Dynamic Order Submission Strategies with Competition between a Dealer Market and a Crossing Network
Hans Degryse, Mark Van Achter, Gunther Wuyts
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 3,
2009
Abstract
We analyze a dynamic microstructure model in which a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) interact for three informational settings. A key result is that coexistence of trading systems generates systematic patterns in order flow, which depend on the degree of transparency. Further, we study overall welfare, measured by the gains from trade of all agents, and compare it with the maximum overall welfare. The discrepancy between both measures is attributable to two inefficiencies. Due to these inefficiencies, introducing a CN next to a DM, as well as increasing the transparency level, not necessarily produces greater overall welfare.
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Are there Gender-specific Preferences for Location Factors? A Grouped Conditional Logit-model of Interregional Migration Flows in Germany
Lutz Schneider, Alexander Kubis
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 5,
2009
Abstract
The article analyses the question whether women and men differ in their tastes for location factors. The question is answered by quantifying the impact of location characteristics on interregional migration flows across Germany. The analysis is based on a grouped conditional logit approach. We augment the framework by controlling for violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption and for overdispersion. As a result, we find no differences in terms of direction of impact. However, the regressions confirm gender differences in terms of intensity, particularly regarding regional wage levels and the availability of educational institutions.
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Institutions and Clusters
Ulrich Blum
Handbook on Research on Clusters,
2009
Abstract
We show that transaction costs and external economies, which change institutional arrangements heavily, influence cluster structures. Two types of clusters, (i) the vertical cluster where a hub dominates suppliers that have settled in the vicinity and, (ii), the horizontal cluster where firms share a common platform – historically a natural resource, today often knowledge and competences. Furthermore, non-cluster firms exist. We show, in a model, how these types emerge from the interaction found in firms and the interaction of firms within a network system. Changing transaction costs and externalities influence clusters and produce cluster dynamics. The sustainability of a cluster depends on its ability to stabilize the basis of its existence. This is easier for horizontal clusters that can steadily develop their knowledge and competence platform than for a vertical cluster which heavily depends on product life cycles. We give some evidence for clusters in East Germany, which presents an interesting example. The Treuhand atomized the giant combines, so that the rearrangements may be interpreted as results of fundamental market forces. Therefore major influences on the emerging institutional structure should stem from transaction costs and externalities.
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Race to the Market: Can Standards Survive the Acceleration of Innovation and Product Life Cycles?
Ulrich Blum
Spatial Dispersed Production and Network Governance, Papers Presented at the 11th Uddevalla Symposium, 15 – 17. May 2008, Kyoto, Research Report 2008,
2008
Abstract
Plagiarism of emerging market countries has for a considerable time been seen as the main challenge to the western approach of codifying and securing intellectual property rights (IPRs). This neglects the fact that historically all countries which tried to converge to the level of successful economies copied technology. The discussion shadows our view that the more imminent question is whether the steady increase in competition intensity which shortens product life cycles and puts pressure on the invention and innovation system, provides enough time to patent and to standardize. As patent activity not only provides incentives for sinking costs into R&D but is also a first step in the dissemination of technologies, and as standards, especially formal standards, generate level playing fields in broad and reliable markets, this may be critical in the long run. Furthermore, the migration of technologies as a result of a steady reorganization of the spatial division of labor may lead to the adverse situation that countries harboring technologies do not have appropriate institutions for knowledge codification.
Exogenous factors that – at least in the short run – cannot be influenced by the standardization bodies are the level of cooperation among interested parties (and mutual trust and institutional linkage), the competitiveness of the technology, the ability to generate externalities by knowledge codification, and the productivity of the technologies. The most important single success factor that standardization bodies can influence is the speed with which a committee proceeds to timely publish formal standards. With reference to a game-theoretical model and based on data for 1997 and 2007 on published formal standards, we show that until now, standardization bodies seem to have successfully coped with the situation.
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Are European Equity Style Indices Efficient? – An Empirical Quest in Three Essays
Marian Berneburg
Schriften des IWH,
No. 28,
2008
Abstract
Many situations in the history of the stock markets indicate that assets are not always efficiently priced. But why does it matter whether the stock market is efficiently priced? Because “well-functioning financial markets are a key factor to high economic growth”. (Mishkin and Eakins, 2006, pp. 3-4) In three essays, it is the aim of the author to shed some more light on the topic of market efficiency, which is far from being resolved. Since European equity markets have increased in importance globally, the author, instead of focusing on US markets, looks at a unified European equity market. By testing for a random walk in equity prices, revisiting Shiller’s claim of excess volatility through the means of a vector error correction model, and modifying the Gordon-Growth-Model, the book concludes that a small degree of inefficiency cannot be ruled out. While usually European equity markets are pricing assets correctly, some periods (e.g. the late 1990s and early 2000s) show clear signs of mispricing; the hypothesis of a world with two states (regime one, a normal efficient state, and regime two, a state in which markets are more momentum driven) presents a possible explanation.
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Evidence on the effects of inflation on price dispersion under indexation
Juliane Scharff, S. Schreiber
IMK Working Paper, No. 12/2008,
2008
Abstract
Distortionary effects of inflation on relative prices are the main argument for inflation stabilization in macro models with sticky prices. Under indexation of non-optimized prices those models imply a nonlinear and dynamic impact of inflation on the cross-sectional price dispersion (relative-price variability, RPV). Using US sectoral prices we estimate (a generalized form of) the theoretical relationship between inflation and RPV. We confirm the impact of inflation fluctuations but find hitherto neglected endogeneity biases, and our IV and GMM estimates indicate that average (“trend“) inflation is significant for indexation. Lagged inflation is less important.
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Exchange Rates and FDI: Goods versus Capital Market Frictions
Claudia M. Buch, J. Kleinert
World Economy,
forthcoming
Abstract
Changes in exchange rates affect countries through their impact on cross-border activities such as trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). With increasing activities of multinational firms, the FDI channel is likely to gain in importance. Economic theory provides two main explanations why changes in exchange rates can affect FDI. According to the first explanation, FDI reacts to exchange rate changes if there are information frictions on capital markets and if investment depends on firms’ net worth (capital market friction hypothesis). According to the second explanation, FDI reacts to exchange rate changes if output and factor markets are segmented, and if firm-specific assets are important (goods market friction hypothesis). We provide a unified theoretical framework of these two explanations. We analyse the implications of the model empirically using a dataset based on detailed German firm-level data. We find greater support for the goods market than for the capital market friction hypothesis.
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Evaluating the German (New Keynesian) Phillips Curve
Rolf Scheufele
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 10,
2008
Abstract
This paper evaluates the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) and its hybrid
variant within a limited information framework for Germany. The main interest rests on the average frequency of price re-optimization of firms. We use the labor income share as the driving variable and consider a source of real rigidity by allowing for a fixed firm-specific capital stock. A GMM estimation strategy is employed as well as an identification robust method that is based upon the Anderson-Rubin statistic. We find out that the German Phillips Curve is purely forward looking. Moreover, our point estimates are consistent with the view that firms re-optimize prices every two to three quarters. While these estimates seem plausible from an economic point of view, the uncertainties around these estimates are very large and also consistent with perfect nominal price rigidity where firms never re-optimize prices. This analysis also offers some explanations why previous results for the German NKPC based on GMM differ considerably. First, standard GMM results are very sensitive to the way how orthogonality conditions are formulated. Additionally, model misspecifications may be left undetected by conventional J tests. Taken together, this analysis points out
the need for identification robust methods to get reliable estimates for the NKPC.
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Does temporary employment influence the workrelated training of low-skilled employees?
Eva Reinowski, Jan Sauermann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 2,
2008
Abstract
Fixed-term contracts are considerd as one of the most popular instruments of labour market flexibility. Although they provide new labour market options for employer and employees, it is argued that they may lead to decreasing investments in human capital. From the theoretical point of view it is not clear wheter a fixed-term contract is a drawback for the participation in work-related training. The paper deals with the influence of fixed-term contracts on work-related training especially for low-skilled workers. Based on the Micro Census data of 2004, we estimate a bivariate probit model for the probability of fixed-term employment and participating in work-related training. This model enables us to control for selection effects that may arise from unobservable factors. From the estimation results we can conclude that holding a fixed-term contract does not mean a systematical disadvantage for the training probability of low-skilled employees.
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Optimizing knowledge transfer by new employees in companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
Knowledge Management Research and Practice,
No. 4,
2007
Abstract
Companies realize innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. One possible source of innovative ideas are new employees. Based on an existing game-theoretic model the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analyzed. Offering knowledge to a colleague cannot be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives, which motivate the employees to act in favor of the company. The aim of this paper is to show what influences the propensity of the employees to engage in knowledge transfer and how the management can design the incentive structure for optimal transfer. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is at least partly generalized on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: too few or too many developers decrease the remaining company profit. A further result is that depending on the cost structure, perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company.
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