Das Grundeinkommen - Potenziale und Grenzen eines Reformvorschlags
Ingmar Kumpmann
Wirtschaftsdienst,
No. 9,
2006
Abstract
Currently the idea of introducing a Basic Income is politically debated. A Basic Income is “an income paid by a political community to all its members, without means test or consideration” (Vanderborght/Van Parijs). It would replace the existing tax and welfare schemes which guarantee the subsistence levels for all individuals. The Basic Income would prevent poverty, simplify the tax and social security system and disburden labour from the costs of social security. It would put an end to the highly problematic governmental controls concerning the ability and willingness of the unemployed to work. The main challenges of the proposal are the difficulty of funding and the danger of reduced labour incentives, problems which limit the possibility for implementing the model.
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Institutional settings of social assistance: What is improved or unsolved by the
Joachim Wilde
Institutionen und Arbeitsmarkt: Messkonzepte, Wirkungszusammenhänge und internationaler Vergleich,
2006
Abstract
The last reform of benefits for long-term unemployed in Germany ("Hartz IV") did not reduce costs. Moreover, the number of recipients is much higher than it was expected before. Therefore, the institutional settings might be less effective than they could be. Initially, the paper describes the institutional changes by the "Hartz IV" reform. Afterwards, these changes are evaluated with respect to their effects on the number of recipients. The evaluation is based on the results of econometric studies concerning the former social assistance. It is pointed out that the reform improved basic conditions and incentives only partly, whereas some of its elements worsened the institutional settings.
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Longterm development of return on assets – an empirical panel data analysis
Olaf Neubert
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
One of the basic propositions of economic theory is the fact that competition does not allow permanent very high or very low returns. But how can the permanent surplus gain of a monopolist be distinguished from innovation gains? In which markets is a regulatory interference necessary? Contrary to the static analysis, the concept of dynamic competition explicitly considers the temporal development of return and gain. An entrepreneur can achieve an advantage over the competitors through new products or new production processes. Hence arising innovation gains function as incentives for imitators to join the development which in turn leads to a reduction of the surplus gains. Thus, these gains are not contradictory to an effective competition. On the basis of annual balance sheets of German firms, this article analyses the temporal development of returns on assets. It is to evaluate whether the adaptation process assumed by Schumpeter that matches very high and very low gains with a longterm level can be confirmed, and how fast this process works. The average industry returns of the manufacturing industry show a convergence to a longterm level. During this process, an average of 40% of the deviation from the longterm level are melted every year. However, the analysis of company returns shows longterm differences. The adaptation rate of companies, 50%, is significantly higher compared to the industry value. The analysis of the connection between the adaptation rate and the longterm return level of companies proves that companies which face above-average competition strength obtain a higher longterm return level than other companies. When firms operate within markets with high stress of competition they do not achieve below-average returns but rather significantly above-average returns in the long term.
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Network investment and the threat of regulation: avoiding monopoly or infrastructure extension
Christian Growitsch, Niels Krap
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 5,
2006
Abstract
In summer 2005, Deutsche Telekom announced its plans for the buildup of a new fiber glass network. At the same time, it formulated the condition that this network was not to be regulated concerning pricing or use by other providers (network access). In order to make this investment possible, in its coalition treaty the big coalition agreed to exclude the new network from the ex-ante regulation and to include this freedom from regulation in the telecommunication law. The question is now how investments can be facilitated and, at the same time, welfare losses through monopoly gains can be avoided. Applying game theory, it can be shown that a regulation authority like the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’, which is responsible for German telecommunication sector, should signal an increasing tolerance for deviations from its calculated and determined regulatory price in the face of increasing uncertainty concerning expected cost and returns. Thus, the threat of regulation alone leads to tolerable prices, without the actual regulation taking place. In the future, the ‘Bundesnetzagentur’ should reduce information asymmetries and the optimal level of tolerance in order to achieve a more precise intervention price and a more effective threat of regulation. The effectiveness of such a threat decreases if the legislation prevents the regulation authority from using this instrument by law. Against this background, the recent Federal Government resolution from March 17th 2006 noveling the telecommunication law heads for the economically right direction but it has to prove its incentive compatibility in the daily legal practice.
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A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Conditions of Knowledge Transfer by New Employees in Companies
Sidonia vonLedebur
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 3,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. Companies realise innovations by creating and implementing new knowledge. Sources of innovative ideas are partners in the production network but also new employees coming from another company or academia. Based on a model by HECKATHORN (1996) the conditions of efficient knowledge transfer in a team are analysed. Offering knowledge to a colleague can not be controlled directly by the company due to information asymmetries. Thus the management has to provide incentives which motivate the employees to act in favour of the company by providing their knowledge to the rest of the team and likewise to learn from colleagues. The game theoretic analysis aims at investigating how to arrange these incentives efficiently. Several factors are relevant, especially the individual costs of participating in the transfer. These consist mainly of the existing absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere. The model is a 2x2 game but is at least partly generalised on more players. The relevance of the adequate team size is shown: more developers may increase the total profit of an innovation
(before paying the involved people) but when additional wages are paid to each person a greater team decreases the remaining company profit. A further result is
that depending on the cost structure perfect knowledge transfer is not always best for the profit of the company. These formal results are consistent with empirical studies to the absorptive capacity and the working atmosphere.
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Hartz IV: not enough learned from welfare
Joachim Wilde
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 2,
2006
Abstract
The so-called “Hartz IV reform“ should improve the system of services and benefits for the long-term unemployed in Germany. Thus, it was expected that the number of recipients and the volume of expenditures will decrease. However, both are higher than before. Therefore, the institutional settings might be less effective than they could be. Initially, the paper describes the institutional changes by the “Hartz IV“ reform. Afterwards, these changes are evaluated with respect to their effects on the number of recipients. The evaluation is based on the results of econometric studies concerning the former social assistance. It is pointed out that the reform improved basic conditions and incentives only partly, whereas some of its elements worsened the institutional settings.
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Conditions of knowledge transfer of new staff members in companies – a game theoretical analysis -
Sidonia vonLedebur
Wirtschaft im Wandel,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
The availability of knowledge is an essential factor for an economy in global competition. New knowledge is often produced at a different place from its implementation. Thus knowledge transfer is necessary. One possible transfer channel is the employment of people with distinct knowledge not yet available in a company. This study analyses the conditions of efficient transfer of new employees in companies with a game-theoretic model.
It is shown that a high additional reward in relation to the additional effort necessary for knowledge transfer enhances the transfer. But other incentives play a significant role as well, e.g. an adequate team size and a good working atmosphere.
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A Concept of Incentive Ethics for the Enhancement of the Social Financial Security According to Hartz IV
Joachim Wilde
IWH Discussion Papers,
No. 1,
2006
Abstract
Reforms of benefits for long-term unemployed in Germany are usually discussed in
terms of workfare and financial incentives. This paper broadens the discussion with a concept of incentive ethics. It analyzes how the dependency on benefits can be left out by allocating so-called moral goods to the long-term unemployed. Comparing the new concept with the last reform (“Hartz IV“), the shortcomings of this reform are revealed. Thus, the paper concludes with a new reform proposal.
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Determinants of employment - the macroeconomic view
Christian Dreger, Heinz P. Galler, Ulrich (eds) Walwai
Schriften des IWH,
No. 22,
2005
Abstract
The weak performance of the German labour market over the past years has led to a significant unemployment problem. Currently, on average 4.5 mio. people are without a job contract, and a large part of them are long-term unemployed. A longer period of unemployment reduces their employability and aggravates the problem of social exclusion.
The factors driving the evolution of employment have been recently discussed on the workshop Determinanten der Beschäftigung – die makroökonomische Sicht organized jointly by the IAB, Nuremberg, and the IWH, Halle. The present volume contains the papers and proceedings to the policy oriented workshop held in November 2004, 15-16th. The main focus of the contributions is twofold. First, macroeconomic conditions to stimulate output and employment are considered. Second, the impacts of the increasing tax wedge between labour costs and the take home pay are emphasized. In particular, the role of the contributions to the social security system is investigated.
In his introductory address, Ulrich Walwei (IAB) links the unemployment experience to the modest path of economic growth in Germany. In addition, the low employment intensity of GDP growth and the temporary standstill of the convergence process of the East German economy have contributed to the weak labour market performance. In his analysis, Gebhard Flaig (ifo Institute, München) stresses the importance of relative factor price developments. A higher rate of wage growth leads to a decrease of the employment intensity of production, and correspondingly to an increase of the threshold of employment. Christian Dreger (IWH) discusses the relevance of labour market institutions like employment protection legislation and the structure of the wage bargaining process on the labour market outcome. Compared to the current setting, policies should try to introduce more flexibility in labour markets to improve the employment record. The impact of interest rate shocks on production is examined by the paper of Boris Hofmann (Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt). According to the empirical evidence, monetary policy cannot explain the modest economic performance in Germany. György Barabas and Roland Döhrn (RWI Essen) have simulated the effects of a world trade shock on output and employment. The relationships have been fairly stable over the past years, even in light of the increasing globalization. Income and employment effects of the German tax reform in 2000 are discussed by Peter Haan and Viktor Steiner (DIW Berlin). On the base of a microsimulation model, household gains are determined. Also, a positive relationship between wages and labour supply can be established. Michael Feil und Gerd Zika (IAB) have examined the employment effects of a reduction of the contribution rates to the social security system. To obtain robust results, the analysis is done under alternative financing scenarios and with different macroeconometric models. The impacts of allowances of social security contributions on the incentives to work are discussed by Wolfgang Meister and Wolfgang Ochel (ifo München). According to their study, willingness to work is expected to increase especially at the lower end of the income distribution. The implied loss of contributions could be financed by higher taxes.
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