However, with diversity in terms of asset tangibility, liquidation proceeds depend on how funds have been allocated across divisions. As diversity can be traced back to institutional differences between countries, we provide a rationale for multidivisional decision- making in an international context. A main finding is that multinationals may be bound to go to certain countries when financiers cannot control the capital allocation.
Read article