Risikomanagements als Werttreiber: Volks- und betriebswirtschaftliche Perspektive
Ulrich Blum, Werner Gleißner
Wertorientiertes Management,
2006
Abstract
The article inquires how risk and its management directly influence ther wealth of nations and the performance of enterprises. The sources of wealth, especially trade and externalities, are rellated to risk as is its impact on the economic value of the firm. Fundamental methods to control risk as a method of increasing shareholder value are proposed.
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International Trade in and Production of Primary Commodities: Interventions to Improve the Position of Countries and Firms in the Global Value Chain - An Introduction
Tobias Knedlik
African Development Perspectives Yearbook, No. 11,
2006
Abstract
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Longterm development of return on assets – an empirical panel data analysis
Olaf Neubert
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
One of the basic propositions of economic theory is the fact that competition does not allow permanent very high or very low returns. But how can the permanent surplus gain of a monopolist be distinguished from innovation gains? In which markets is a regulatory interference necessary? Contrary to the static analysis, the concept of dynamic competition explicitly considers the temporal development of return and gain. An entrepreneur can achieve an advantage over the competitors through new products or new production processes. Hence arising innovation gains function as incentives for imitators to join the development which in turn leads to a reduction of the surplus gains. Thus, these gains are not contradictory to an effective competition. On the basis of annual balance sheets of German firms, this article analyses the temporal development of returns on assets. It is to evaluate whether the adaptation process assumed by Schumpeter that matches very high and very low gains with a longterm level can be confirmed, and how fast this process works. The average industry returns of the manufacturing industry show a convergence to a longterm level. During this process, an average of 40% of the deviation from the longterm level are melted every year. However, the analysis of company returns shows longterm differences. The adaptation rate of companies, 50%, is significantly higher compared to the industry value. The analysis of the connection between the adaptation rate and the longterm return level of companies proves that companies which face above-average competition strength obtain a higher longterm return level than other companies. When firms operate within markets with high stress of competition they do not achieve below-average returns but rather significantly above-average returns in the long term.
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Asset Tangibility and Capital Allocation within Multinational Corporations
Diemo Dietrich
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 4,
2006
Abstract
We investigate capital allocation across a firm's divisions that differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the outcome of potential debt renegotiations depends on the liquidation value of assets. However, with diversity in terms of asset tangibility, liquidation proceeds depend on how funds have been allocated across divisions. As diversity can be traced back to institutional differences between countries, we provide a rationale for multidivisional decision- making in an international context. A main finding is that multinationals may be bound to go to certain countries when financiers cannot control the capital allocation.
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Unit labor costs and competitiveness - a micro econometric analysis for East Germany
Harald Lehmann
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 180,
2003
Abstract
The paper stresses the value of unit labour costs as an indicator of competitiveness. It is assumed that there are different advantages by using microeconomic data which additionally allow the use of panelregressive methods. The findings for East German enterprises in the manufacturing industry (1998 to 2000) are that unit labour cost are useful for explaining the profit rate. This indicates that East German firms are facing in-price competition which depends clearly of labour costs. But unit labour costs do not explain the success on supraregional markets which are marked by non-in-price competition.
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Enterprise-related services in East-Germany – an investigation of the service sector statistics
Siegfried Beer
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 12,
2003
Abstract
According to the national accounts in East Germany, the enterprise-related services have developed substantielly since 1990. This is expressed by the average annual increase of real gross value added of 9.5% (GDP: 4.9%) until 2000. According to the newly introduced service sector statistics (for 2000), firms in the East German enterprise related services have on average 9 employes, and thus, they are only slightly smaller than enterprises in West-Germany. Much bigger differences appear with respect to the average sales and productivity (60% or 45%). Various explanations exist. One major reason obviously is, that enterprises in East-Germany make smaller sales because of the clearly smaller size of enterprises which demand these services. Furthermore the smaller earning power of services demanding enterprises, differences in the branch structur of enterprise related services, and administrative regulations for prices play a role.
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A revised theory of contestable markets : applied on the German telecommunication sector
Christian Growitsch, Thomas Wein
External Publications,
No. 275,
2002
Abstract
Despite the scepticism raised by the German Monopoly Commission our analysis shows that the revised theory of contestable markets can be applied to the telecommunications market better than expected. The original contestable market theory implied three assumptions necessary to be satisfied to establish potential competition: Free market entry, market exit is possible without any costs, and the price adjustment lag exceeds the entry lag. Our analysis shows that if the incumbent reduces its prices slowly (high adjustment lag) and the market entry can be performed quickly (low entry lag), a new competitor will be able to earn back sunk costs. Therefore it is not necessary that all three conditions are satisfied for potential competition to exist. We applied the ‘revised’ contestable market theory to the German telecommunication market and have been able to clearly identify the value added stages in which regulation is required. Under the present conditions local loops - which can be determined as natural monopolies - are not contestable due to sunk costs, high entry lags expected and a probable short price adjustment lag. Local loops can be identified as monopolistic bottlenecks therefore. Regional and local connection networks should also be regulated because a high entry lag and a low price adjustment lag have to be expected as well as current competition does not exist today. The national connection network shows current competition between several network providers; hence regulation can be abolished in this field. Assumed that network access is regulated, services can be supplied by several competing firms.
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Productivity gap of East German industry: A summarizing evaluation
Joachim Ragnitz
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 7,
2001
Abstract
Ten years after German unification labor productivity in the New Laender reaches only 70 per cent of West German levels. Further, in the second half of the 1990ies, convergence did not continue. Because productivity can be regarded as a key for wages, for competitiveness of firms and for future transfer payments, the reasons for low productivity in East Germany are of major importance. In this article, it is argued that the existing productivity gap reflects mainly structural differences between East and West Germany, that is the high share of small firms and the predominance of sectors with low value added per worker. Additionally, difficulties on product markets leading to insufficient selling prices are responsible for the comparative low productivity of East German firms. Differences in capital intensity or in human capital, however, do explain only a small part of the productivity gap.
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Methodical limits of calculating productivity in the new Länder
Gerald Müller
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 129,
2000
Abstract
The „Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung der Länder“ now publishes figures concerning the value added in Germany. Formerly the Statistische Bundesamt had this assignment. Some corporations have plant locations in the new Länder as well as in the old Länder. The employed method for splitting-up the value added produce by these corporations might lead to an underestimation of the overall value added produced in the new Länder. However, an estimation using the firm panel of the IAB shows that the East German productivity gap for manufacturing is overestimated by maximally two percentage points. Still in sectors that are dominated by multi plant corporations this effect is stronger. All in all the East German productivity gab is overestimated by maximally three percentage points.
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