Investment and Internal Finance: Asymmetric Information or Managerial Discretion?
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
This paper examines the investment-cash flow sensitivity of publicly listed firms in The Netherlands. Investment-cash flow sensitivities can be attributed to overinvestment resulting from the abuse of managerial discretion, but also to underinvestment due to information problems. The Dutch corporate governance structure presents a number of distinctive features, in particular the limited influence of shareholders, the presence of large blockholders, and the importance of bank ties. We expect that in The Netherlands, the managerial discretion problem is more important than the asymmetric information problem. We use Tobin's Q to discriminate between firms with these problems, where LOW Q firms face the managerial discretion problem and HIGH Q firms the asymmetric information problem. As hypothesized, we find substantially larger investment-cash flow sensitivity for LOW Q firms. Moreover, specifically in the LOW Q sample, we find that firms with higher (bank) debt have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity. This finding shows that leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem.
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Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition
Hans Degryse, Steven Ongena
Journal of Finance,
No. 1,
2005
Abstract
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity. For our study, we employ detailed contract information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan portfolio of a large Belgian bank. We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending. Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and competing banks. Transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe.
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Discrimination of combination wage recipients by municipal labor market policy
Cornelia Lang, Martin T. W. Rosenfeld, Hilmar Schneider
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 13,
2001
Abstract
Die Funktion der sozialen Grundsicherung wird in Deutschland durch die Sozialhilfe und die Arbeitslosenhilfe abgedeckt. Während jedoch die Finanzierung der Arbeitslosenhilfe durch den Bund erfolgt, obliegt die Finanzierung der Sozialhilfe den Kommunen. Dieser Dualismus führt mutmaßlich zur Benachteiligung sogenannter Kombihilfeempfänger im Hinblick auf deren Wiedereingliederung in den Arbeitsmarkt durch Maßnahmen der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Kombihilfeempfänger sind Personen, deren staatlich garantiertes Mindesteinkommen sowohl aus Sozialhilfe als auch aus Arbeitslosenunterstützung besteht. Ihr Einkommensanspruch ist zwar nicht höher als der von reinen Sozialhilfeempfängern, doch die zwischen Bund und Kommunen geteilte Zuständigkeit für dessen Finanzierung erzeugt Anreize zur gegenseitigen Lastenverschiebung....
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