Drivers of Effort: Evidence from Employee Absenteeism
Morten Bennedsen, Margarita Tsoutsoura, Daniel Wolfenzon
Journal of Financial Economics,
No. 3,
2019
Abstract
We use detailed information on individual absent spells of all employees in 4140 firms in Denmark to show large differences in average absenteeism across firms. Using employees who switch firms, we decompose days absent into an individual component (e.g., motivation, work ethic) and a firm component (e.g., incentives, corporate culture). We find the firm component explains 50%–60% of the difference in absenteeism across firms, with the individual component explaining the rest. We present suggestive evidence of the mechanisms behind the firm effect with family firm status and concentrated ownership strongly correlated with decreases in absenteeism. We also analyze the firm characteristics that correlate with the individual effect and find that firms with stronger career incentives attract lower-absenteeism employees.
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Improving Hartz IV after the Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court
Joachim Wilde
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 8,
2008
Abstract
In 2005, the assistance for the long-term unemployed in Germany was restructured by the so-called „Hartz IV reform“. An important part of the reform was to replace the former different administrations by a single institution. However, in December 2007, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the new institution is not consistent with the constitutional law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, a reform of the institution or a change of the constitutional law is necessary.
Different reform ideas have been proposed. However, all of them only solve the juristic problem. Not one single reform tries to improve the system. Therefore, the article introduces a new concept of incentive ethics. It shows how the dependency on benefits can be left out by allocating so-called moral goods to the long-term unemployed. A first empirical result supports the concept. Pilot projects should be conducted to get more valid results.
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Konzept der Anreizethik zur Weiterentwicklung der sozialen Grundsicherung nach Hartz IV
Joachim Wilde
Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik,
2007
Abstract
Reforms of benefits for long-term unemployed in Germany are usually discussed in terms of workfare and financial incentives. This paper broadens the discussion with a concept of incentive ethics. It analyzes how the dependency on benefits can be left out by allocating so-called moral goods to the longterm unemployed. Comparing the new concept with the last reform ("Hartz IV"), the shortcomings of this reform are revealed. Thus, the paper concludes with a new reform proposal.
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A Concept of Incentive Ethics for the Enhancement of the Social Financial Security According to Hartz IV
Joachim Wilde
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
Reforms of benefits for long-term unemployed in Germany are usually discussed in
terms of workfare and financial incentives. This paper broadens the discussion with a concept of incentive ethics. It analyzes how the dependency on benefits can be left out by allocating so-called moral goods to the long-term unemployed. Comparing the new concept with the last reform (“Hartz IV“), the shortcomings of this reform are revealed. Thus, the paper concludes with a new reform proposal.
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Non-market Allocation in Transport: A Reassessment of its Justification and the Challenge of Institutional Transition
Ulrich Blum
50 Years of Transport Research: Experiences Gained and Major Challenges Ahead,
2005
Abstract
Economic theory knows two systems of coordination: through public choice or through the market principle. If the market is chosen, then it may either be regulated, or it may be fully competitive (or be in between these two extremes). This paper first inquires into the reasons for regulation, it analyses the reasons for the important role of government in the transportation sector, especially in the procurement of infrastructure. Historical reasons are seen as important reasons for bureaucratic objections to deregulation. Fundamental economic concepts are forwarded that suggest market failure and justify a regulatory environment. The reasons for regulation cited above, however, may be challenged; we forward theoretical concepts from industrial organization theory and from institutional economics which suggest that competition is even possible on the level of infrastructure. The transition from a strongly regulated to a competitive environment poses problems that have given lieu to numerous failures in privatization and deregulation. Structural inertia plays an important role, and the incentive-compatible management of infrastructure is seen as the key element of any liberal transportation policy. It requires that the setting of rules on the meta level satisfies both local and global efficiency ends. We conclude that, in market economies, competition and regulation should not be substitutes but complements. General rules, an "ethic of competition" have to be set that guarantee a level playing field to agents; it is complimented by institutions that provide arbitration in case of misconduct.
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