Financial Constraints and Foreign Direct Investment: Firm-level Evidence
Claudia M. Buch, I. Kesternich, A. Lipponer, Monika Schnitzer
Review of World Economics,
No. 2,
2014
Abstract
Low productivity is an important barrier to the cross-border expansion of firms. But firms may also need external finance to shoulder the costs of entering foreign markets. We develop a model of multinational firms facing real and financial barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), and we analyze their impact on the FDI decision. Theoretically, we show that financial constraints can affect highly productive firms more than firms with low productivity because the former are more likely to expand abroad. We provide empirical evidence based on a detailed dataset of German domestic and multinational firms which contains information on parent-level financial constraints as well as on the location the foreign affiliates. We find that financial factors constrain firms’ foreign investment decisions, an effect felt in particular by firms most likely to consider investing abroad. The locational information in our dataset allows exploiting cross-country differences in contract enforcement. Consistent with theory, we find that poor contract enforcement in the host country has a negative impact on FDI decisions.
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Determinants of Illegal Mexican Immigration into the US Southern Border States
A. Buehn, Stefan Eichler
Eastern Economic Journal,
No. 4,
2013
Abstract
We model illegal immigration across the US-Mexico border into Arizona, California, and Texas as an unobservable variable applying a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes model. Using state-level data from 1985 to 2004, we test the incentives and deterrents influencing illegal immigration. Better labor market conditions in a US state and worse in Mexico encourage illegal immigration while more intense border enforcement deters it. Estimating the state-specific inflow of illegal Mexican immigrants we find that the 1994/95 peso crisis in Mexico led to significant increases in illegal immigration. US border enforcement policies in the 1990s provided temporary relief while post-9/11 re-enforcement has reduced illegal immigration.
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Equity Home Bias and Corporate Disclosure
Stefan Eichler
Journal of International Money and Finance,
No. 5,
2012
Abstract
I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.
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Macroeconomic Challenges in the Euro Area and the Acceding Countries
Katja Drechsel
Dissertation, Online-Publikation,
2010
Abstract
The conduct of effective economic policy faces a multiplicity of macroeconomic challenges, which requires a wide scope of theoretical and empirical analyses. With a focus on the European Union, this doctoral dissertation consists of two parts which make empirical and methodological contributions to the literature on forecasting real economic activity and on the analysis of business cycles in a boom-bust framework in the light of the EMU enlargement. In the first part, we tackle the problem of publication lags and analyse the role of the information flow in computing short-term forecasts up to one quarter ahead for the euro area GDP and its main components. A huge dataset of monthly indicators is used to estimate simple bridge equations. The individual forecasts are then pooled, using different weighting schemes. To take into consideration the release calendar of each indicator, six forecasts are compiled successively during the quarter. We find that the sequencing of information determines the weight allocated to each block of indicators, especially when the first month of hard data becomes available. This conclusion extends the findings of the recent literature. Moreover, when combining forecasts, two weighting schemes are found to outperform the equal weighting scheme in almost all cases. In the second part, we focus on the potential accession of the new EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe to the euro area. In contrast to the discussion of Optimum Currency Areas, we follow a non-standard approach for the discussion on abandonment of national currencies the boom-bust theory. We analyse whether evidence for boom-bust cycles is given and draw conclusions whether these countries should join the EMU in the near future. Using a broad range of data sets and empirical methods we document credit market imperfections, comprising asymmetric financing opportunities across sectors, excess foreign currency liabilities and contract enforceability problems both at macro and micro level. Furthermore, we depart from the standard analysis of comovements of business cycles among countries and rather consider long-run and short-run comovements across sectors. While the results differ across countries, we find evidence for credit market imperfections in Central and Eastern Europe and different sectoral reactions to shocks. This gives favour for the assessment of the potential euro accession using this supplementary, non-standard approach.
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Environmental Protection and the Private Provision of International Public Goods
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher, Dirk T. G. Rübbelke, E. Sheshinski
Economica,
2010
Abstract
International environmental protection like the combat of global warming exhibits properties of public goods. In the international arena, no coercive authority exists that can enforce measures to overcome free-rider incentives. Therefore decentralized negotiations between individual regions serve as an approach to pursue efficient international environmental protection. We propose a scheme which is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. The negotiating entities offer side-payments to counterparts in order to influence their taxation of polluting consumption. Side-payments, in turn, are self-financed by means of externality-correcting taxes. As we show, a Pareto-efficient outcome can be attained.
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Smuggling Illegal versus Legal Goods across the U.S.-Mexico Border: A Structural Equations Model Approach
A. Buehn, Stefan Eichler
Southern Economic Journal,
No. 2,
2009
Abstract
We study the smuggling of illegal and legal goods across the U.S.-Mexico border from 1975 to 2004. Using a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model we test the microeconomic determinants of both smuggling types and reveal their trends. We find that illegal goods smuggling decreased from $116 billion in 1984 to $27 billion in 2004 as a result of improved labor market conditions in Mexico and intensified U.S. border enforcement. Smuggling legal goods is motivated by tax and tariff evasion. While export misinvoicing fluctuated at low levels, import misinvoicing switched from underinvoicing to overinvoicing after Mexico's accession to the GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) induced lower tariffs.
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Der lange Schatten des Sozialismus: Folgen für die Wirtschaftspolitik in Ostdeutschland
Ulrich Blum
List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik,
2008
Abstract
East Germany’s economy growth was not able to close, over the last ten years, the lag against the West German economy. This paper inquires into the economic reasons, especially those that can be traced in history. It is shown that the exodus of elites from what was Central Germany started in the 1930s because of the persecution of the Jewish elites. During the period after the Second World War until the construction of the wall in 1961 especially young and qualified people left the Soviet Zone and later the G.D.R. Thus, the elites destroyed in the Third Reich and the Second World War could not be replaced exogenously. In the 1970s, an inadequate economic system destroyed the still existing industrial middle class which was an important base of productivity and helped to generate foreign income because of its export intensity to the Western countries. This generated a current account crisis which was only overcome by a loan from West Germany, the so-called “Strauß-Kredit”. In 1988, however, the fundamental problems again became visible and enforced a change of the economic system. The privatisation strategy by the Treuhand by and large did not sell or restitute enterprises but sold plants out of the fragmented combines. Today, the visible deficit in headquarter function is the most important single obstacle against growth and wealth in the New Lander. It can be expected that this will only disappear within a new technology cycle.
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On the Rationale of Leniency Programs: a Game-Theoretical Analysis
Ulrich Blum, Nicole Steinat, Michael A. Veltins
European Journal of Law and Economics,
2008
Abstract
In order to enhance the enforcement of Antitrust Law, leniency policies were introduced in nearly all industrialized countries. These programs aim at deterring and eliminating cartels. In this paper we analyze the rationale of the current European and German leniency regulation. We challenge the contemporary view that the standard leniency privilege is incentive-compatible with respect to its aim to enhance competition. Instead, we argue for it to be used as a preemptive strike against competitors under circumstances where cartels become unstable. This implies a tightening of markets in subsequent periods and, thus, a potential reduction in competition intensity. Given strategic reasoning by agents, the principal witness may assure an economically privileged position in the future. This consequence might not be intended by the bonus regulations. Nevertheless if the leniency policies lead to more competition in the market the results should be welcomed by the national cartel offices. We give anecdotal evidence of the German cement case and base our arguments on a game-theoretical model.
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Preventing Innovative Cooperations: The Legal Exemptions Unintended Side Effect
Christian Growitsch, Nicole Nulsch, Margarethe Rammerstorfer
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 6,
2008
Abstract
In 2004, European competition law had been faced with considerable changes due to the introduction of the new Council Regulation No. 1/2003. One of the major renewals was the replacement of the centralized notification system for inter-company cooperations in favor of a so-called legal exemption system. We analyze the implications of this reform on the agreements firms implement. In contrast to previous research we focus on the reform’s impact on especially welfare enhancing, namely innovative agreements. We show that the law’s intention to reduce the incentive to establish illegal cartels will be reached. However, by the same mechanism, also highly innovative cooperations might be prevented. To avoid this unintended effect, we conclude that only fines but not the monitoring activities should be increased in order to deter illegal but not innovative agreements.
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